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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Man makes monarchies and establishes republics, but the township is a gift from the hand of 
God -Alexis Tocqueville 
 
 
Local government and local participation are integral and fundamental components of 
American democracy. From their founding days, local governments have been an avenue in which 
individuals could engage in political participation and practice self-government. Through this 
process, citizens can develop a deeper understanding of democracy and the democratic process.   
In his observations of early America, Tocqueville (2003) observes that “political life took 
root” in local governments (78). It was in town hall meetings that citizens gathered to discuss 
policies that impacted their respective localities. Echoing Tocqueville, Mill (1971) explains that 
local governments are “schools of democracy,” providing a myriad of opportunities for 
participation and for nurturing an understanding of democratic values. Participation, Mill (1963) 
argues, should be “practiced” at the local level and is the only way “the people will ever learn how 
to exercise it on a larger scale” (186).  
Tocqueville (2003) emphasizes that citizens are involved in local government “because he 
helps to run it” (82). This suggests that local elections are essential to American democracy for 
two reasons. First, they provide participatory opportunities. Local elections are held regularly and 
frequently. Voting in local elections allows citizens to assert their policy preferences and their 
voices heard. Second, local elections are the way in which citizens govern their localities. The 
winners at the ballot box impact localities in three ways. First, it directly alters or sustains the 
composition of local governing boards. Second and related to the first, it determines what public 
policies that are pursued. Third, it influences the quality of local government services. This directly 
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impacts citizens’ daily lives. By casting a ballot, citizens hold elected officials accountable for 
decisions made while in office. The act of voting, then, is the primary method of influencing local 
government.  
  Despite the importance and potential impact of voting, voter turnout is not high at any level 
of American government. This is particularly true in local elections. At the national level, voter 
turnout in the United States is low compared to other industrialized democracies (Powell 1980; 
Powell 1986), and voter turnout for local elections is abysmal (Bullock 1990; Verba et al. 1995; 
Sharp 2003).  
In local elections, eligible voters are inundated with a variety of additional complexities in 
order to cast a ballot. These difficulties - existing only at the local level - increase the cost of voting 
and the burden placed on the voter. For example, local elections are often held at different times 
of the year than national or statewide elections. Most local elections are non-concurrent (off-year 
or odd numbered year) elections and/or held during non-traditional months, such as May. Holding 
elections non-concurrently is a primary reason for low voter turnout at the local level (Wood 2002; 
Hajnal and Lewis 2003). When an election is held non-concurrently, the public tends to pay less 
attention to it and fewer resources are dedicated to turnout efforts (Hajnal and Lewis 2003).  
Aside from the timing of elections, there is consensus in urban literature that two 
institutional structures, which are a result of the reforms, have a negative impact on turnout. Both 
nonpartisan elections and council-manager forms of government decrease voter turnout (Wood 
2002; Karning and Walters 1983; Alford and Lee 1968). This is especially prevalent in non-
concurrent elections (Hajnal and Lewis 2003).  
While it has been argued that low turnout can be an indicator of satisfaction and stability 
in a democracy (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Weisberg and Grofman 1981), it can also 
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be a sign of an unhealthy democracy. High participation ensures that public policies will reflect 
the will of the people and not the interests of a select few (Hudson 2010). As Lijphart (1997) points 
out, “unequal participation spells unequal influence” (1). Low voter turnout could create a bias in 
the system as political participation influences ‘who gets what’ (Crosnell paraphrased in Sharp 
2003), and ‘who gets what’ is often a zero-sum game in local politics (Kaufmann 2007). Moreover, 
local governments with high political participation have better policy congruence between the 
public and office holders (Verba and Nie 1972; Hansen 1975; Berry, Portney, and Thomson 1993). 
If high participation is essential for a healthy democracy, what can be done to encourage voters to 
vote more often?  
One solution offered by scholars is for polities to lower the cost of voting. In theory, if the 
costs of voting are reduced, then voter turnout should increase (Downs 1957; Aldrich 1993). One 
approach to reducing the costs of voting would be for the governing systems to alter their election 
laws. Election laws dictate the time, place, or manner of conducting elections, such as early voting 
laws, absentee ballot laws, same day voter registration, etc. Polities with election laws that lower 
the costs of voting, or lower the burdens placed on the voter, are characterized as having liberal 
voting laws. Similarly, polities that have election laws that increase the costs of voting, or increase 
the burden of voting, are considered to have conservative voting laws. These types of laws are 
more restrictive in nature as the voter often has a higher cost associated with casting a ballot.  
Scholars have posited that states with liberalized voting laws have higher turnout rates than 
states with more conservative voting laws (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1980; Powell 
1986; Teixeira 1987). Empirical evidence supports this assertion. Political systems with more 
conservative voting laws have lower turnout rates (Rusk 1970; Converse 1972; Powell 1980; 
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Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira 1987; Jackman 1987; Dubin and Kalsow 
1996; Timpone 1998). This suggests that election laws directly influence voter turnout.  
A specific election law that is perceived to lower the cost of voting is early voting. Over 
half of the states have adopted some method of early voting. The various methods of early voting 
laws will be discussed in more detail below. The variety of early voting laws found among the 
states allows scholars to examine the impact that each method has on voter turnout at different 
levels of government. In this study, I seek to determine how in-person early voting, a specific type 
of early voting, affects voter turnout in local elections. The next section highlights the significance 
of local governments in American political life. 
Importance of Local Government   
Local governments have been and still are a significant and fundamental part of democracy 
in America. The reason for this is twofold: 1) local governments are an indispensable element of 
American democracy and 2) an important American philosophy is one of localism. 
First, localities are an indispensable element of American democracy because they help 
maintain security. Mill (1963) illustrates this when he asserts that localities are the “safety-valve 
of democracy” (186). The independence granted to local governments prevents despotism (Syed 
1966). Similarly, Tocqueville (2003) states that “the strength of free nations resides in the 
township…Without town institutions a nation can establish a free government, but has not the 
spirit of freedom” (73). Tocqueville suggests that it is only through local governments - and the 
institutions that compromise them - that a nation can experience genuine freedom. Localities not 
only develop democracy, according to Tocqueville, but also sustain it (Gannett 2005). Localities 
sustain American democracy because they are the oldest form of government, they are the 
governing system closest to the people, they protect and promote democracy, and they foster 
political participation.  
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Citizens have a strongly held belief that they ought to manage their own affairs. This belief 
stems from the notion that sovereignty resides ultimately with the people. The subsequent outcome 
of this creed is a deep and meaningful attachment to their community. This attachment is the basis 
of localism advanced by Thomas Jefferson.  
Jefferson was the first champion of local government. He believed that the smaller the 
locality, the more likely it was to be democratic (Syed 1966). Democracy, according to Jefferson, 
thrives in small homogenous units of government because it better promotes and cultivates 
political participation and an interest in politics. Smaller units of government were more effective 
at addressing the needs and demands of its citizens, thereby making them more efficient.  
The Jeffersonian ideal is still an inherent and central part of American political tradition 
(Rourke 1964; Syed 1966). His idea of localism underscores the right of localities to self-govern 
“as an expression of the sovereignty of the individual, derived from the doctrine of the sovereignty 
of the people” (Syed 1966, 5). This sovereignty is the basis for the autonomy found in local 
governments. The self-governing nature of local governments compels citizens to play a large role 
in the direction of public policies as well as who is elected as the decision makers. For example, 
citizens have direct influence on determining policy issues, such as park locations, trash collection, 
and the quality of public schools. Citizens can participate and advance their policy stances on any 
of these issues by attending meetings, voting, contacting their elected officials, etc. Accordingly, 
citizens develop a political attachment to their community by doing so.  
Progressive Reforms 
As the population in the United States expanded, “cities were no longer occasional 
aberrations set in a cluster of comfortable commercial centers and flourishing farm communities-
they had become typical, a chosen way of life” (Wood 1979, 34). The development of and 
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movement to cities produced its own set of troubles. The most predominant problems that emerged 
at the local level were government corruption and the control party machines exhibited both in and 
out of government.  
It appeared that the Jeffersonian ideal of a “republic-in-miniature” had vanished. The wave 
of migration to cities revealed the need for the provision of services that local governments failed 
to offer ((Welch and Bledsoe 1988, Chapter 1; Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). Party 
machines seized the opportunity and stepped in to deliver these services, which were mainly social 
services, such as jobs, food, and/or money to those in need or new residents. In return, these 
individuals provided a vote, which helped the party secure seats in office. The party machine even 
assisted local businesses by offering avenues for business growth and development (Welch and 
Bledsoe 1988, Chapter 1; Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). Because the party machine 
controlled government, it could, for the right price per se, furnish a business with items such as 
liquor licenses and/or government contracts.    
The party machine flourished until the early 20th Century. While there had always been 
reform voices present, they often failed to make their desired impact on government. However, the 
Progressive Era gave birth to a reform movement that affected all levels of government. Reformers 
highlighted the corruption found in American politics and businesses. They were able to 
successfully pass reforms at the national and state level that included popular election of U.S. 
Senators, the initiative and referendum, the regulation of liquor sales, the elimination of child 
labor, and the establishment of the Food and Drug Administration (Welch and Bledsoe 1988). In 
1984, the National Municipal League was formed, which encouraged cities to engage in good 
government practices (Welch and Bledsoe 1988). 
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In particular, reformers advocated for a myriad of policy changes at the local level. First, 
they believed that local government would be more efficient if it was run like a business and by 
experts (Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). To achieve this efficiency, they pushed for city 
managers. Second, they proposed the non-partisan ballot, which removed any form of party 
identification on the ballot (Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). Without party identification 
on the ballot, they argued, voters would be able to make better decisions because they would think 
about the interests of the city as a whole and not just the political interests asserted by the party 
machine. Likewise, reformers also recommended at large elections instead of district (or ward) 
elections (Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). They believed candidates in an at large election 
would appeal to the needs of the entire city and not just the needs of a single district. 
In essence, proponents of the reforms sought to eliminate political corruption and restore 
good governance within the American political system. Because of the sovereign nature of local 
governments, localities determined which policies, if any, to adopt. Therefore, not every local 
government adopted the policies advocated by the reformers. These localities are commonly 
referred to as non-reform cities. The local governments that adopted reform policies are known as 
reform cities.  
The reforms are the principal reason for the variation of local government structures and 
local electoral systems. The governmental structures of reform cities tend to have weak political 
organization because they have adopted at least one of the following measures: non-partisan 
elections, non-concurrent elections, at-large districts, and/or a council-manager form of 
government. Aside from the lack of political organization, by having a manager there is likely an 
absence of a mayoral candidate on the ballot. Therefore, it is difficult for citizens to blame 
government failures on a specific elected individual. In at-large district elections, voters are often 
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selecting between candidates they don’t know and/or have less knowledge about compared to 
candidates from their own neighborhood or district. These factors diminish the excitement of the 
electoral process and negatively impact voter turnout. 
On the other hand, non-reform cities embrace features where political organization can 
occur more easily. Features of non-reform cities include partisan elections, single district elections, 
and/or a mayor-council form of government. In contrast to reform cities, the electoral process in a 
non-reform city often is filled with excitement. Their elections have a mayor, thereby creating a 
high-profile race. Council candidates typically are elected by districts, thereby they tend to be from 
the neighborhood of the voters electing them. This creates higher levels of name recognition and 
knowledge about the candidate. And, the party label is present in these elections as they tend to be 
partisan elections. These factors increase the excitement of the electoral process, and in so doing, 
increasing turnout at the polls.  
This variation of institutional structure found among municipalities influences voter 
turnout in municipal elections. Previous research indicates that cities that have adopted reform 
structures depress voter turnout (Caren 2007; Welch and Bledsoe 1988; Bridges 1997; Oliver 
2001; Oliver and Ha 2007; Wood 2002). Among the various aspects of the reforms, three key 
features have been shown to negatively affect voter turnout in municipal elections: non-partisan 
elections, mayor-council form of government, and non-concurrent elections (Wood 2002; Hajnal 
and Lewis 2003; Karning and Walters 1983; Alford and Lee 1968). While a thorough discussion 
of the reforms can be found in Chapter 2, the purpose here is to merely mention what factors 
influence voter turnout in local elections. Next, I discuss the various types of local governments 
and provide a definition of local government.   
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Defining Local Governments   
In the United States, the structure of local governments is not only complex but diverse. 
First, the types of local governments vary from state to state. For example, Connecticut and Rhode 
Island do not have a county structure. And, a number of states do not possess any form of township 
governments. Second, states often use differing classification systems to organize their sub county 
governments; therefore, the level of home rule given to local governments varies. The amount of 
home rule given to a locality determines what functions it can or cannot perform. For instance, in 
Michigan, there are townships and charter townships. Townships are a statutory unit of 
government whose powers are determined by the State of Michigan, whereas charter townships 
have greater amount of home rule as their charter outlines the duties, responsibilities, and rights. 
The different classification systems create diversity among local governments not only between 
the states, but within a state.   
According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2012), there are 89,004 local government entities, 
including both general purpose and special purpose governments. To be classified as a local 
government, the U.S. Census Bureau (2012) states that the locality needs to possess all three of 
the following attributes: 1) existence as an organized entity, 2) governmental character (e.g. the 
ability to elect officials), and 3) substantial autonomy (e.g. controlling its own affairs independent 
of another government structure). This provides a basic definition of local government.  
Using this definition, there are five types of local government systems within the United 
States. There are three general purpose governments: counties, municipalities, towns/townships. 
Plus two special purpose governments: special districts and school districts. Table 1.1 provides a 
detailed breakdown of the number of local governments by categories of each local government 
system.  
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Table 1.1 Number of Local Governments in the U.S. by Category 
General Purpose Governments  Special Purpose Governments   
Counties 3,031 Special Districts 37,203 
Municipalities 19,522 School Districts 12,884 
Towns/Townships 16,364   
Total 38,917 Total 50,087 
* Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2012 
 
The vast number of local governments and the multifaceted differences between them 
creates difficultly in furnishing a definition of local government. Below, I provide a descriptive 
analysis of the various forms of local government using the definition provided by the U.S. Census 
Bureau. The hope here is to provide insight and clarification on the complex local government 
system found in the United States. I conclude this section by offering a definition of local 
government.  
Special Purpose Governments 
Special purpose governments include both special districts and school districts. The 
legislation that governs both types varies from state to state. However, special purpose 
governments have administrative and fiscal autonomy from general purpose governments. These 
governments typically have a single objective. For example, school districts deal with matters 
related to local education while special districts handle services including hospitals, water, 
cemetery upkeep, and mosquito abatement. Next, I provide a descriptive analysis of both special 
districts and school boards.  
Special Districts 
By definition, “special district governments are independent, special-purpose 
governmental units (other than school district governments), that exist as separate entities with 
substantial administrative and fiscal independence from general-purpose local governments” (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2012). Typically, special districts are created as a single purpose service provider. 
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These services range from social services, such as fire protection, to the more monotonous 
services, such as waste management. They are independent, autonomous entities that can tax, float 
bonds, and can have a property requirement for voters (Burns 1994). Special districts have more 
flexible geographical boundaries. Therefore, it is not uncommon to see special districts overlap 
with other local government systems (Burns 1994). Unsurprisingly, citizens belonging to the same 
municipality or county government may not receive services by the same special district and/or 
have multiple special districts providing services. Ultimately, special districts provide citizens with 
the ability to self-govern, but the additional layer of local government adds to the complexity of 
it.   
School Districts 
 School boards have been around since 1837 when Massachusetts created the first state 
school board (Danzberger 1992; 1994). Later, in 1891, Massachusetts enacted legislation giving 
local school boards financial and administrative authority, which allowed school boards to meet 
the needs of their district more effectively (Danzberger 1992). The Massachusetts structure became 
the primary type of school board system found among the various New England states and 
eventually became the system found largely within the United States (Land 2002).  
The school board is important as a local governing entity as it is the primary way in which 
education is controlled in the United States (Johnson 1988). Education is a topic that everyone is 
familiar with and cares about (Chubb and Moe 1990). Citizens, through school boards, determine 
who teaches their children, how the children are taught, where they are taught, and what they are 
taught. While there is often disagreement among some of these policy areas - such as school prayer, 
sex education curriculums, and/or school dress policies - everyone within the community believes 
they have a say in the matter of local education. Thus, local schools are community based because 
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citizens believe they “could and should be able to govern their own educational affairs” (Chubb 
and Moe 1990).  
While both types of special purpose governments are comprised of elected officials from 
the community, they can only govern affairs that pertain to their jurisdiction. This is an important 
distinction to make when examining local governments. This is not to suggest that special purpose 
governments are not a form of local government, but rather to illustrate their limited role in local 
matters. The next section highlights the role of general purpose governments, which provide a 
broader and more extensive range of services and functions.   
General Purpose Governments  
Counties, towns/townships, and municipalities are all types of general purpose 
governments. Unlike special districts, general purpose governments engage in a variety of public 
policies, have diverse economies, and need to manage an array of conflict over a range of issues. 
At the same time, they need to provide good governance that is expected by residents, who are 
often their friends and neighbors. Below is a brief overview of each type of general purpose 
government.  
Counties 
  In the United States, 48 states have county governments. Connecticut and Rhode Island are 
the exceptions since a functioning county government system is absent in both of these states (U.S. 
Census Bureau 201). Of all general purpose governments, county governments are the largest, 
geographically speaking. Generally, the duties performed by county governments are similar and 
state mandated (Marschall 2010). Examples of their duties include keeping records on births, 
deaths, and land deeds; conducting elections; and assessing property.  
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Most county governments are comparable in their functions, but there are exceptions. For 
example, Alaska has boroughs. A borough in Alaska can fall into two different classifications: 
incorporated or unincorporated. Incorporated boroughs are independent regional units of 
government with home rule powers, while unincorporated boroughs are extensions of the state 
government and not a political subdivision of the state. Therefore, in Alaska, not all boroughs are 
created equal. The specific classification of boroughs gives some greater autonomy than others.  
As mentioned, Connecticut and Rhode Island lack county government structures. 
Interestingly, both these states are organized into geographical regions referred to as counties. 
However, without a functioning county government, the primary purpose of the county structure 
in Rhode Island and Connecticut is simply organizational. In these states, towns play a greater role 
in the provision of services.  
Some areas have even consolidated their county and municipal structures. When a 
municipality and a county government join forces, it is then considered to be a consolidated 
government structure. The result of a consolidation is a combined governmental entity with both 
county and municipal responsibilities. The reasons for consolidation often include creating more 
efficient government, increasing accountability, and/or creating cost savings. If the county and 
municipal governments have been consolidated, they are considered by the U.S. Census Bureau to 
be a municipal entity. 
Despite variations, county structures among the states and their roles are similar. They 
provide services to their constituents, although the level and number of services provided differ 
from county to county. All county governments have elected boards and are held accountable by 
their voters. Additionally, all other general purpose governments are typically found within the 
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borders of county governments. Thus, towns, townships, and municipalities are commonly referred 
to as sub-county governments.    
Towns/Townships 
Townships are only found among 20 states within the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 
2012). They are found predominately in the Northeast and Midwest and are largely absent in the 
West and South. There are also different types of townships: civil, judicial, congressional, and 
charter. Civil townships are the most familiar. They are political subdivisions of the state, are 
independent governmental units, and have geographical boundaries. Judicial townships are a 
political subdivision of a county and found primarily in the West. Congressional townships were 
created without consideration to boundaries. Therefore, they often overlap with other political 
jurisdictions. Charter townships tend to have a greater amount of home rule because their powers 
and duties are outlined in their charter. This gives them more autonomy than a statutory township 
whose powers come from the state.  
Township governments and town governments differ. Townships, if given similar powers 
and functions as a municipality, tend to have municipal structures. Otherwise they have an elected 
board. The duties of a township can vary. For example, in the Northeast, townships govern schools, 
while in the Midwest, townships are service providers. In general, townships tend to encompass 
broad authority and carry out similar duties as municipalities. Towns tend to be governed by the 
town meeting. In states without a county structure, towns tend to be the primary local government 
system. The principle difference between towns/townships and municipalities are their means of 
incorporation.    
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Municipalities  
Currently, there are 19,522 municipal governments in the United States (U.S. Census 
2012). The U.S. Census Bureau (2012) defines municipal government as:  
political subdivisions within which a municipal corporation has been established to provide 
general local government for a specific population concentration in a defined area, and 
includes all active government units officially designated as cities, boroughs (except in 
Alaska), towns (except in the six New England states, and in Minnesota, New York, and 
Wisconsin), and villages.  
 
For this study, local government will be defined as municipalities. Unlike other types of 
general purpose governments, such as counties and townships, municipalities can be found all 
across the United States. As mentioned, the states of Connecticut and Rhode Island do not have 
counties, and the township form of government is absent in over half of the states. But, every state 
contains at least one municipal government (U.S. Census Bureau 2012).  
Aside from the sheer number of municipal governments found among all 50 states, 
municipalities are the lowest level of government, and therefore, the government system closest to 
the people. Municipalities are physically closer since they are more geographically proximate to 
their residents. Aside from geographic proximity, municipal government boards are comprised of 
friends, neighbors, and/or family members. Those who govern the municipality are people who 
residents see at church, PTA meetings, and even the local grocery store. Residents have more direct 
contact with municipal elected officials and/or administrators than elected officials at the state or 
national level. Municipalities also give meaning to citizenship. Municipalities have the power to 
zone. The ability for municipalities to zone permits them to create geographical boundaries 
demarcating their municipal boarders. Through zoning, municipalities can define who is, and who 
is not, a resident of their community. Citizenship then is conferred by municipalities through 
zoning - a special power given only to municipal governments.  
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In short, municipalities can make their own decisions independent of another government 
system, such as the state or federal government. They are autonomous entities where its citizens 
determine the manner in which they are governed and by whom they will be governed. They 
provide all the basic services expected by a local government. Municipalities also give meaning to 
citizenship. The preceding aspects of municipalities make them the closest form of government to 
the people. Aside from the features discussed above, data availability is greater and more 
accessible for municipalities. These are the reasons for defining local governments as 
municipalities for this project. The next section discusses how the dynamics of local elections are 
similar among localities but differ from national and state elections. I also address the different 
approaches to increasing voter turnout in municipal elections.  
Local Elections and In-Person Early Voting  
Local elections have vastly different dynamics than state or national elections. Yet, the 
dynamics among the various types of local government and their elections are very similar. First, 
all local governments practice self-government. This ability to self-govern is a long standing 
tradition in the United States. Because citizens believe that “sovereignty ought to be diffused to 
the point of ultimate residence in the individual himself” (Syed 1966, 21), they, in turn, have given 
local governments a sizeable amount of autonomy. This autonomy keeps the citizen close to the 
local governing structure. Since it is the local citizens who govern themselves, they develop a 
sense of community and create a meaning of citizenship.    
Second, in local elections, their political context and the impact of their issues tend to be 
alike. This differentiates them from state or national elections. Unlike state and national elections 
where the candidate is not personally known by the community, candidates in local elections tend 
to be neighbors, friends, co-workers, or members from the same organization. This creates a 
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similar political context among all local elections. Likewise, the issues present in local elections 
tend to impact citizens more directly than state or national issues. Citizens at the local level care if 
their trash is picked up, worry about the quality of their water, and are concerned with where the 
local park or library will be located. The trade-offs of local public policies tend to be more apparent 
creating a zero-sum game (Kaufmann 2007). For example, if a tax levy for a public school fails, it 
could mean a layoff of teachers, reduced extra-circular activities, and/or have no buses to transport 
students for that school year. A failed property tax increase could lead to less police and fire 
protection or the closing of parks and/or libraries. Therefore, citizens should have the desire to 
influence government though elections, however, turnout for local elections are lower than any 
other type of election.  
Voter turnout in local elections is paradoxical. It is where government is closest to those 
governed and where many first become politically active. Yet, it is also where political 
participation, specifically voting, is the lowest. If high participation is an indicator of a healthy 
democracy, then what can be done to increase participation at the local level?  
There are various ways to foster voter turnout in local elections. For example, local 
governments could simplify their ballot, reduce the number of elections held, and/or reduce the 
number of elected officials. Another possible approach to increasing turnout include making 
Election Day a holiday, which would ensure everyone has the ability to cast a ballot. Creating 
easier access to the ballot by easing the registration process through practices such as same day 
registration could also increase voter turnout.  
A particular approach to increasing voter turnout at the local level is to alter the laws 
governing their elections. Previous research suggests that election laws impact voter turnout (Rusk 
1970; Converse 1972; Powell 1980; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira 1987; 
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Jackman 1987; Dubin and Kalsow 1996; Timpone 1998). For example, holding local elections 
concurrently would increase turnout (Wood 2002). Expanding the number of days an individual 
can cast a ballot (known as early voting) has also been shown to increase voter turnout at the 
municipal level (Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007). However, there are a variety 
of early voting practices found among the states. The next section discusses the various forms of 
early voting - in particular the method of early voting known as in-person early voting.  
Early Voting 
Early voting policies differ from state to state. These differences include no excuse 
absentee voting, in-person early voting, and/or vote by mail elections. Table 1.2 provides a detailed 
description of the various forms of early voting used by the states.  
Over half of the states within the United States have adopted in-person early voting, yet 
much of the research done thus far on early voting and municipal elections is on vote by mail 
elections. Studies on vote by mail elections in Oregon and California have shown that early voting 
does increase turnout at the municipal level (Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007). 
Because these studies are on vote by mail laws, it leaves unanswered questions about the effects 
of in-person early voting laws on municipal elections. 
In-Person Early Voting versus Vote by Mail 
Making the distinction between vote by mail elections and in-person early voting is 
important because there are considerable differences between vote by mail laws (VBM) and in-
person early voting laws. First, VBM laws are only found in two states, Oregon and Washington, 
while in-person early voting laws can be found in 32 states (NCSL). Since more states have in- 
person early voting laws than VBM laws, scholars need to understand what effects in-person early 
voting have on voter turnout in municipal elections.  
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Table 1.2:  Methods of Early Voting Used by States 
No Excuse Absentee Voting State(s) permit any qualified voter to vote absentee 
without offering an excuse. 
In Person Early Voting State(s) allow any qualified voter to cast a ballot in 
person during a designated period prior to Election 
Day. No excuse or justification is required. 
Vote By Mail Elections 
 
 
 
State(s) automatically mail a ballot to every eligible 
voter (no request or application is necessary), and the 
state does not use traditional poll sites that offer in-
person voting on Election Day.  
In Person Early Voting & No 
Excuse Absentee Voting 
State(s) allow any qualified voter to cast a ballot in 
person during a designated period prior to Election 
Day and permit any qualified voter to vote absentee. 
Both can be done without offering an excuse or 
giving a justification.  
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures website  
 
Secondly, the role of the government, and subsequently the burden placed on the voter, are 
vastly different between these two methods of early voting. Vote by mail laws, by their nature, 
require state governments to play a more active role in the voting process. In a vote by mail system, 
the state government mails all registered voters their ballot for each election even if they have 
decided not to vote in that particular election. If the voter opts to vote, it is up to the voter to 
complete the ballot and return it via mail. 
Alternatively, the burden to vote remains completely upon the individual in states with in-
person early voting. While in-person early voting laws allow one to cast a ballot prior to Election 
Day, the voter must still make the decision to vote, locate the early voting center, and then go to 
the early voting center to cast a ballot. The costs of voting are much higher in in-person early 
voting states than states that have vote by mail elections. Therefore, it is necessary for scholars to 
know how in-person early voting laws affect municipal elections despite the previous work done 
by scholars on the effects of vote by mail systems.   
  With a few exceptions (Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007), early voting 
studies have not focused on voter turnout in municipal elections. As discussed in the following 
20 
 
 
 
section, I hypothesize that in-person early voting has a significant positive impact on municipal 
turnout.  
General Argument 
According to the ICMA (2002), 77 percent of municipalities have non-concurrent (odd 
numbered years) elections. In addition to non-concurrent elections, many municipal governments 
hold elections in months that are atypical, such as May. Previous research on early voting has 
almost entirely focused on voter turnout in concurrent election years - where there is a presidential 
or statewide election (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Lyons and Scheb 1999; Dyck and Gimpel 
2005; Karp and Banducci 2001; Burden et al 2009; Gronke et al 2007; Neeley and Richardson 
2001; Stein 1998; Gronke et al 2005; Leighley and Nagler 2009). Consequently, the majority of 
the early voting studies fail to include the years, or months, that the majority of municipalities 
conduct their elections. By examining non concurrent election years, I can isolate the effects of 
early voting at the local level.  
This project asks a simple, but overlooked question: Does in-person early voting impact 
voter turnout in municipal elections? While studies on in-person early voting suggest that early 
voting does not increase turnout (Stein 1998; Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997; Neeley and 
Richardson 2001), these studies are on state and national elections. Research on early voting that 
include municipal elections indicate that early voting increases turnout in local elections (Karp and 
Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007). Similarly, I hypothesize that in-person early voting 
has a significant positive impact on voter turnout in municipal elections. If empirical evidence 
supports my hypothesis, it would suggest that local democracies benefit the most from the early 
voting laws. Conversely, if the results of this study do not support my hypothesis, it suggests that 
in-person early voting may not be the best method of early voting to increases voter turnout. As 
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other studies on in-person early voting indicate, it does not increase voter turnout in state or 
national elections. This is not surprising since statewide and national elections tend to be high-
stimulus elections which, by their nature, attract a greater number of voters to the polls. On the 
other hand, most municipal elections tend to be low-stimulus elections thereby often having lower 
turnout rates than national and statewide elections. The positive effect of early voting may be more 
pronounced in these low-stimulus elections, which is why I hypothesize a positive relationship 
between in-person early voting and municipal voter turnout. 
Data and Methods 
To assess the impact of in-person early voting on voter turnout in municipal elections, I 
use individual level data to conduct a cross-sectional time series analysis to examine turnout in 
mayoral elections among the 938 municipalities in Ohio. The data for this project will come from 
a variety of sources: the Ohio voter file; U.S. Census data; the Ohio Municipal, Township, and 
School Board Roster; the Ohio Municipal League, and election results from the County Board of 
Elections.  
I collect a variety of information on municipalities for this study.  I obtain election results 
for all mayoral elections within my specified time period. I also collect the number of registered 
voters in each municipality for each election year in this study. These pieces of information are 
collected from the 88 County Boards of Elections within the State of Ohio. The U.S. Census data 
is downloaded from the Census Bureau’s website and used to determine the localities’ 
demographic make-up, such as city size. Information obtained from the Ohio Municipal, 
Township, and School Board Roster, includes a list of all the cities in the State of Ohio as well as 
their government structure (e.g. mayor-council or council-manager).  
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Implications 
 This study has implications in two main areas of scholarship: public policy and the study 
of local elections. This study examines the impact of a statewide public policy on its subunits of 
government. Studying early voting at the municipal level will provide an understanding of the 
effects of state public policies on municipal governments. Because early voting laws impact local 
governments in the same manner and the dynamics of local elections are similar among localities, 
the results can be generalized to other local governments as well. This analysis will provide a better 
understanding of the impact of early voting policies on municipalities and municipal elections in 
particular, and local elections in general, even if the results suggest early voting has no influence, 
or a negative influence, on voter turnout.  
Public Policy 
 Early voting laws significantly alter the costs and benefits of voting. This has important 
consequences for who votes, the manner that votes are translated into legislative seats, and the 
overall direction of public policy (Marschall 2010). Understanding the impact early voting policies 
have on local elections is, therefore, essential.  
 Recently, many states have reexamined their early voting laws. These states have either 
attempted to or were successful at scaling back the number of days individuals could cast an early 
vote. For example, two key swing states, Florida and Ohio, have attempted such action. Florida 
successfully decreased the number of days voters could cast their ballot early from 14 to eight.1 In 
2012, Ohio’s Secretary of State Jon Husted attempted to prohibit early voting 72 hours before 
Election Day expect for military personnel.2 
                                                 
1 FL HB 1355 passed in 2011 and signed by Gov. Rick Scott 
2 US Supreme Court denied hearing the case, and Husted ordered the 88 County Boards of Elections to hold hours 
for the 72 hours before Election Day (Sat, Sun, Mon).  
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It has been just over 20 years since the first state introduced early voting. Yet scholars have 
not assessed the impact of early voting laws for all types of elections. The majority of early voting 
research has focused on national and statewide elections. While there have been a few studies on 
municipal elections in vote by mail systems, the impact of the other forms of early voting on 
municipal, school board, township, and other local elections has yet to be determined. Since early 
voting is a controversial public policy, understanding its impact at all levels is necessary, especially 
if early voting policies are being altered. This study advances the knowledge of early voting 
policies by examining its effects on voter turnout in local elections.  
Local Elections  
 A specific study within the field of urban politics is that of local elections and political 
participation. While studies of local participation far and few between, studies specifically on 
municipal elections are even more uncommon (Marschall 2010; Clark and Krebs 2012). 
Additionally, Sapotichne et al (2007) found that studies on voting behavior are underrepresented 
in citations in urban journals. Given the close proximity of local governments to their citizens and 
the myriad of research opportunities that local elections present, it is surprising that local elections 
have been largely overlooked by scholars. 
 Studies on local elections that focus on turnout have concentrated on three explanatory 
factors. Those factors include 1) electoral and institutional arrangements, 2) candidate 
characteristics, and 3) local context (Marschall 2010). This study examines two of the three 
explanatory factors: electoral and institutional arrangements and local context. Electoral and 
intuitional arrangements focus on the rules that govern elections (e.g. timing of elections) and the 
forms of government (e.g. manager versus mayor systems) respectively. Local context investigates 
how variables, such as the population or size of the local entity being studied, affect voter turnout.  
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In addition, this study is a macro-level study; the municipality is the unit of analysis. This 
is unique as many of the studies on early voting have not had this focus. Previous studies on early 
voting and local elections have used the precinct as the unit of analysis and included municipal 
elections as variables (see Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007).  Since I have 
municipalities as the unit of analysis, it will provide a unique insight on how election laws 
influence voter turnout within the municipal settings and will contribute to a better understanding 
of voter turnout in municipal elections specifically. However, the findings of this study can be 
generalized to other forms of local government and local elections overall.  
Overview of Chapters 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I provide a literature review on municipal governments and 
participation and early voting respectively. In particular, Chapter 2 gives a detailed discussion on 
the importance of local governments and local elections in American democracy. I then discuss 
the impact of local governments’ administrative and electoral structures on political participation. 
I conclude this chapter with an analysis of the characteristics of local governments that scholars 
have found to influence voter turnout in local elections. Chapter 3 provides an overview of early 
voting and its impact on voter turnout in elections, and particularly municipal elections. Chapter 4 
provides a thorough discussion on the methodology and data collection procedures used for this 
study.  
In Chapter 5, I develop and test my model. Using the data I have collected and controlling 
for the key municipal variables indicated in the literature, I examine my hypothesis by employing 
a cross-sectional time series analysis for the years 2001-2013. Since the State of Ohio implemented 
early voting in 2006, this will be the interruption year. The observations will be aggregated to the 
municipal level. I contend that while in-person early voting laws have not increased turnout in 
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national or statewide elections, it has a significant positive impact on turnout in municipal elections 
suggesting that municipalities have benefited the most from early voting laws. 
Chapter 6 will summarize the findings and discuss their implications. I expect in-person 
early voting to have a positive effect on voter turnout in municipal elections. These local 
democracies are likely to be the greatest beneficiary of early voting laws. Identifying what 
contextual factors of municipalities contribute to early voting in municipal elections will give 
scholars a deeper understanding of how institutional and local contextual factors impact turnout in 
municipal elections. Gaining a better understanding of how in-person early voting in particular 
affects turnout in municipal elections is essential. As Election Day continuously transforms, it is 
imperative we understand what impact election reforms have on political participation at all levels 
of government.  
In this introduction, I have illustrated the importance of local governments to the American 
political system as well as the significance of local elections. In the next chapter, I provide a 
comprehensive analysis on local governments and local elections in the United States. I pay 
particular attention to the structures of local governments and how they impact political 
participation. I further ground this work in the theories on local governments discussed above.  
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CHAPTER 2 
STRUCTURE MATTERS:  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES AND VOTER TURNOUT  
  
Localities typically are thought of as ‘creatures of the state,’3 but in practice, they exercise 
a significant amount of autonomy. That autonomy is a defining feature of the American political 
system, and permits localities to make public policy choices that impact the daily lives of their 
citizens. They determine where homes can be built, where and what businesses can operate within 
their borders, as well as what services they provide to their residents. In turn, citizens participate 
in local elections to hold elected officials accountable for their policy choices.  
Local governments, since their inception, have been an avenues for individuals to practice 
self-government and participate politics. This invites two assumptions: individuals have the right 
to self-govern - an assumption that has broad support - and participation at the local level should 
be promoted. 
Promoting participation at the local level encompasses two streams of philosophical 
debate: disagreement over what characteristic of local government create an optimal environment 
for participation, and disagreement over who should participate at the local level. Which 
characteristics of local government facilitate participation? One group argues that small, 
homogenous republics are best. Another contends that large heterogeneous populations are more 
effective. This debate continues today among scholars who study urban/local politics.  
                                                 
3 Justice Dillon in Atkins v. Kansas (1903) declared municipalities as “creatures of the state” 
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At the local level, political participation is largely tied to their geographical environment4  
(see Marschall 2010; Baybeck 2014). Huckfeldt (1979) theorized that participation was linked to 
the status of one’s neighborhood. He found evidence supporting his claim. While Huckfeldt 
empirically tested his theoretical claim, he was not the first to theorize that geographical 
environment affects participation. During the nation’s founding, the Anti-Federalists and 
Federalists quarreled over the optimal size for the newly created nation. Likewise Tocqueville 
wrote about the relationship between local governments’ structure and participation among its 
citizens. Early in America’s history, theories surrounding the importance of geographical context 
and environment were present.  
Exactly how geographical context influences participation is a debate that has yet to be 
settled among scholars. Geographical context can be broken down into two sub-categories: local 
context and institutional (or structural) context. Scholars who study local politics typically agree 
that local context matters.5 Local contexts refers to the characteristics of localities, such as their 
size and demographic composition. The philosophical disagreement among scholars is over what 
characteristics create the optimal environment for political participation at the local level. 
Jeffersonians contend that small, homogenous republics are best at cultivating participation. 
Alternatively, others maintain that large, heterogeneous populations are better suited to promote 
participation. Both schools of thought, however, signify that local context is important and does 
influence political participation. Scholars have found statistically significant correlations between 
local context and political participation (see Oliver 1999, 2000, 2001; Oliver and Ha 2007). 
                                                 
4 Individual factors, such as socioeconomic status, or mobilization also play a role in an individual participating in 
politics, however, local context is an additional factor taken into account when examining local participation.  
5 Some don’t necessarily agree that context matters. See King 1996.  
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However, this centuries old debate continues today among scholars who study urban and/or local 
politics (see Kelleher and Lowery 2004).  
Much like local context, the importance of a local government’s institutional context is not 
without contention. The disagreement here is over the impact of local government structures on 
participation. These institutional structures include the type of government (i.e. mayor-council 
versus council-manager) and the electoral structures (i.e. the timing of the election and method of 
selection). As mentioned, Tocqueville, early in America’s history, commented on how local 
government structure influenced local participation.  
Who should participate at the local level? During the Progressive Era, reformers sought to 
change the political, institutional, and electoral structures of local governments so that politics and 
administration would be separate. The reformers claimed that only the elites should participate and 
govern localities. Opponents of the reformers argued that there should be mass participation at the 
local level. Yet, both sides believed that the structure of local government impacted who 
participated (Welsh and Bledsoe 1988).  
Scholars who study local and urban politics recognize the impact institutional structures 
have on local participation. Local governments that adopted aspects of the reform measures, and 
subsequently de-politicized local government, typically have lower turnout than localities that did 
not adopt these measures (see Caren 2007; Wood 2002; Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Empirical 
research demonstrates that these structures matter since they influence who participates. In turn, 
who participates can effect which public policies are adopted and the overall direction of local 
government. The political institutions of local governments have a profound impact on political 
participation (Milner 2002).   
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Should local governments promote participation? Should there be mass participation or 
participation by a select few? What form of local government best promotes participation? How 
do the institutional and electoral structures of localities impact participation? In this chapter, I 
address these questions. I begin by discussing the philosophies of local government focusing on 
the debates over local and institutional contexts of localities. I examine the implications that both 
the size and institutional structures have on local voter turnout. I then move to an overview of local 
participation, focusing on why it is an important feature of American democracy. I conclude with 
a discussion on how the structure of localities matter with regards to voter turnout. In future 
chapters, I apply these concepts to my data. The purpose here is to give a comprehensive overview 
of local governments and how their structures impact participation.  
Philosophies of Local Government 
The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people asserts that the people are the ultimate 
authority. Therefore, the government derives its powers from the people. The Federalist Papers 
support this distinction. In Federalist #46, the authors state that “the federal and state governments 
are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people.” Even Jefferson (1993), an Anti-
Federalist, wrote, “I consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source of all 
authority in that nation” (294). The sovereign, then, is the person, or a body of people. There is no 
entity politically superior as the “people are the source of legal power and authority in the United 
States” (Eaton 1900, 442). Thus, powers are reserved for the people unless they are delegated to 
some other government entity.  
Localism, advocated by Jefferson, underscores the right of localities to self-govern “as an 
expression of the sovereignty of the individual, derived from the doctrine of the sovereignty of the 
people” (Syed 1966, 5). People are the “only source of power” and this is most noticeable at the 
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local level because it has the most “immediate effect” (Tocqueville 2003, 74). For Tocqueville, 
this was an identifying feature of the American political system.   
The autonomous nature of localities expects citizens to share in local policy decisions and 
to participate in selecting decision makers through elections. For example, citizens should have 
direct influence on determining public policy issues, such as park locations, trash collection, and 
the quality of public schools. Citizens can participate and advance their policy stances on any of 
these issues by attending meetings, voting, contacting their elected officials, etc. Arguably, 
participation at the local level fosters an attachment to their community. 
While advocates for both small and large local governments agree that the people are the 
ultimate sovereign and have the right to self-govern, they disagree on the both the size and 
composition of governments. Aristotle, the Anti-Federalists, and in particular, Thomas Jefferson, 
argue that democracy would be most advantageous in small units of government. The Federalists, 
and James Madison specifically, suggest that large, heterogeneous republics are better because 
they protect public interest. The philosophical differences between these two sides are over the 
features or characteristics of national government systems, yet have application to local 
governments. While seemingly unimportant, these features have profound effects on political 
participation at the local level.  
Size and Demographic Composition of Local Government 
The ideal size and composition of governmental units is a centuries old debate. Aristotle 
suggests that governments should be comprised of small republics. These city-states should be 
large enough for self-sufficiency, but small enough to foster a feeling of closeness between the 
citizen and the government. This bond between the citizen and the government is created because 
man holds office and takes part in the affairs of government. Holding elected positions, for 
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Aristotle, was an essential aspect of citizenship. As an active participant in political affairs, men 
would develop a deep attachment to the government system he is associated with.   
When establishing the government system for the United States, the Anti-Federalists 
reasoned that self-government should consist of a patchwork of small, limited, homogenous units. 
In this type of government system, consensus could be reached more efficiently and conflict 
avoided because the citizens would have common and shared interests. This was the means to good 
governance.  It was only through small, limited government that they could ensure self-government 
and preserve liberty.  
Conversely, the Federalists maintained that only in large republics with a strong 
government could the evils that plagued governments (man’s own self-interest and factions) be 
curtailed. Self-interest could only be prevented by establishing a system that could check it. 
Factions were created when groups of men with the same interest united. A large republic could 
overcome these ills because interests would be more varied, a larger number of individuals would 
be represented, and it would extend over a geographically large territory. Through large 
governments, both majority and minority rights could be secured and justice obtained.  
The arguments between the Anti-Federalist and Federalists of the late 18th Century 
predominately focused on national government systems. However, their normative arguments 
have important implications for local governments. Do size and composition of a unit of 
government influence participation? Should local governments be large and heterogeneous? Or 
small and homogenous? While the arguments asserted by the Anti-Federalists and Federalists are 
normative in nature, they continue to be debated, and empirically tested, by urban and local 
government scholars. This section takes a deeper look at both of these philosophies and the 
empirical evidence supporting each claim.  
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Small, Homogeneous Localities Promote Participation  
Building off of the Anti-Federalist arguments, Thomas Jefferson asserts that America 
should be comprised of small, homogenous wards with yeoman farmers-the “chosen people of 
God”-working the land and achieving their own destiny (Jefferson 1993, 259). The wards would 
be small and numerous so that every citizen could participate in the affairs of that neighborhood. 
Jefferson (1993) reasoned that every county should be divided into hundreds of wards because it 
was the “little republics [that] would be the main strength of the great one” (Jefferson 1993, 554). 
This, for Jefferson, was the only way the new country would survive. 
Jefferson advocated for small ward republics because he believed they were the best way 
to promote participation. For Jefferson, the principal role of government was to citizens could 
participate “directly and personally” (Syed 1966). The ward system Jefferson idealized allowed 
for maximum participation by citizens because it provided an opportunity for direct democracy, 
which was the essence of republicanism (Syed 1966). For Jefferson, government became more 
pure as it grew closer to the people; the ward system exemplified this (Syed 1966).  
During his visit to the United States, Tocqueville observed town governments in New 
England that promoted maximum participation and were a forum for direct democracy. Town 
meetings were the primary way which Americans participated in governing their localities. The 
freemen of the community would gather to discuss local affairs. A moderator would preside over 
the meetings. Here, the townsmen would pass resolutions and elect or appoint individuals to their 
governing boards. In doing so, they exercised democratic principles.  
Tocqueville (2003) indicates that citizens participated in their local government because 
they feel responsible for governing their community, thereby suggesting that the ideas of 
participation and citizenship are closely related. When an individual becomes involved in local 
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politics, they develop a sense of attachment to their community. Rousseau also indicates that 
participation “increases the feeling among individual citizens that they ‘belong’ in their 
community” (Pateman 1970, 27). Participation - a vital aspect of citizenship – creates a bond 
between citizens and their community. This attachment is the basis of localism.  
The Jeffersonian ideal has become part of American political tradition (Rourke 1964; Syed 
1966). This can be seen two ways: normatively and empirically. Localism suggests ‘small is 
beautiful.’ These beliefs suggests that small, homogenous government entities are better at 
developing a meaningful understanding of citizenship, promote participation, increase interest in 
politics, and increase political efficacy. In essence, "small localities facilitate participation because 
of the shared values they foster in the ease of participation they afford" (Kelleher and Lowery 
2004, 721-722).  
Scholars have examined normative assumptions of small local governments. One of their 
major claims is that small governments promote participation. Verba and Nie (1972), and more 
recently Oliver (2000, 2001), found that participation is higher in smaller localities than large ones. 
Oliver reasons that large local governments make civic action more difficult, which leads to a 
decrease in civic activity.  
Oliver’s findings provide empirical support as well as normative. Using data from the 1990 
American Citizen Participation Study and the 1990 Census, Oliver (2000) discovered that the size 
of a municipality has a profound effect on political participation. In particular, he found that 
“people in smaller places are more civically involved" (Oliver 2000, 371). He attributes this to the 
differences in social relationships and psychological orientations of citizens in larger and smaller 
municipalities. He suggests that in larger localities there is less attachment because citizens are 
less likely to know their neighbors, and be less socially connected. In essence, Oliver suggests that 
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the lack of attachments within larger municipalities has an overall negative impact on political 
participation.  
By contrast, it has also been shown that the small localities promote civic attitudes, increase 
interest in politics, and have higher levels of political efficacy. For instance, in their analysis, 
Finifter and Abramson (1975) observed that small municipalities promote civic attitudes. 
Similarly, Oliver and Ha (2007), when studying suburban communities, noticed individuals in 
small suburbs are more engaged in local politics. Individuals in smaller localities also have a 
greater sense of political efficacy because they have more in common with their neighbors (Oliver 
2000).  
Fittingly, Jefferson argued that large republics were not capable of offering the same 
benefits that smaller republics could. He believed cities were akin to “sores” on the human body. 
Like sores, cities weaken the Union. He reasoned that the smaller the locality, the more likely it 
was to be democratic (Syed 1966). In short, smaller units of government were more effective at 
addressing the needs and demands of its citizens, thereby making them more efficient at managing 
local affairs and encouraging participation.  
Large, Heterogeneous Localities Promote Participation 
While never distinctly discussing localities, James Madison does assert that large, 
heterogeneous populations are better at promoting democracy. In Federalist 10, Madison argues 
that large republics are the only way to ensure that the will of the people will be protected. Large 
republics offer more, and better, options for electing representatives of “fit” character because 
there would be more candidates from which to choose. Because there would be more citizens 
choosing representatives in large republics, it would be difficult for an “unworthy” candidate to 
win would undergo greater scrutiny by a larger electorate. Large republics contain a greater variety 
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of interests making it less probable for a majority to invalidate the rights of the minority. Simply 
put, large republics curtail factions; and safeguard public interests and individual liberties.  
Unlike Jefferson, Madison opposed ward republics. In Madison’s view of government, 
representation is the epitome of republicanism not direct democracy (Syed 1966). Ward republics 
permit factions because citizens have the same interests thereby creating local majorities. These 
local majorities threatened the very essence of republicanism. For Madison, government should 
separate itself from citizens through representation (Syed 1966). The more removed citizens were 
from government, the more pure it became (Syed 1966).   
While Madison’s writings focused on the national government, his arguments have found 
a home in urban and local literature. It has been argued that larger is better because large, 
heterogeneous municipalities foster participation (Kelleher and Lowery 2004).  Normatively, 
large, heterogeneous localities also often have more conflict over political issues because the 
demographic composition is more diverse, therefore, interests are more varied. This conflict within 
a community spurs citizens to mobilize either in support of or against the issue at hand. It is because 
of this conflict, that large, heterogeneous localities have higher rates of political mobilization 
(Kelleher & Lowery 2004).  
Empirical evidence that supports this normative claim indicates a positive relationship 
between large localities and participation. Milbrath (1965) suggests that the larger the community, 
the higher the rate of political participation. Similarly, Fischer (1975) found that residents of larger 
cities have a higher interest in politics. In relationship to turnout and the size of localities, 
Kesselman (1966) observed that as the size of the community increases, turnout for national 
elections increases. 
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By contrast, Oliver (2000, 2001) finds a negative relationship between large local 
governments and participation. However, scholars offer two primary reasons for this disparate 
finding. The first reason is the complexity of large governments. Finifter and Abramson (1975) 
suggest that lower participation occurs in larger municipalities because of the complex 
bureaucracy associated with larger local governments. If the system is complex, the costs of 
participation are high. If costs are high, participation tends to be low (Downs 1957).  
The second reason for low participation in large localities is associated with the attachment 
individuals establish with their locality. Fisher, (1975) and Verba and Nie (1972), suggest that in 
large municipalities there is greater physical and psychological distance between citizens and 
political officials. In a similar vein, Oliver (2000) states that “as cities size increases, people are 
less likely to know their neighbors and less likely to have social contacts that are geographically 
proximate" (370). Essentially Fisher, Verba, Nie, and Oliver all suggest that the size of the locality 
shapes the connection citizens develop for their community.   
Institutional Structures and Participation  
Size and composition of governments while important are not the only points of contention 
regarding local governments and participation. The institutional context of local governments 
plays a key role in understanding local participation. Institutional contexts refers to “specific 
institutional structures, rules and procedures, that formally or informally define relationships 
among individuals and in turn influence individual behavior” (Johnson, Shively and Stein, 1999, 
3). At the local level, this includes the structure of the locality (e.g. council-manager versus mayor-
council) and the electoral rules that govern it (e.g. method of representation).  
In his analysis of democracy in the United States, Tocqueville (2003) admired the high 
levels of participation at the local level. He observed how the institutional structure of local 
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governments influenced participation. Public duties of local governments were “numerous” and 
“divided” among the citizens (Tocqueville 2003, Chapter 5). He reasoned that individuals were 
aware of local matters and would partake in the decision-making process to address them. 
Tocqueville (2003) believed that individuals were devoted to their local government because they 
help run it (82). Local governments and the participation of their citizens were, for Tocqueville, 
the reason democracy in America was so remarkable.  
Local governments have undergone many changes since Tocqueville’s visit to the United 
States. The reforms that transpired during the Progressive Reform Movement of the early 20th 
Century had a sizable impact on local participation. Fittingly, during this movement, there was a 
debate over the institutional, political, and electoral structures of local governments. Echoing 
Tocqueville, both supporters and opponents of the reforms believed that institutional and electoral 
structures of local government impacted political participation (Welsh and Bledsoe 1988, xiv). As 
research indicates, the structure of governing institutions is a key factor in local electoral 
participation (Sharp 2003; Hajnal and Lewis 2003).   
The Reform Movement 
The reform movement began between 1890 and 1930 and was closely linked to the 
Progressive Movement. Largely due to the influx of immigrants, the population of the cities were 
growing. Municipal governments were unable or opted not to provide basic services, which offered 
an opportunity for political parties to intervene and fill the void. The result was the genesis of the 
party machine and ultimately corruption-both in and out of local government. 
Party machines controlled many local governments. The goal of the party machine was 
simple: secure votes, win elections, and control local government. They achieved their goal by 
offering social services, patronage, and favors to the urban residents, mainly the poor and new 
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immigrants (Welch and Bledsoe 1988, Chapter 1; Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). These 
services and favors could be offered because the party machine used their government connections 
to obtain police protection, government contracts, and special privileges for businesses (Welch 
and Bledsoe 1988, Chapter 1; Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). In turn, the recipients would 
‘pay back’ the party by voting for those on the party ticket. The party machine included ethnic 
groups, organized labor, blue-collar workers, and immigrants who were traditionally excluded 
from the political process (Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). Many immigrants used their 
involvement with the party machine to climb up the social ladder.  
At the local level, the reformers sought to improve municipal government under the guise 
of curtailing government corruption and creating a more efficient government. Their political ethos 
focused on the idea that “public interest should prevail,” ‘politics’ was unacceptable, and that 
municipal government should be run by those who were best qualified to manage public affairs 
(Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). Supporters for local government reforms included 
liberals, reporters, professors, and predominately upper-class, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant individuals 
who sought to regain control of local government (Dye and MacManus 2012).  
To achieve their goals, proponents of the reforms pushed for changes in the electoral and 
institutional structures of local governments. They recruited educated, upper-class, typically 
successful business owners to seek office and pushed for city managers (Dye and MacManus 2012, 
Chapter 11). By having a council-manager form of government, reformers argued, localities could 
separate the business of government from the politics of government, which would make it more 
honest and less corrupt.  
To ensure public interest would prevail, reformers aimed on altering the electoral system 
in two ways. First, they proposed the elimination of political parties from the political process via 
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a nonpartisan ballot (Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). A nonpartisan ballot removes any 
form of party identification. Without party identification on the ballot, they reasoned, voters would 
be able to make better decisions because they would think about the interests of the city as a whole 
and not just the political interests asserted by the party machine. The second change to the electoral 
system included at-large elections instead of district (or ward) elections (Dye and MacManus 2012, 
Chapter 11). The reformers believed candidates in an at-large elections would appeal to the needs 
of the entire city and not just the needs of a single district. 
Opponents maintained that the changes to local government proposed by the reformers 
were actually created to exclude certain groups from the political system. They claimed that the 
structural changes professed by the reformers were a mechanism to decrease political power 
among the groups traditionally excluded, but were included by the party machines (Burnham 
1982). In particular, they claimed these reforms reduced the political power of immigrants and the 
working class and increased political power among the elite (Burnham 1982; Welch and Bledsoe 
1988). 
 “Both supporters and opponents to the reforms obviously believed that structures impact 
the kinds of people elected to office, the way the political process works when decisions are being 
made, and the nature of those decisions” (Welch and Bledsoe 1988, xiv). While opponents claimed 
the reforms would, in essence, alienate certain groups from the political system, the reformers 
maintained that the changes to the political, institutional, and electoral structures of localities 
would produce a more honest, efficient, and effective government (Welch and Bledsoe 1988, xiii). 
And, this would promote good governance and public policies that benefited the public as a whole.   
The proposed structural changes to local governments artfully redefined who was included 
in the electorate at the local level. Broadly speaking, the adoption of the reforms had a devastating 
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effect on turnout in local elections. Scholars have consistently found that turnout is depressed in 
localities that adopted the reforms (see Lineberry & Folwer 1967; Alford & Lee 1968; Bridges 
1997; Karnig and Walter 1983; Wood 2002; Caren 2007). As Teixeira (1987) indicates, turnout 
never reached the levels attained before the reforms. The lack of interest in politics and political 
participation was directly related to the institutional structures put in place by reformers (Bridges 
1997). A result of the reforms is a government system that is less responsive to elections (Lineberry 
and Fowler 1967). The reform structures also diminish the ability for citizens to maintain 
accountability of government (Sharp 2003). 
According to Bridges (1997), reform governments create barriers to voting and 
participation and insulate politicians and government from the demands of lower income and 
ethnic groups. The findings produced by scholars who examine the effect of the reforms on 
participation illustrate the importance of institutional structures. "It is clear that institutional 
arrangements associated with "reform" government, such as at-large election of city council 
members, nonpartisan elections, and the replacement of directly elected mayors with 
professionally credentialed, appointed city managers, have come at a price” (Sharp 2003, 71).  
It should be noted that not every local government adopted the structures advocated by the 
reformers. These localities are commonly referred to as unreform cities. The local governments 
that adopted reform policies often did so in a piecemeal fashion-adopting some policies but not 
others. These localities are known as reform cities. Table 2.1 illustrates the diversity of municipal 
administrative and electoral system as a result of the reforms. Today, these reforms are the 
principal reason for the variation of local institutional and electoral structures found among 
localities. 
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The institutional structures of reform cities tend to have weak political organization 
because they have adopted at least one of the following measures: nonpartisan elections, non 
concurrent elections, at-large districts, and/or a council-manager form of government. Aside from 
the lack of political organization by having a manager, there is likely an absence of a mayoral 
candidate on the ballot. Therefore, it is difficult for citizens to ‘blame’ government failures on a 
specific elected individual. In at-large district elections, voters are often selecting between 
candidates they don’t know and/or have less knowledge about compared to candidates from their 
own neighborhood or district. These factors coupled together minimize the ‘excitement’ of the 
electoral process and negatively impact voter turnout. 
On the other hand, unreform cities embrace features where political organization can occur 
more easily. Features of unreform cities include partisan elections, single district elections, and/or 
a mayor-council form of government. In contrast to reform cities, the electoral process in an 
unreform city often is filled with excitement. Their elections include a mayor candidate, thereby 
creating a high-profile race. Council member candidates tend to be from a single district, thus from 
the neighborhood of the voters electing them. This creates higher levels of name recognition and 
knowledge about the candidate. And, the party label is typically present in these elections as they 
tend to be partisan elections. These factors increase the excitement of the electoral process, and in 
so doing, increasing turnout at the polls.  
These two types of local government structures tend to dominate the American landscape 
and are the primary focus of this project. However, more recently, scholars have suggested that 
local governments may be more dynamic than these two legal descriptions reveal. Frederickson, 
Johnson, and Wood (2004) suggest that there has been an emergence of the adaptive city. There 
are three types of adaptive cities: adaptive political, conciliated/fully adaptive, and adaptive  
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Table 2.1 Percent Break Down of Municipal Forms of Government  
Administrative Structure   
     Council-Manager 59% 
     Mayor-Council 33% 
     Other 8% 
  
Electoral Structure   
     Partisan Elections 21% 
     Non-Partisan Elections 80% 
  
     At-Large Elections 66% 
     District/Ward Elections 17% 
     Combination of At-Large and District/Ward Elections 17% 
  * Source: IMCA 2011 Municipal Form of Government Survey  
 
administrative (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004a; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 
2004b). Adaptive political municipalities have government structures that resemble mayor-council 
municipalities, but have adopted various reforms that include structural characteristics of council-
manager municipalities (Frederickson and Johnson 2001; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 
2004a). Likewise, council-manager municipalities that have adopted some structural 
characteristics of mayor-council municipalities are referred to as adapted administrative 
municipalities (Frederickson and Johnson 2001; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004a). Finally 
there is conciliated or fully adapted city, which is defined as having neither an exclusive separation 
of powers model (i.e. mayor-council structure) nor a unity of powers model (i.e. council-manager 
structure) (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004b). These conciliated or fully adapted 
municipalities have a chief administrative officer, directly elected mayor, both district and at-large 
council elections, and the mayor serves on council and either is full time or part time (Frederickson 
and Johnson 2001; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004a, Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 
2004b).  
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The Impact of the Reforms on Local Participation 
As mentioned, research indicates that cities with reform structures have comparatively 
lower voter turnout (Caren 2007; Welch & Bledsoe 1988; Bridges 1997; Oliver 2001; Oliver & 
Ha 2007; Wood 2002). Among the various aspects of the reforms, three key features have been 
shown to negatively affect voter turnout in municipal elections: nonpartisan elections, council-
manager form of government, and non concurrent elections (Wood 2002; Hajnal & Lewis 2003; 
Karning and Walters 1983; Alford & Lee 1968). 
Nonpartisan elections eliminated the party machine. By having a nonpartisan ballot, the 
party affiliation is removed. Candidates running for office in a nonpartisan election run without a 
party label for voters to identify with. For instance, the City of Oklahoma, both the mayor and city 
council candidates run on a nonpartisan ballot. The primary election for mayor is held in March. 
If no candidate receives a majority vote, then the top two vote getters run in a general election in 
April. The general election would then declare the winner for the mayoral race. For the voter, 
moving to a nonpartisan ballot means the party cue is removed, thereby increasing the costs of 
voting (Karning and Walter 1983). When the costs of voting are high, turnout tends to be low 
(Downs 1957).  
Examining the impact of a nonpartisan ballot on turnout has mixed results. Early research 
by Karning and Walter (1983) and Alford and Lee (1968) finds that nonpartisan elections have 
lower turnout rates. More recently, scholars have found no significant difference in turnout rates 
between partisan and nonpartisan ballots (Lublin and Tate 1995; Wood 2002) expect when the 
elections are close (Caren 2007). The difference in findings is likely do to the statistical techniques 
utilized by the authors; the latter scholars use regression analysis while the former group does not. 
The more recent findings are also in line with research suggesting that party affiliation is not salient 
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in local elections (Peterson 1981; Kaufmann 2007) and politics at the local level are more 
allocative in nature (Kaufmann 2007). 
Much like the nonpartisan ballot, holding non concurrent elections (elections held in odd 
numbered years) increases the cost of voting. When local elections are prohibited from coinciding 
with other major elections, such as a presidential election, they don’t receive as much attention 
and have few resourced dedicated to voter turnout (Wood 2002; Hajnal and Lewis 2003). This in 
turn results in lower voter turnout compared to local elections held concurrently with major 
elections (i.e. presidential elections). If local elections were held at the same time as presidential 
elections, it is estimated that turnout would increase by as much as 36 percent (Hajnal and Lewis 
2003).  
 However, unlike research on the nonpartisan ballot, there is consensus on the impact of 
non concurrent elections. Holding a local election non concurrently has consistently been shown 
to reduce turnout (Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Caren 2007; Wood 2002). “Cities that hold elections 
concurrently with state and national elections have about a 29 percent higher voter turnout than 
cities who do not hold concurrent city elections” (Wood 2002, 228). The timing of an election, 
more than any other institutional factor, has the largest negative impact on voter turnout (Caren 
2007; Wood 2002). 
Another aspect of the reforms was the introduction of council-manager form of 
government. Research has frequently shown that the council-manager form of government 
decreases turnout (Karning and Walter 1983; Alford and Lee 1968; Wood 2002; Hajnal and Lewis 
2003). And, municipalities with a mayor-council form of government have higher turnout rates 
(Caren 2007; Oliver 2001).  
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Previous scholarship has indicated that the laws governing local governments’ institutional 
and electoral structures impact participation, specifically voter turnout. Table 2.2 provides a 
summary of local government structures and their influence local voter turnout. Typically, reform 
cities have a lower turnout than unreform cities suggesting that institutional and electoral structures 
play a meaningful role in local participation. Participants influence the direction of local public 
policies, the composition of governing bodies, and who benefits from the public policies.  
The debate over the reforms focused on two important features of democracy: 
representation and participation. The question of representation centered on who should be 
represented and which method of representation should be utilized (Welch and Bledsoe1988; 
Hayes 1964). With regards to participation, and more imperative to this project, the question 
became who should participate in local affairs? Should the local political system encourage mass 
participation? Or should it only encourage those who were educated and had a stake in local 
government to participate? In short, should electoral participation encompass the masses or a select 
few? This debate continues among scholars today and is the subject of the next section.  
Local Participation-Does It Really Matter? 
As Tocqueville (2003) indicates, high participation in local affairs is a distinctive and 
important aspect of the American political system. He applauded the high rates of participation 
found among localities. Key aspects of a democracy are the concepts of consent and legitimacy. 
Tocqueville reasoned that individuals participated in the decision-making process of local 
government because it was a way to consent and provide legitimacy to the local governing entity. 
In the New England towns, Tocqueville observers how the townsmen came together to discuss 
local matters. Being an active participant in the decision making process, an individual exerts their 
right to be heard. Since those affected by the decision have been given a chance to be heard, the 
outcome of the decision is perceived as legitimate.  
46 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Local Government Structures and Expectations of Local Voter Turnout  
Low Voter Turnout Expected When: High Voter Turnout Expected When: 
Nonpartisan electoral system is used Partisan elections, especially when 
competitive  
Council-Manager from of Government Mayor-Council from of Government  
Conduct Elections in Odd Numbered Years Conduct Elections in Even Numbered Years 
Homogenous Population Heterogeneous Population  
            *Adopted from Dye and MacManus 2012 
 
While Tocqueville paints a splendid picture of participation at the local level, not all 
scholars agree that high participation is necessary for a healthy democracy. What level of 
participation should be desired is a reoccurring debate. How much participation is necessary? In a 
democracy, are high levels of turnout needed? Or is it acceptable for a democracy to have low 
levels of turnout? 
Lower Participation is Best 
Some scholars argue that low levels of participation is an indicator for satisfaction and 
stability in a democracy (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Weisberg and Grofman 1981). 
Low levels of participation creates stability within the political system and limits conflict. It 
indicates that citizens are content with public policies and elected officials. In their study of voter 
alienation, satisfaction and indifference, Weisberg and Grofman (1981) found that voters abstain 
from voting if they like both candidates. In other words, candidate satisfaction suppresses overall 
turnout (Weisberg and Grofman 1981).  
In a local political context, voters can use either exit or voice (Hirschman 1970). Exit is 
escaping from the undesired condition while voice involves an attempt to change the condition 
(Hirschman 1970). At the local level, an individual could opt to exit thereby moving to a new 
locality for better services, such as a better school system. However, the ability for individuals to 
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exit one locality in favor for another is typically not a feasible option. Moving costs money, which 
not everyone has. If one cannot utilize exit, they turn to voice (Hirschman 1970).  
If a voter becomes dissatisfied, they can use their ‘voice’ and vote against policies and 
candidates with whom they disagree (Hirschman 1970; Hirschman 1980). Voice can mean 
individual voice, such as calling a local official and complaining, or collective voice, where voters 
as a whole can participate by voting, marching, protesting, etc. (Dowding and John 2008).  
Unsatisfied voters can utilize the collective voice and engage in protests, marches or riots. 
These are “political explosions” that are sudden and occur when there is an intense preference for 
a certain public policy (Hirschman 1980). In Dowding and John’s (2008) study of UK residents 
and public service satisfaction, they found that dissatisfied individuals were more likely to vote 
and engage in other collective participation forms (i.e. marches). “The discontented customers or 
members could become so harassing that their protests would at some point hinder rather than 
help” (Hirschman 1980, 31) suggesting that sharp increase in participation may lead to more 
conflict than a democracy can handle.  
Accordingly, some citizens are highly active, some are not, and some fall somewhere in 
the middle (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954). This distribution of political activity works 
because the political system is threatened when too many individuals participate. If individuals do 
not participate normally, they may not have a commitment to democratic values, therefore, when 
these individuals participate, they may be prone to support more authoritarian solutions to societal 
problems (Hudson 2010). Thus, political apathy and inactivity make the political system more 
stable since high levels of participation would collapse the political system (Berelson, Lazarsfeld 
and McPhee 1954).  
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Higher Participation is Best  
Alternatively, low participation can also be a sign of an unhealthy democracy. This school 
of thought claims high levels of participation are needed because it confers legitimacy of a political 
system, provides a mandate to govern, offers control over and accountability of elected officials, 
and reduces the bias in policy outcomes. Voter turnout is a widely used approach of establishing 
the legitimacy of the political system (Clark and Krebs 2012). 
High levels of participation signify that the newly elected governing body has a mandate 
to govern and provides legitimacy to the political system (Dahl 1956). If voter turnout is low, it 
may call into question the legitimacy of a given political system. For instance, Wilks-Heeg and 
Blick (2009) suggest that turnout in local elections is too low to offer adequate legitimacy to their 
political systems. By having low turnout, it is difficult to argue that citizens have a reasonable 
degree of accountability over their elected officials. Additionally, low voter turnout creates 
difficulty in declaring that election results are an indicator of the citizens’ policy preferences.   
Low voter turnout also makes it harder to ensure accountability of elected officials. 
Newton’s (1976) study illustrates just how sensitive elected officials are to constituents’ 
preferences. In an English city, local officials kept rent down due to fear of being voted out of 
office when housing was a local campaign issue (Newton 1976). The threat of being voted out 
helps ensure that elected officials adhere to their campaign mandates (Powell 2000) and thereby 
making the elected official more responsive to constituents’ preferences (Clark and Krebs 2012). 
High participation ensures that public policies will reflect the will of the people and not the 
interests of a select few (Hudson 2010). As Lijphart (1997) points out, “unequal participation spells 
unequal influence” (1). Voters and non-voters are different: voters tend to be better educated and 
have higher incomes than non-voters (Clark and Krebs 2012). If only a select few are participating, 
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policies tend to favor the participating groups, which subsequently forms a bias in public policies. 
Those who don’t (or can’t) participate fail to have their voices heard. “When disadvantage groups 
fail to vote, local officials are more likely to be unresponsive to their concerns” (Hajnal 2010, 139). 
Berry, Portney, and Thomson (1993) found that citizens in cities with citywide programs designed 
to give neighborhood organizations a role in the local policy process were more likely to feel that 
government was responsive to their needs. Participation, then, is the vehicle to obtain the outcomes 
desired from government. Scholars have found that with high turnout, the bias of public policies 
are fairly low (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Mahler 2008).  
This view of democracy also argues that participation teaches individuals how to be good 
citizens. If individuals practice democracy through voting, it allows them to learn about the 
political system, the issues and matters affecting society, and creates awareness of their fellow 
man’s concerns. Through participation, individuals can understand what the public good is. Local 
governments provide a forum for individuals to learn these democratic values. This idea is 
discussed further in the next section.    
Participation at the Local Level 
Engaging in participation at the local level has three principal consequences. As Mill and 
others note, participation at the local level is paramount because it is where the individual learns 
about democracy and democratic values. Mill (1971) suggests that local governments are “schools 
of democracy.” Localities provide a myriad of opportunities for participation and foster an 
understanding of democratic values. Practicing participation at the local level, Mill (1963) argues, 
is the only way “the people will ever learn how to exercise it on a larger scale” (186).  
As citizens participate more frequently at the local level, they gain a democratic education that 
makes it easier to participate in the future and at other levels. “Participation develops and fosters 
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the very qualities necessary for it; the more individuals participate, the better able they become to 
do so” (Pateman 1970, 42-43). Participation is expected, according to Bentham and Mill, since 
citizens are assumed to be “interested in politics because it was in his best interest to be so” 
(Pateman 1970, 19). 
For Mill, understanding democracy and participation are instrumental for a healthy 
democracy. The democratic education citizens receive through participation at the local level helps 
prevent tyranny. Conventional wisdom acknowledges that the Founders believed individuals 
would seek their own self-interest both in and out of government. To prevent tyranny, they 
decentralized power. The decentralization found in the American political system provides citizens 
the opportunity to practice democracy at many levels, beginning primarily at the local level. The 
independence granted to local governments prevents despotism because “a people who had not 
learned to use freedom in small concerns would not know how to use it in great affairs of the State” 
(Syed 1966, 31). Through participation in local government, citizens learn about democracy, 
practice it on a small scale, and are then able to exercise it at the state and federal levels. The 
outcome is a nation that practices democracy at all government levels.  
Second, Mill and Bentham argue that participation at the local level is the key to good 
governance. Mill and Bentham maintain that “participation of the people has a very narrow 
function; it ensures that good government… is achieved through the sanction of loss of office” 
(Pateman 1970, 19). Elections are the mechanisms employed by citizens to ensure that the will of 
the people is attained. By participating in elections, Mill and Bentham reason, the “private interests 
of each citizen [are] protected” (Pateman 1970, 20). Similarly, Rousseau views participation as the 
means to ensuring “freedom to the individual by enabling him to be (and remain) his own master” 
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(Pateman 1970, 26). Because of the equality6 in participation and the ability to be governed, man 
“remains master of his own affairs” and only surrenders that ability when his actions cause 
“damage” to “society” (Tocqueville 2003, 78).  “The participatory process ensures that although 
no man, or group, is master of another, all are equally dependent on each other and equally subject 
to the law” (Pateman 1970, 27).  
Mill, Bentham, Rousseau, and Tocqueville suggest there is a protective function in 
participation. It protects individual freedom and curtails individual self-interest. The power 
conferred to local governments is decentralized among its institutions. Localities “diversify the 
duties” of government (Tocqueville 2003, 81). In doing so, they “share” local “authority among a 
large number of citizens” (Tocqueville 2003, 81).  When individuals participate at the local level, 
they do so to protect their own private interests (Tocqueville 2003). However, these interests are 
reduced because “he [man] views the township as a strong, free social body of which he is part 
and which merits the care he devotes to its management” (Tocqueville 2003, 80).  Citizens do what 
is best for the community as a whole because their survival depends on it. The decentralization of 
power within local government ensures that individual freedom is maintained and self-interests 
are minimized. 
Finally, participation at the local level creates a sense of belonging or attachment to their 
community. Rousseau indicates that participation “increases the feeling among individual citizens 
that they ‘belong’ in their community” (Pateman 1970, 27). There is equality in participation: one 
man, one vote. Voting booths do not differentiate between a rich person’s vote and a poor person’s 
vote. At the voting booth, all citizens of the community are equal. The experience of participating 
                                                 
6 Equality here means one man, one vote  
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in the decision-making process of the locality, by any means, attaches the individual to the 
community.  
Governing Localities: Local Elections and Participation  
The impact of decisions made by government varies depending on the level of government 
making the decision. Decisions made by the national government do not necessarily have the same 
immediate impact compared to decision made at the local level. For example, national and even 
state policy on abortion only becomes applicable to an individual’s daily life if they or their partner 
are pregnant. FDA regulations impact pharmaceutical companies and other food and drug 
manufactures directly; a secondary impact might be felt by the individual if they are a consumer 
of a product offered by a manufacture that must comply with FDA regulations. 
On the other hand, decisions made at the local level directly impact the daily lives of 
citizens. Tocqueville (2003) suggests this is because decisions made by local governments are “at 
the center of everyday affairs” (81). Issues such as trash collection, library and park locations, 
water and sewer maintenance, property tax rates, mosquito abatement, and the quality of public 
schools are all matters that are debated and decided at the local level. The impact of these decisions 
has a more immediate effect. For instance, citizens know when their trash has not been picked up 
or if their school district eliminates teaching positions.  
Additionally, the nature of policy decision making of localities is “often a zero-sum game” 
(Kaufmann 2007) meaning a gain for one group/project/entity is a loss for another. Since local 
politics tends to be a zero-sum game, the trade-offs of policies tend to be more apparent (Kaufmann 
2007). For example, if a tax levy for a public school fails, it could mean a layoff of teachers, 
reduced extra-circular activities, and/or have no buses running for that school year. A failed 
property tax increase could lead to less police and fire protection or the closing of parks and/or 
libraries. For that reason, the ability to influence local government decision making is paramount. 
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The American Electoral System: An Overview 
A primary way to participate and influence government is through elections. Elections 
ensure that elected officials are held accountable and authorize citizens to remain in control of 
their government. Elected officials are those who are directly elected by the eligible voters. In the 
United States, voters elect 513,658 individuals to public office (U.S. Department of Commerce 
1992). The vast majority of these elected officials, however, are not elected to federal or even state 
office. Ninety-six percent of all elected officials are elected to local offices (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 1992). Table 2.3 illustrates just how many elected officials there are within the United 
States, and in particular, local governments.  
Table 2.3 Number of Elected Officials in U.S. by Government Unit 
Government Unit   Total Number of Elected Officials  
United States 513,200 
Federal Government  542 
State Governments 18,828 
Local Governments  493,830 
  
General-Purpose 
Governments  
 
County 58,818 
Sub-County 262,489 
Municipal  135,531 
Town/Township 126,958 
  
Special-Purpose  
School District 88,434 
Special District 84,089 
   *Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1992 Census of Governments 
 
The sheer number of local elected officials suggests that there are a considerable number 
of elections to fill these positions. Broadly speaking, local elections include elections for counties, 
municipalities, towns/townships, school boards, and special districts7. Overall, there are 89,527 
                                                 
7 This is not a compressive list of all local elections.  
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government entities within the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). Collectively, local 
governments comprise 89,476, or 99 percent, of those governmental entities. These local 
government entities tend to hold elections for their respective governing bodies. Table 2.4 breaks 
down the number of local government entities found in the United States. Since local elections 
tend to be held often, there is a larger number of observations for scholars to better understand 
political behavior at the local level. Nonetheless local elections have been overlooked by scholars 
(Clark and Krebs 2012; Marschall 2010).  
More specifically for this project, local governments refers to municipal governments. 
Recall that municipal governments are sub-governments under the broader classification of 
general-purpose governments. Of the 89,476 local governments found in the United States, 19,492, 
or 21 percent, are municipalities (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The number of municipal 
governments found within a state range from 1 to 1,299 (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). At least one 
municipality can be found in every state.  
Table 2.4 Number of Local Governments in U.S. by Category 
General Purpose Governments  Special Purpose Governments   
Counties 3,031 Special Districts 37,203 
Municipalities 19,522 School Districts 12,884 
Towns/Townships 16,364   
Total 38,917 Total 50,087 
* Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2012 
 
Municipal governments have an elected governing body to administer services and make 
decisions on local matters. In the State of Ohio, there are 938 municipal governments (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2012). Municipal boards or councils in Ohio have at least six elected members but no more 
than 17 elected members (Ohio Revised Code 731.01 and 731.09)8. Do the math, the State of Ohio 
                                                 
8 The number is dependent on the size of the municipality. Municipalities can also alter their number of elected 
councilmen per a ballot initiative.  
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has anywhere from 5,628 to 15,946 elected officials just to manage the 938 municipal 
governments.  
Types of Elections 
There are different types of elections within the United States. First there are general 
elections-where the person that is elected holds office. General elections are conducted for federal, 
state, and local offices. Presidential elections occur every four years in November and falling on 
even numbered years. Midterm elections are held every two years after the quadrennial election of 
president also in the month of November. State elections include statewide offices, such as 
governor, secretary of state, and state legislators. Only four states hold elections for their state 
assemblies in odd years (National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)).9 And, just six states 
hold their gubernatorial elections in odd years (National Governors Association)10. The majority 
of state elections are held in even numbered years thereby falling concurrently with either 
presidential or midterm elections. Local elections broadly encompasses all sub-state elections 
including but not limited to city councils, county commissions, mayors, school boards, township 
officials, and special district officials. Unlike federal and most state elections, local elections tend 
to take place in odd numbered years (non-concurrent). The International City/County Management 
Association (ICMA) (2002), indicates that 77 percent of municipalities hold their elections non-
concurrently.  
In addition to general elections, there are also primary and special elections. Primary 
elections are held to determine which candidate will represent each political party in a general 
election. It is not uncommon to have a primary election for president, U.S. Senators, U.S. 
Representatives, mayors, governors, etc. There are also special elections that can occur within a 
                                                 
9 New Jersey, Virginia, Louisiana, Mississippi 
10 Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, West Virginia, New Jersey, Virginia  
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state or locality. Special elections can be held to fill a vacant seat, or for ballot issues, such as 
mileage proposals. In 2013, there were 16 special elections to fill state legislative vacancies 
(NCSL). Primary and special elections add to the sheer number of elections conducted in the 
United States.   
Given the large quantity of elections held in the United States, some voters have the 
opportunity to cast a ballot every year, such as voters in the State of Ohio. Voters in Ohio, like 
those in other states, elect a president every four years and a congressman every two years. Both 
of these federal general elections occur in even numbered years and in November, the traditional 
month to hold elections. In addition to federal elections, Ohioans elect statewide officers- governor 
and lieutenant governor, secretary of state, auditor of state, treasurer of state, and attorney general- 
and county officers in even years that fall non-concurrently with presidential election years (e.g. 
2010, 2014, and 2018). In odd numbered years, voters in Ohio elect municipal officers, including 
city councilmen and mayors, school board officials, special district officers, and township officers. 
For voters living in the State of Ohio, every year they have the opportunity to cast a ballot in a 
general election.  
Local Elections Are Different 
To this point, the discussion has highlighted the nuances of the American electoral system. 
But, there are fundamental differences between federal and local elections.  
The most notable difference is the timing of local elections. Unlike the federal government, 
where the time of the election is set for all federal elections, local governments have no set time 
or method that applies to all localities. Local elections are often held at different times of the year 
than national or statewide elections. As Marschall (2010) explains, only 22.6 percent of municipal 
governments held elections concurrently leaving 77.4 percent of municipal government to hold 
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elections non-currently.11 For instance, voters in the cities of Birmingham, Alabama; Apache 
Junction Arizona; and North Miami, Florida all elected their mayors in odd numbered years.12 
This difference has a significant impact on voter turnout. Holding elections non-
concurrently is a primary reason for low voter turnout at the local level (Wood 2002; Hajnal and 
Lewis 2003). If local elections are held concurrently with presidential elections, it is estimated that 
turnout in local elections would increase by as much as 29 percent (Wood 2002).  "Participation 
in local elections depends critically on the timing of those elections" (Hajnal and Lewis 2003, 
656). 
Additionally, there are differences in the method of selection are different between federal 
and local elections. First is whether candidates have their party identification on the ballot. In non-
partisan elections, candidates seek office without a party label on the ballot whereas partisan 
elections provide candidates with a party label on the ballot. In federal elections, the candidate 
runs with a party label-Republican, Democrat, Independent, etc. During a federal election, political 
parties mobilize voters, provide the candidate with a party label, and align themselves government 
services and programs that appeal to their base. In many local elections, the party label is absent. 
For instance, 77 percent of municipalities and 89 percent of school boards have non-partisan 
elections (ICMA 2002; Hess 2002). Recent scholarship indicates that there is no significant 
difference in turnout rates between partisan and nonpartisan ballots (Lublin and Tate 1995; Wood 
2002) expect when the elections are close (Caren 2007) These findings are in line with research 
suggesting that party affiliation is not salient in local elections (Peterson 1981; Kaufmann 2007) 
and politics at the local level are more allocative in nature (Kaufmann 2007). 
                                                 
11 This also includes municipalities that hold elections in both odd and even years 
12 City of Birmingham, Alabama who elected their mayor in October of 2013. In March of 2013, voters in Apache 
Junction, Arizona elected their mayor. The City of North Miami held its election for mayor in May of 2011. 
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Secondly, the type of district is different between local and federal elections. At the local 
level, municipalities have either single member district or an at-large district. Single member 
districts are similar to Congressional districts in that the candidates are elected by voters of 
particular district or ward, and the candidate represents that district or ward while in office. In at-
large districts, voters across the municipality as a whole elect candidates who will represent the 
entire city, not a particular district. As noted in Table 2.1, 66 percent of localities elect their 
governing boards through at-large elections while 17 percent hold single-district elections. This is 
a unique feature of local governments. Using an at-large system of electing public officials versus 
a single-member district has also been shown to have a negative impact on voter turnout in 
municipal elections (Hajnal and Lewis 2003), however, this finding should be used with caution 
as the number of single member districts in the study was small.  
Finally, the institutional structure of local governments are different from those found at 
the state and national level. All fifty states have an executive (governor) and a legislative body. 
The national government has an executive (president) and a legislative body. When political 
systems have an executive, voters have someone to blame when times are tough and reward when 
times are good. In municipal governments, the executive (mayor) is often absent since the majority 
of municipalities have council-manager systems. In a council-manager form of government, the 
municipal government has a manager to handle administrative matters. Alternatively, in a mayor-
council form of government, the municipal government has a mayor, which generally makes 
executive decisions. Research has consistently shown that the council-manager form of 
government decreases turnout (Karning and Walter 1983; Alford and Lee 1968; Wood 2002; 
Hajnal and Lewis 2003) while municipalities with a mayor-council form of government have 
higher turnout rates (Caren 2007; Oliver 2001). In council-manager systems, voters have a difficult 
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time determining who to blame for poor performance or who to reward for good performance. The 
lack of an executive in many localities creates a distinctive election dynamic.   
Participation in Local Elections  
For Tocqueville (2003), local elections were significant because it was where citizens 
learned to govern by seeking opportunities to help run local government (82). Tocqueville suggests 
that local elections are essential to American democracy for two reasons. First, local elections 
involve citizens because they provide many participatory opportunities. Local elections are held 
regularly and frequently. As a result, local elections are a mechanism utilized by citizens to manage 
those who are elected. Casting a ballot in a local election is one method for citizens to assert their 
policy preferences and allow their voices to be heard.  
Second, local elections are the way in which citizens govern their locality. It is at the ballot 
box that citizens hold elected officials accountable for their decisions while in office. 
Consequently, who wins at the ballot box directly alters or sustains the composition of local 
governing boards and what public policies are pursued. In a local setting, this has substantial 
consequences as the public policies determine what services are provided as well as the quality of 
those services. These service choices have a direct effect on a citizen’s daily life. The act of voting, 
then, is the primary method of influencing local government.  
Local Campaigns 
 Most municipal elections tend to be low-stimulus elections thereby often having lower 
turnout rates than national and statewide elections. Local campaigns tend not to receive the same 
amount of media coverage as state or national elections. The media acts as an intermediary between 
the people and politics. It can be used, for instance, to discuss issues and increase name recognition 
of candidates. Media buys are expensive and candidates would need to have the necessary funds 
to run a media campaign. At the local level, even if the candidate had enough in his war chest to 
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launch a media campaign, it would be fruitless since media markets often cross the geographical 
boundaries of a locality (Welsh and Bledsoe 1988). In local elections, especially those with single-
member districts, the media buy would be large compared to the district (Welsh and Bledsoe 1988).  
For national elections, votes do not necessarily need to be abreast of the national issues, 
they can use the candidates’ party affiliation as a cue to determine who they vote for. This dynamic 
is not the same in local elections. The party affiliation for candidates is often absent in local 
elections, and issues tend to matter more. The issues at the local level are “smaller in number, less 
complicated, and more proximate than are issues at the national level” (Kaufmann 2007, 19). For 
Americans, “the role of their local government is to maintain or enhance their immediate quality 
of life, to provide necessary services” (Kaufmann 2007, 18-19). Consequently, local campaigns 
tend to focus on the ‘who gets what’ and at the expense of whom.  The emphasis of local campaigns 
is on the outputs of local government decisions. Debates in local campaigns are over parks, police 
and fire protection, garbage collection, and misquote abatement. The distribution of these services 
(or lack thereof) and the benefits they entail can create conflict during an election making the 
issues more salient than other more typical factors, such as party affiliation.  
This, coupled with the zero-sum nature of local politics makes the allocation of local 
resources more relevant in local campaigns. It also makes the politics of “place” more common. It 
is not unusual for there to be divisions in the electorate between the east or west side of a locality 
or between the business community and residents. This makes electoral coalitions an important 
part in winning local elections.  
Turnout in Local Elections 
Scholars, when examining local elections, have consistently concluded that turnout in local 
elections is low (Bullock 1990; Verba et al 1995; Sharp 2003). At the national level, 55-60 percent 
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of eligible voters will cast a ballot while only 25-35 percent cast a ballot in local elections (Dye 
and MacManus 2012). In Caren’s (2007) analysis, the average turnout for municipal elections is 
27 percent. This begs the question: why is turnout in local elections so low? 
In the previous sections, I have offered some explanations for this. I have illustrated how 
local elections are different than national elections. In local elections, eligible voters are inundated 
with a variety of additional complexities in order to cast a ballot. These difficulties - existing only 
at the local level - consequently increase the cost of voting and the burden placed on the voter.  
I have indicated that the institutional structure of local governments influences turnout. 
There are three particular electoral structures that are unique to localities that greatly impact 
elections. First is the timing of elections. The timing of elections is the main reason for low voter 
turnout (Wood 2002; Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Hajnal and Lewis (2003) argue that by holding 
local elections concurrently, it would “essentially double voter turnout” (661). Turnout is low 
when held non concurrently because the public tends to pay less attention to it and fewer resources 
are dedicated to turnout efforts (Hajnal and Lewis 2003).  
Second is the method of selection-using at-large districts or single member districts to elect 
council members. The method of selection has been found to impact minority representation in 
local legislative bodies (Marschall 2010). Using a nonpartisan ballot also affects local elections. 
Conducting nonpartisan elections appears to diminish voter turnout when the elections are close 
(Caren 2007). The electoral structures of localities are important because they alter the costs and 
benefits of voting. Changing the costs and benefits of voting has significant repercussions with 
respect to who votes and who wins. 
Aside from the electoral structures of local elections, the institutional structure of local 
governments can negatively impact voter turnout. There is consensus in urban literature that 
62 
 
 
 
localities with a council-manager form of government have lower turnout (Karning and Walter 
1983; Alford and Lee 1968; Wood 2002; Hajnal and Lewis 2003). This is especially prevalent in 
non concurrent elections (Hajnal & Lewis 2003).  
It is apparent that the structures of local governments influence participation within them. 
In particular, the electoral structures of localities have a negative impact on voter turnout. The 
electoral structures of the reforms are a primary area of study among scholars. However, local 
governments have another electoral structure that has yet to be full examined. Early voting laws 
are an electoral reform. They were primarily adopted as a tool to increase turnout. While early 
voting is a state policy, localities must adhere to it. How has this electoral reform impacted local 
participation? What are the implications of early voting laws on voter turnout?   
In the following chapter, I discuss the impact of electoral reforms on political participation. 
I focus mainly on early voting laws and its effect on voter turnout. However, these analyses are 
limited to primarily national and statewide elections as research on the impact of early voting laws 
on local governments has been understudied. In future chapters, I examine the influence of early 
voting laws on voter turnout in local elections.   
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CHAPTER 3 
ELECTION LAWS AND VOTER TURNOUT 
 
 American elections are legendary for low voter turnout. In presidential elections, turnout 
exceeds just half of the voting age population (Martinez 2010; Franklin and Weber 2010), and in 
midterm elections, turnout is far worse. Local elections, such as but not limited to elections for 
county commissioners, city councilmen, mayors, school boards, special districts, and/or township 
boards, have awful voter turnout (Bullock 1990; Verba et al. 1995; Sharp 2003).  
Scholars have spent decades trying to understand why American elections have such low 
voter turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira 1987; 
Franklin 2002). The literature on voter turnout offers a few explanations, one of which is that the 
legal rules, or election laws, governing elections have a significant influence on voter turnout13 
(Rusk 1970; Converse 1972, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira 
1987). Altering those legal rules can have a positive or negative impact on turnout. This chapter 
focuses on how the legal rules, or elections laws, influence turnout in American elections.  
Election laws are policy interventions that governments can adopt to increase, or decrease, 
voter turnout. This chapter is not exhaustive, but rather highlights the impact of recent federal and 
state election laws on voter turnout. In particular, I discuss early voting, a specific type of election 
law, which alters the timing of elections by extending the number of days a voter can cast a ballot. 
                                                 
13 Four factors have been identified that significantly affect voter turnout in American elections: 1) legal factors 
(Rusk 1970; Converse 1972, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira 1987) 2) 
psychological factors (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Campbell 1979; Clotfelter and Prysby 1980), 
3) personal/demographic factors (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba and Nie 1972; Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993; Brody 1978; Cassel and Hill 1981; Abramson and Aldrich 82), and 4) mobilization (Burnham 1982; 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  
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Assuming high participation in American elections is good and desired in a democracy, low voter 
turnout in local elections is particularly concerning. Early voting laws may be a public policy 
solution that can increase voter turnout in local elections by alleviating the burdens of voting. 
While there are a variety of early voting laws, I focus on in-person early voting laws. I hypothesize 
that in-person early voting has a significant positive influence on voter turnout in municipal 
elections. This suggests early voting laws benefit local democracies the most.  
Election Laws 
Election laws regulate how elections are administered and define the structures of the 
electoral system. Electoral structures influence who votes (turnout), when they vote (timing of 
elections), how they vote (method of voting), how the votes cast are translated into legislative seats 
(method of selection), and, in the end, the overall direction of public policies. Since the voting 
process in the United States is twofold14, election laws also include registration laws, as they have 
a substantial impact on who votes.   
 The federal and state governments share the responsibility of elections in the United States. 
The Constitution sets the date for federal offices (the President and Congress). Both the president 
and members of Congress are elected the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of even 
years. States have the authority to determine the time, place, and manner of elections for federal 
offices. This produces different rules (laws) for governing elections. For instance, each state has 
the power to determine residency requirements, the time period for both registration and voting, 
and the location of polling stations. The result is an assortment of election laws adopted by the 
                                                 
14 The first step is to register to vote. The second is to actually vote.  
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states creating a mixture of rules and regulations to govern elections. Table 3.1 illustrates the 
diversity of election laws found among the states.  
There are three components of state elections laws: year, place and manner. The year (odd 
or even numbered) includes the month the election is held and the length of the voting period. 
Place refers to the location(s) where an individual can cast a ballot (i.e. location of polling station). 
The manner of elections often refers to how the elections will be conducted (i.e. type of ballots).  
State laws regarding time, place, and manner of elections have a significant effect on voter 
turnout. For example, with regards to the timing of elections, those held non-concurrently with 
higher offices have lower turnout (Berry and Gerson 2010). Polling stations located in 
nontraditional places, such as supermarkets, marginally increase turnout (Stein and Garcia-Monet 
1997). Likewise, proximity to the voting site matters. The further away a voter lives from a polling 
station or early voting site, the more likely the individual will become a nonvoter (Dyck and 
Gimpel 2005). However, the manner of elections can have a positive impact on turnout, as is the 
case with an all-mail system. Conducting elections with an all-mail system increases turnout by as 
much as 10 percent (Southwell and Burchett 2000). While place and manner of elections are 
important, this project focuses on the election laws that determine the timing of elections. 
Timing of Local Elections 
The timing of federal elections is set and does not vary across the states. According to the 
Constitution, federal elections are held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. 
This creates consistency for federal elections across states. For local elections, states have the 
authority to determine what day and what month elections are held. The result is a variety of   
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Table 3.1 Elections Laws and Number of State Adoptions 
Election Law Number of States with Law 
Photo ID Law (requires picture ID) 18 
Photo ID Law (photo not required, just ID) 19 
Early Voting Law* 33 
No Excuse Absentee Law* 28 
Excuse Required Absentee Law 21 
Permanent Absentee Law* 8 
Vote by Mail 2 
Pre-registration (for those under 18)* 23 
Same Day Registration* 12 
Online Voter Registration  19 
Limited Online Voter Registration  5 
Straight Ticket Voting 14 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 2013 * Includes the District of Columbia in Totals  
 
days and months which local elections are held across the country. Since localities are “creatures 
of the state,” the states determine when localities can conduct their elections. For instance, the 
State of Connecticut gives localities two options: the first Monday in May or the first Tuesday 
after the first Monday in November (Berry and Gerson 2010). In Ohio, state law requires all 
general elections to be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November (R.C. 3501). 
Louisiana’s municipal and ward general elections not held concurrently with a gubernatorial or 
congressional election are conducted on the fourth Saturday in February or the fourth Saturday in 
April (Berry and Gersen 2010)15. In California, municipal elections are held primarily in March, 
April or June (Berry and Gersen 2010). The variation in the timing of local elections emphasizes 
the piecemeal policies that govern timing of local elections.  
The majority of states conduct their elections in even numbered years. Only New Jersey, 
Virginia, Louisiana, and Mississippi hold election for state offices, such as governor and state 
                                                 
15 The month of the general election depends on when the primary was held. If the primary was in February, then 
general election is also in February; primaries held in April have their general elections held in April  
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legislative bodies, in odd numbered years (non concurrently) (National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL)).  
Since there is no central database for local elections in the United States, it is difficult to 
determine exactly how many localities conduct elections in odd versus even years. A survey by 
International City/Council Management Association (ICMA) (2002) indicates that only 22.6 
percent of municipalities hold their elections in even years (concurrently with federal offices) 
while 77.4 percent conduct their elections in either odd years or in both odd and even years. For 
instance, the State of Connecticut mandates that local officers be elected in odd numbered years 
(Berry and Gerson 2010) while the State of Ohio law splits the timing of local elections with county 
officials being elected in even numbered years and all other municipal officers are elected in odd 
numbered years (Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3501). Of the 19,135 local elected officials in Ohio, 
8,829 (46.1%) are elected in non-concurrent years (US Department of Commerce 1992). California 
and Montana also divide local elections between even and odd numbered years (Berry and Gerson 
2010). The end result is great variation in the year local elections are conducted. 
Does Changing Election Laws Increase Turnout?  
Altering election laws occurs with somewhat regular frequency at the national and state 
levels. At the national level, amendments to the Constitution have expanded the electorate to 
include women, African Americans, and 18 year olds. States have required individuals to pay poll 
taxes, pass literacy tests, and own property in order to vote. While none of these former practices 
are used today, states require photo identification, determine voter registration periods, and decide 
residency requirements. At the local level, municipalities that adopted aspects of the reforms, such 
as nonpartisan elections, also altered their electoral systems (Welsh and Bledsoe 1988; Bridges 
1997). Therefore, election laws become an important component of electoral systems because they 
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can have a direct influence on voter turnout since they determine who is able to cast a ballot (Rusk 
1970; Converse 1972, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira 
1987).  
In the examples above, the changes made to the national, state, or local electoral system 
redefined who could vote. This can have significant consequences as voters and nonvoters tend to 
be different. Voters tend to be older, more educated, and have higher incomes than nonvoters 
(Clark and Krebs 2012; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). This is concerning, since who votes 
shapes the policy outcomes of the government system. Like the adage “the squeaky wheel gets the 
grease,” those who are able to vote and do so have the ear of their elected officials (Clark and 
Krebs 2012; Lijphart 1997).  
This section reviews national, state, and local policies that have been used to increase, or 
decrease, voter turnout. For this project, I assume high participation is desirable in a democracy. 
Recall from Chapter 2 that higher voter turnout reduces potential policy bias, provides legitimacy, 
and ensures accountability. Election laws can be policy prescriptions that alleviate the burden of 
casting a ballot. That is not to say election laws do not have a negative impact on voter turnout, 
they sometimes do. As past U.S. history reveals, some policies adopted by the states, such as 
literacy tests, had a devastating impact on the black vote.16 But, the goal of an election law in 
American democracy should be to increase voter turnout. Democracy cannot be sustained with 
zero voters. And, low voter turnout can call into question the legitimacy of the system and the 
                                                 
16Literacy tests, poll taxes, registration systems, and white primaries were all means to disenfranchise the black 
voters. These laws had a severe impact on the number of blacks registered to vote. According to the Smithsonian 
National Museum of American History, in Mississippi, fewer than 9,000 of the 147,000 voting-age African 
Americans were registered after 1890. In 1989, Louisiana had more than 130,000 black voters registered. The 
number dwindled to 1,342 by 1904. http://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/1-segregated/white-only-1.html 
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mandate of those elected. By changing the legal context that shapes the electoral system, there can 
be a positive influence on voter turnout.  
In Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) seminal piece, Who Votes?, the authors primarily 
examine the demographic composition of voters in the United States. More importantly for this 
project, they also study the influence of state election laws - registration laws specifically - on 
voter turnout. Voter registration is the legal means to vote; without registering to vote, one cannot 
cast a ballot on Election Day. While voter registration was originally a mechanism used to combat 
voter fraud, it is now often perceived as a barrier to the voting booth (Brown 2010).  
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found that registration laws correlated with turnout rates. 
Four conditions in particular had a negative impact on turnout: early registration deadlines, 
irregular office hours, no Saturday registration, and no absentee registration. The negative 
relationship between voter registration laws and turnout, they theorize, is because these laws 
increase the costs of voting “above the threshold of many people” (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
1980, 79). In order to register, a potential voter must navigate the bureaucratic red tape, such as 
knowing the registration deadlines and the location of the registration facility, therefore the costs 
of registering are not equal for everyone (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Education is a factor 
that can help reduce the costs associated with registration. A higher education voter can overcome 
the obstacles associated with voter registration better since education increases their ability to 
manage the bureaucratic hurdles that come with registering to vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
1980).  
Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) work laid the foundation for future research on voter 
registration laws and turnout. Scholars have consistently found that strict voter registration 
requirements negatively impact turnout; this finding is consistent across all electoral contexts 
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(Brown 2012). Registering to vote often has many procedural steps. Additionally, an individual 
must make the decision to register long before the election has gained momentum. The costs of 
voting are increased by registration requirements because it asks the individual to be aware of the 
registration process and register to vote before interest in the campaign occurs. Registration has 
information costs, such as knowing registration deadlines and the location of registration offices, 
as well as physical costs, such as time away from work, to register.  
Analyzing voter turnout from a cost and benefit perspective stems from the rational choice 
framework. In An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs’ (1957) model of voting hypothesized 
that an individual’s decision to vote is a function of the costs and benefits of voting. In a perfect 
world, with no information costs, a voter would decide which candidate to vote for by comparing 
the expected utility from the incumbent while in office to the expected utility from the challenger 
had he won office (Downs 1957, Chapter 3). This allows the voter to find his current party utility 
differentials, which would then determine his vote choice. Since the world is not perfect, a rational 
voter seeks to increase his efficiency and does so by spending no more time or money on obtaining 
information than his potential benefits warrant (Downs 1957, Chapter 12). A rational voter will 
vote if the benefits of voting outweigh the costs; “if not, he abstains” (Downs 1957, 260).  
Downs suggests that there are two primary costs of voting: information costs and physical 
costs. Information costs refer to the resources utilized to obtain information about the candidates 
and/or parties. Physical costs include the resources, such as time and money, needed to register to 
vote and then vote, as well as the time taken off work in order to complete these tasks. While 
information costs are important in calculating who to vote for, physical costs can be lessened by 
election laws. For instance, election laws can alter the hours a polling station is open or the duration 
of the voting or registration period. The longer hours reduce the cost of voting (or registering) 
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because they create more opportunities for the individual to complete these tasks. The benefits of 
voting include the value the voter places on democracy and the concern the voter has on the 
outcome of the election. Since the probability for one vote to make a difference in election 
outcomes is low, Downs reasons that voting is irrational if the costs outweigh the benefits.  
Using his model,17 Downs’ work predicts a much lower turnout than what actually occurs. 
Since a democracy cannot survive with zero voters, he suggests that individuals may be motivated 
to vote so that democracy is sustained even when there are no personal gains from voting (Downs 
1957, Chapter 14). Much like the probability of an individual’s vote deciding the out of an election 
is slim, there is relatively little chance that one vote would determine the success (or failure) of a 
democracy.  
The rational choice perspective of voting offered by Downs asks an important question: 
why do people vote?  Expanding on Downs’ theory, Riker and Ordeshook (1970) include a civic 
duty variable in Downs’ equation. Akin to Downs’ notion that individuals may vote to support 
democracy, Riker and Ordeshook’s civic duty variable aims to capture the satisfaction one receives 
from voting, affirming allegiance to their political party, and being part of the political system 
(Riker and Ordeshook 1970, 28). With the inclusion of a civic duty variable in the calculation of 
voting, their findings support the theory that an individuals’ voting behavior can be explained by 
rational decision-making (Riker and Ordeshook 1970).  
The model used by Riker and Ordeshook (1970) indicates that the probability of an 
individual’s vote mattering (P), the benefits received from voting (B), the costs associated with 
                                                 
17 The expected utility hypothesis states the calculus of voting is: R= (BP)-C where R= individual rewards from 
voting, B= the individual’s differential benefit between the candidates, P= the probability that voting will bring the 
expected benefit, C= individual costs of voting (See Downs 1957, Riker and Ordeshook 1970). 
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voting (C), and civic duty (D) all have marginal effects on voter turnout. According to their model, 
a change in any of these variables would create a change in voter turnout. Election laws affect the 
costs (C) of voting. Using their model,18 if there is a decrease in the costs of voting (C), then there 
should be an increase in turnout. This model has been the foundation for later scholarship that 
examines the impact of election laws on voter turnout.  
Much of the literature on election laws and voter turnout has been done under the rational 
choice framework, which suggests that if the costs of voting were lowered, participation would 
increase (Downs 1954; Riker and Ordeshook 1969). Election laws are the primary means to 
altering these costs as they can make it easier, or harder, for individuals to access the ballot. 
Returning to voter registration as an example, costs of registering are high because of the resources 
(e.g. time) used to navigate the registration process, learn the registration deadlines, locate the 
registration office, etc. Most registration deadlines are 10 to 30 days prior to Election Day.19 These 
early registration deadlines have a negative effect on voter turnout because they occur before the 
campaign has built momentum (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  
How significant is the impact of voter registration laws on turnout? Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1980) found registration laws decrease voter turnout by nine percent. Others have 
estimated an eight percent reduction in turnout due to the barriers presented by the registration 
process (Teixeira 1992). If voter registration laws were liberalized, meaning less costly to the 
voter, it would increase voter turnout by about eight percent (Mitchell and Wlezien 1995).  
                                                 
18 Their model and others, such as Downs, who have also used the calculus of voting formula. 
19 Exceptions are states with Election Day registration. There are six states who practice Election Day registration 
and one state that does not require voters to register (Brown 2010).  
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In an effort to ease the burden of registration on potential voters, Congress enacted the 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (a.k.a. Motor Voter law). A key feature of the NVRA 
allows an individual to register to vote when renewing their driver’s license. This was largely 
viewed as a potential means to reduce the burden of the registration process. The central 
anticipation after the passage of the NVRA was that voter turnout would increase since the costs 
of registering were decreased. This speculation assumes that once registered, voting would follow. 
As empirical evidence points out, lessening registration costs does not necessarily mean voter 
turnout increases. Registering to vote and casting a ballot are two separate political acts. In theory, 
the NVRA should increase registration rates since it reduced the costs associated with registration. 
Empirical evidence indicates that by decreasing the burdens associated with registration, the 
numbers of those registered has increased. In examining the NVRA, Martinez and Hill (1999) 
found that registration increased, but not turnout. Others have found registration has increased 
among groups traditionally less likely to register (Hill 2003; Brown and Wedeking 2006). While 
the NVRA creates an easier registration process and expands the electorate, it has not increased 
turnout in American elections.  
The NVRA is an example of a national law that has been implemented to reduce the costs 
of voting by making the registration process easier for the potential voter. But, states have also 
adopted policies that alter the registration and voting process. A long line of research has been 
conducted on state election laws (Larocca and Dlemanski 2011; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and 
Miller 2007; Berinsky 2005; Fitzgerald 2005; Wolfinger, Highton, and Mullin 2005; Gronke 2004; 
Karp and Banducci 2000, 2001; Knack 2001; Stein 1998; Southwell and Burchett 1997; Stein and 
Garcia-Monet 1997). Some of these election laws have had a positive impact on voter turnout (e.g. 
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vote by mail elections, Election Day registration) while others have produced the opposite (e.g. in-
person early voting).  
At the state level, there are two types of laws that ease the registration process: same day 
registration and Election Day registration. These two laws are similar as they both offer a one-stop 
shop that allows individuals to register and vote simultaneously. Logically, if potential voters can 
incur the costs of registration and voting at the same time, and do so closer to Election Day when 
campaign momentum is higher, the perceived benefit of voting may be greater. This should have 
a positive effect on turnout as the costs (C) are decreased and the perceived benefits (B) are 
increased. The difference between same day registration and Election Day registration lies in when 
a voter is able both register and vote. Same day registration permits a voter to register and vote on 
the same day prior to Election Day whereas Election Day registration allows voters to both register 
and vote on Election Day.  
Same day registration (SDR) allows an individual to go to a voting site, such as the election 
office, register to vote, and then vote. With SDR, the costs associated with registering to vote and 
actually voting are incurred at the same time. SDR should have a positive impact on voter turnout 
because the costs of voting are reduced. In her study of SDR and NVRA, Rhine (1996) found a 
positive relationship between SDR and voter turnout. She estimates SDR increases turnout 
between 10-14 percent.  
Likewise, Election Day registration (EDR) allows potential voters to register at their voting 
site, such as their polling location, on Election Day. On Election Day, they register, then proceed 
to the polling booth to cast their ballot. EDR in particular allows voters to register and vote at the 
last moment of an election cycle when voter interest is highest and the campaign has the most 
momentum (Burden et al 2009). With EDR, the costs of registering and voting are lessened 
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because they are experienced simultaneously and the perceived benefit of voting is greater since 
the campaign is at its peak. It is not surprising then that EDR has a positive impact on voter turnout 
(Burden et al 2009). States that adopt EDR had higher turnout rates in midterm elections (Knack 
1998; Fenster 1994). Turnout in midterm elections increased by six percent in states that had EDR 
(Fester 1994). In presidential elections, states with EDR also had higher turnout rates compared to 
states without EDR (Brians and Grofman 2001; Knack 1998; Fenster 1994). Interestingly, Larocca 
and Dlemanski (2011), who examined turnout in presidential elections (2000, 2004, and 2008), 
found EDR increased the probability of new residents voting. This finding supports Squire, 
Wolfinger, and Glass’ (1987) hypothesis that low turnout among movers is due to the burden of 
re-registering to vote. In presidential elections, EDR increased turnout by as little as three percent 
(Knack 1998) and as much as seven percent (Brians and Grofman 2001). It is estimated that a 
national EDR law would increase turnout by five percent (Fenster 1994).  
Other proposals for registration reform include mail-in registration and easing the 
requirements of registration (often re-registration) for movers. Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass (1987) 
suggest that low turnout among movers is due to the burden of re-registering to vote. If this burden 
of registering was reduced for those who move, turnout would increase by nine percent (Squire, 
Wolfinger, and Glass 1987).  
Additionally, states could adopt policies that do more to facilitate access to the ballot. Some 
suggestions include having accessible polling locations, mailing sample ballots and polling 
information to voters, and have the polling stations stay open longer. When a voting location is 
less accessible, the costs to get there could be higher than any benefit the voter receives from 
casting a ballot (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003). Gimpel and Schuknecht (2003) found that 
accessibility does make a significant difference in turnout with distance imposing the heaviest 
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burden. States that mail sample ballots to voters prior to Election Day, mail information about 
polling locations, and have polls open for longer periods of time, have higher turnout rates 
(Wolfinger, Hughton, and Mullin 2005). Wolfinger, Hughton, and Mullin (2005) indicate that if 
states adopt these aforementioned practices, it would increase turnout by three percent.  
 Early Voting  
 Another state policy that has been touted as an approach to increasing voter turnout is early 
voting. Early voting is a means to vote outside of the traditional voting booth while still preserving 
the integrity and fairness of an election (Rosenfield 1994). Advocates of early voting claimed it 
would attract marginal voters - those who would vote if they could get to the polls on Election Day 
(Rosenfield 1994). Therefore, voter turnout should increase. Election Day voters are confined to 
the hours and assigned polling location determined by the government. Those who opt to vote 
early travel to an early voting site at their convenience to cast a ballot. Early voting extends the 
number of days in which a person can cast a ballot and increases the number and type of voting 
locations (Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997).  
Texas introduced early voting in 1988. Because of early voting’s popularity among voters, 
a number of states have adopted similar policies. Currently, 34 states utilize some form of early 
voting. The rapid adoption of early voting among the states is not surprising as it is common 
practice for a state to adopt policies of neighboring states (Walker 1969; Katz, Levin, and Hamilton 
1963; Berry and Berry 1990; Mooney and Lee 1995; Mintrom and Vergari 1998). However, early 
voting laws vary among the states. These variations primarily include the method of early voting 
and the features of in-person early voting.  
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Methods of Early Voting  
There are four primary methods of early voting: no-excuse absentee voting, permanent 
absentee voting, vote-by-mail, and in-person early voting. It is common to refer to any of these 
methods as early voting, even though they are vastly different in practice. Each type of early voting 
law attempts to reduce the costs of voting borne by individual by expanding the number of days 
an individual can cast a ballot. However, some early voting laws are more liberalized than others. 
In other words, if the early voting law is liberalized, the state government bears most of the burden 
associated with voting rather than the individual. The methods of early voting can placed on a 
spectrum from most liberal to least liberal (most restrictive). See figure 3.1. Using the cost - benefit 
approach, liberalized early voting laws would have less individual costs associated with them. 
Therefore, participation should increase.  
Figure 3.1:  Continuum of Early Voting 
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No-Excuse Absentee Voting and Permanent Absentee Voting  
No-excuse absentee voting allows voters to request an absentee ballot without providing 
an excuse. Twenty-eight states have implemented no-excuse absentee voting; twenty-six have both 
no-excuse absentee voting and in-person early voting (NCSL). Unlike the other methods of early 
voting, with no-excuse absentee voting the voter still needs to request a ballot from the 
government. Therefore, the costs of voting are still borne by the voter. States with no excuse 
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absentee voting have higher rates of absentee voters than states that require an excuse to vote 
absentee (US Election Assistance Commission 2006 (US EAC)).  
A caveat to no-excuse absentee voting is permanent absentee status. In seven states, voters 
can request to be placed on a permanent absentee ballot list (NCSL). Upon doing so, these 
permanent absentee voters are mailed an absentee ballot every election without the need to request 
an absentee ballot. With permanent absentee voting, the costs of voting shift from the voter to the 
state since the state becomes responsible for mailing the ballot to the voter without a request from 
the voter.  
Vote By Mail 
The vote by mail (VBM) system has been used in Oregon since 1998. Currently two states, 
Oregon and Washington, practice this method of early voting. In VBM elections, voters receive 
their voter pamphlets in the mail, followed by their ballots, which they return via the mail.  
Vote by mail laws, by their nature, require state governments to play a more active role in 
the voting process. In a vote by mail system, the state government mails all registered voters their 
ballot for each election. This occurs even if the voter has decided not to vote in that particular 
election. If the voter opts to vote, it is up to the voter to complete the ballot and return it via mail. 
In-person early voting 
In-person early voting is akin to absentee voting in that both can be done prior to Election 
Day. However, there are clear differences. In absentee voting, the voter requests the ballot, which 
is then mailed to them. And in some cases, absentee voting requires an excuse be provided.20 In-
person early voting allows voters cast a ballot at an election center and/or a satellite location before 
                                                 
20 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, 20 states require an excuse to vote absentee. 
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Election Day without an excuse. Election centers are located in places such as the clerk’s or 
election officials’ office. Satellite locations are typically determined by the state or local clerks 
and include places such as government buildings, firehouses, shopping malls, and/or grocery stores 
(Stein and Vonnahme 2010). When voters arrive at the voting site, they cast a ballot using the same 
equipment that is used on Election Day. 
The burden to vote remains completely upon the individual in states with in-person early 
voting. While in-person early voting laws allow one to cast a ballot prior to Election Day, the voter 
must still make the decision to vote, locate the early voting center, and then travel to the early 
voting center to cast a ballot. The costs of voting are much higher in in-person early voting states 
than states that have VBM elections or permanent absentee ballot systems.  
Features of In-Person Early Voting 
 Since in-person early voting is a state law, its characteristics differ among the states. These 
differences include the period of early voting, the location of voting sites, the type of voting sites 
used, and the hours voting sites are open.  
Early voting laws lengthen the time period a person can cast a ballot. States like Michigan, 
which has not adopted any method of early voting, only permit their voters to vote during specified 
hours on Election Day. Alternatively, in-person early voting allows voters to cast a ballot at a 
voting site as early as 45 days prior to Election Day (NCSL). The start dates for in-person early 
voting fluctuate by state. For example, in the State of Ohio, voters can cast a ballot at early voting 
sites 35 days before Election Day. Vermont21 and Florida22, which have similar in-person early 
voting laws to Ohio, permit voters to cast a ballot 45 days and 10 days prior to Election Day 
                                                 
21 http://vermont-elections.org/elections1/absentee_overview.html 
22 http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voting/early.shtml 
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respectively. On average, states open the early voting process 22 days before Election Day 
(NCSL). 
Much like the start dates of in-person early voting, the end dates also differ between the 
states. Early voting can remain open as late as the day before Election Day (NCSL). In three states, 
in-person early voting closes the Thursday prior to Election Day (NCSL).  Nine states end in-
person early voting the Friday before Election Day (NCSL).  In five states, early voting concludes 
the Saturday before Election Day whereas 11 states end it on the Monday prior to Election Day 
(NCSL). The average voting period is 19 days among the states with in-person early voting 
(NCSL). 
The hours and days that voting sites are open for in-person early voting vary by state. In 
many cases, states with in-person early voting have locations open on weekend days.23 For 
instance, in Texas, during the last week of early voting, the most populous counties’ early voting 
sites are required to stay open 12 hours a day (Rosenfield 1994).Twelve states require that voting 
centers remain open on weekends (NCSL). In the remaining 20 states, either the county or local 
officials determine the hours of early voting sites (NCSL).   
The locations where voters can travel to cast a ballot early are known as voting sites, and 
voting sites differ by state.  Stein and Garcia-Monet (1997) point out that voting sites can be 
traditional or non-traditional. Traditional voting sites include election offices and government 
facilities, such as libraries and courthouses. Non-traditional voting sites include satellite locations, 
such as grocery stores and shopping malls. The State of Ohio uses traditional voting sites, typically 
                                                 
23 Weekend days are Saturday and Sunday 
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county board of elections offices.24 On the other hand, Texas has both non-traditional and 
traditional voting sites, including city halls, libraries, churches, and rec centers.25  
Early Voting and Turnout 
Theoretically, states with early voting policies should have higher rates of voter turnout 
than states without early voting policies, ceteris paribus. However, to presume that early voting 
laws (broadly speaking) increase turnout assumes all methods of early voting are synonymous. As 
the preceding section indicates, early voting laws are not equivalent. Each method of early voting 
has different costs associated with it. Recall that in vote by mail elections, the government bears a 
substantial portion of the costs. On the other hand, in in-person early voting elections, the 
individual still carries the majority of the costs. This theoretical assumption also presumes that all 
elections are equal. Federal elections tend to be high-stimulus, which by their nature produce 
higher turnout rates than low-stimulus elections (e.g. local elections).  
The relationship between early voting and turnout is more complex than the theoretical 
assertion assumes. The effect early voting laws have on voter turnout is in large part dependent on 
two factors: the method of early voting and the type of election. For example, vote by mail has had 
a positive impact on voter turnout while in-person early voting has not seen similar results. In state 
elections, vote by mail appears to have a positive effect on turnout whereas in-person early voting 
only has a marginal effect on turnout in state elections. Two methods of early voting that have 
received a considerable amount of attention in the literature: vote by mail and in-person early 
voting. The next section discusses the influence of these two methods of early voting on turnout. 
                                                 
24 http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/Voters/absentee/inperson.aspx 
25 http://www.dallascountyvotes.org/early-voting-information/early-voting-locations-3/ 
82 
 
 
 
Vote By Mail Systems and Turnout 
The literature on vote by mail (VBM) elections and voter turnout appears to provide 
conflicting findings. In aggregate level studies, scholars have found that vote by mail increases 
voter turnout (Southwell and Burchett 2000; Karp and Banducci 2000). Although an individual 
level examination reveals that vote by mail does not significantly increase turnout (Berinsky et al 
2001). Yet, the mixed results are negated when election type is teased out and examined 
independently.  
Overall, studies indicate that at the national level, VBM doesn’t significantly increase voter 
turnout and may lower it. Studies indicate that national elections have not seen the increase in voter 
turnout that is expected with VBM systems. In their examination of U.S. Senate races, Berinksey 
and Traugott (2001) found that VBM increases turnout marginally and does not make the 
electorate descriptively representative of the voting population. Kousser and Mullin’s (2007) 
findings are much graver. Their analysis of VBM in presidential elections shows that VBM 
decreases turnout in national elections by two percent.  
The impact of VBM on state elections is much more mixed. Southwell and Burchett (2000) 
found that VBM increased turnout by 10 percent. Similarly, Karp and Banducci (2000) found 
VBM had a 2.9 percent increase in turnout in midterm elections. More recently, Kousser and 
Mullin (2007) found that VBM decreases turnout in gubernatorial elections. This difference could 
be due to the location of study. Southwell and Burchett (2000) and Karp and Banducci (2000) 
studied VBM in the State of Oregon while Kousser and Mullin (2007) studied VBM in counties 
within California. The different findings could also be due to the type of methods used. Kousser 
and Mullin (2007) took advantage of a natural experiment where voter in precincts with less than 
250 voters received mail ballots and voters in larger precincts used traditional polling locations 
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during two elections (2000 and 2002). Southwell and Burchett (2000) examined 48 elections 
between 1960 and 1996. Similarly, Karp and Banducci (2000) studied six elections between 1986 
and 2000. Southwell and Burchett (2000) and Karp and Banducci (2000) also use the same measure 
for voter turnout, which may be a reason for their similar findings.  
Local elections appear to have benefited the most from VBM elections. Studies have 
consistently found that VBM increases turnout in local elections. David B. Magleby (1987) found 
a 19 percent increase in turnout at the local level. In their study of Oregon’s VBM system, Karp 
and Banducci (2000) found that while VBM increased turnout across all elections, local elections 
saw the largest increase, 26.5 percent. In California, Kousser and Mullin (2007) found VBM 
increases turnout in local elections by 7.6 percent. 
In-person early voting and Voter Turnout  
Both aggregate and individual level studies on in-person early voting and voter turnout 
have similar findings. They have consistently demonstrated that in-person early voting has no 
significant impact on turnout (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein 1998; Stein and Garcia-Monet 
1997; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Neeley and Richardson 2001). However, 
the findings from in-person early voting become more conflicting when broken down by election 
type. 
The type of election studied seems to be important in determining if in-person early voting 
affects turnout. In presidential and midterm elections, Gronke and Toffey (2008) found in-person 
early voting increased turnout. But, others who have examined national elections have found 
insignificant or marginal effect on turnout (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein and Garcia-Monet 
1997; Neeley and Richardson 2001) or no effect at all (Gronke Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 
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2007). Gronke et al (2007) assert that only when in-person early voting and no excuse absentee 
voting are combined, and then only in midterm elections, is there an increase in voter turnout.     
In state elections, in-person early voting appears to have a marginal effect on turnout. Stein 
(1998) found that in-person early voting increased in voter turnout in gubernatorial elections, but 
only marginally. Stein, Owens, and Leighley (1993) indicate that in-person early voting increases 
turnout when the parties and campaigns incorporate early voting into their campaigns. Similarly, 
J. Eric Oliver (1996) notes that early voting along with strong mobilization efforts increase voter 
turnout. 
Scholars also indicate that early voting may increase turnout at first, but over time, this 
effect fades. Gronke and Miller (2007) argue that the increase in voter turnout found by others is 
a “novelty effect.” Voters utilize the new laws at first, which leads to an immediate increase in 
voter turnout. With time, the novelty wears off and voter turnout returns to its previous rate. 
Likewise, Giammo and Brox (2010) found that early voting produced a short-lived increase in 
turnout. Voter turnout increased until the second presidential election after implementation after 
which voter turnout declined by two to three percent (Giammo and Brox 2010), supporting Gronke 
and Miller’s novelty effect hypothesis.  
Others suggest that increases in voter turnout due to early voting can be attributed to party 
loyalists who are encouraged to vote in low profile elections in which they traditionally would not 
have voted (Harris 1999; Hillygus 2005; Holbrook and McClurg 2005).  
It is important to note that unlike VBM systems, in-person early voting has not been fully 
examined at the local level. Richardson and Neeley (1996) conducted a study in Tennessee to 
examine the impact of in-person early voting implementation and voter turnout. They found that 
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in-person early voting increased countywide turnout. Their findings also suggest that having 
municipal elections on the ballot is an important factor in early voting participation. However, 
their study focused on implementation factors that influence early voting. Thus, these results do 
not necessarily explain the relationship between in-person early voting and voter turnout. The 
present study helps fill this void in the literature by examining in-person early voting and voter 
turnout in municipal elections.  
Unanswered Questions about Early Voting and Turnout in Local Elections 
While there has been considerable research on early voting and its effect on voter turnout, 
the question of early voting’s substantive impact on voter turnout at the local level is unanswered 
in the participation and urban studies literature. With Election Day is slowly becoming obsolete, 
advancing early voting scholarship by determining how in-person early voting influences political 
participation at all levels of government is increasingly important. 
I hypothesize that early voting, in-person early voting in particular, has a significant 
positive impact on voter turnout in municipal elections. As findings from previous vote by mail 
studies indicate, local democracies likely benefit the most from early voting laws (David B. 
Magleby 1987; Dubin and Kalsow 1996; Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007). 
What is left unanswered is the impact of in-person early voting on local elections. Does in-person 
early voting increase participation at the local level? The following chapters answer this question.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Data and Methods 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the sources of the data, the construction of the 
data set, the statistical model, the statistical methods used for this study, and the variable measures. 
The data set for this study is unique as it is a compilation of data from a variety of sources. What 
sets this study apart is the application of the independent variable - in-person early voting - to local 
elections. Having a locality26 as the unit of analysis provides insight on how early voting affects 
local elections. Many localities hold their election in non concurrent years (or odd numbered 
years). Examining non concurrent election years allows me to isolate the effects of early voting at 
the local level because the only elections occurring are local elections. By having municipalities 
as the unit of analysis, my study fills an existing gap in both urban and early voting research. I ask 
a simple, but overlooked question: Does in-person early voting impact voter turnout in municipal 
elections?  
 The chapter begins with a discussion of the unit of analysis - municipalities - and then 
moves to a discussion on the decision to use the State of Ohio. The second section addresses the 
data sources and the approach of data collection. I then proceed to a discussion of the statistical 
method used to examine the impact of in-person early voting on municipal voter turnout. I 
conclude this chapter with an overview of the statistical model, variables, and how those variables 
are operationalized to test the concepts of interest, and hypothesis that is tested in the subsequent 
chapter.  
                                                 
26 I use the term locality and municipality interchangeably.  
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Why Municipalities? 
I chose municipalities because they are convenient, understudied, and a unique political 
unit within the United States. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, municipalities are an important 
and fundamental component of American democracy. Municipalities can be thought of as small-
scale democracies where citizens debate and resolve local issues and matters. Additionally, 
scholarship on early voting studies tends to focus on the individual voter rather than a political 
unit, such as a municipality. Such research asks: Do early voting laws impact individual behavior? 
Who utilizes early voting? How are early voters and Election Day voters different? While these 
are important questions that warrant study, it is not the only question researchers and policymakers 
should examine. 
Proponents of early voting laws contend that these laws should increase turnout in 
elections. Recall from Chapter 3 that in-person early voting has no significant impact on turnout 
in state and national elections (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein 1998; Stein and Garcia-Monet 
1997; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Neeley and Richardson 2001). Vote by Mail 
(VBM) studies have consistently found that VBM increases turnout in local elections (Karp and 
Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007). 27 These studies provide some knowledge on how local 
elections are affected by a VBM laws, a specific type of early voting law. But, how does in-person 
early voting, which 32 states use, impact local elections? This study begins to address this question. 
                                                 
27  It can be problematic to use individual-level data to analyze a social or political unit if the researcher makes 
inferences about individuals that are deduced from the social or political unit being studied (Singleton and Straits 
2010). Since we often don’t know how individuals vote, researchers often use other ways to capture it, such as 
percent of votes cast, percent vote share, etc. The problem is not the use of such proxies, but occurs in the 
interpretation of the results. An ecological fallacy occurs when researchers use aggregate or group data, such as data 
on cities, to infer individual behavior. For instance, let’s say the results indicate that cities with higher percentages of 
whites have higher turnout. An ecological fallacy is committed if one infers from this that whites are more likely to 
vote. While my study uses individual-level data that are tabulated to describe political units, municipalities, my 
focus is on the policy of early voting. I seek to determine how voter turnout in municipal elections are impacted by 
in-person early voting, not individual behaviors. 
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Municipalities are the unit of analysis of this dissertation. The definition for municipalities, 
especially Ohio municipalities, is relatively straightforward. Using the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
definition, a municipal government is defined as  
political subdivisions within which a municipal corporation has been established to provide 
general local government for a specific population concentration in a defined area, and 
includes all active government units officially designated as cities, boroughs (except in 
Alaska), towns (except in the six New England states, and in Minnesota, New York, and 
Wisconsin), and villages (2012). 
 
For the State of Ohio, a municipal government would then be municipal corporations that have 
been designated as cities and villages.28 According to the Ohio Constitution, cities are defined as 
municipal corporations having a population of 5,000 or more while villages are defined as 
municipal corporations having a population less than 5,000 (OH Constitution Article XVIII). Since 
both cities and villages in Ohio are defined as municipal corporations, both will be included in this 
analysis, and will be henceforth referred to as municipalities. Using this definition, there are 938 
municipalities in the State of Ohio.  
 The decision to include both cities and villages for this study raises an important question: 
do cities and villages have the same functions, powers, and authority? The Ohio Revised Code 
grants both cities and villages the same general powers, they both provide similar services, and 
they both have the same function (R.C. 715.01, 717.01).29 For instance, both have the power to 
police, erect buildings, collect taxes, sue and be sued, acquire property, and maintain municipal 
roads. Both provide sanitation services, street cleaning services, street lighting, and clean water, 
power, and heat to their residents. Both have the authority to govern taverns, determine fencing 
ordinances, enter into contracts for the provision of services, and regulate the impoundment and 
                                                 
28 The State of Ohio does not have boroughs or towns.   
29 For a complete list of powers see Ohio Revised Code 715.01 and 717.01.  
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sale of animals.   
 The cities and villages organize under one of three plans outlined by the Ohio Constitution 
and the Ohio Revised Code. Those plans are commission, manager, and mayor30 (R.C. 705, OH 
Constitution Article VXIII). Commission plans only elect commission members to sit on the 
municipal commission (R.C. 705.41). Manager plans have an elected council while the manager 
is appointed/hired by the council.31 For mayor plans, voters elect both the mayor and the council. 
Unless otherwise stated in a municipal charter, mayoral elections occur every four years.32 
Statutory cities and villages are to hold nonpartisan elections unless the city or village has adopted 
partisan elections in accordance with the Ohio Constitution and Revised Code. See Table 4.1 for 
a breakdown of the municipal organization plans found in Ohio. 
The main difference between a city and a village in Ohio is the population (Ohio 
Constitution Article XVIII, §1).33 Classification of a municipality as a city or village depends on 
its population and/or the number of registered voters residing within the municipality’s borders. 34  
While a municipality’s classification can change (city to village or vice versa), it is important to 
note that the duties, powers, and responsibilities of municipalities do not.  
                                                 
30 Ohio calls the mayor-council government plan the federal plan. 
31 The exception to this is Ashtabula which elects its manager.  
32 Exception being a vacancy, which they are required by law to fill.  
33 There are other differences, such as but not limited to the governing boards and administrative personnel, 
however, for the purposes of this dissertation, the population difference is of primary interest.  
34
There are two ways a municipality can have its classification changed: after the last federal census or an increase 
or decrease in the number of registered voters34 (R.C. 703). After the federal census is completed, city and village 
classifications are reevaluated. A village that saw an increase in population to more than 5,000 residents is 
reclassified to a city. Likewise, a city that experiences a decline in population and has less than 5,000 residents is 
classified as a village. When a change from village to city or city to village occurs, the Secretary of State issues a 
proclamation indicating the change. Copies of the proclamation are sent to the mayor and municipal legislative 
body. After 30 days, the change takes effect. Similarly, changes can be made by an increase or decrease in the 
number of electors in a municipality. If a municipality’s electors increase to more than 5,000, it is changed to a city. 
If a municipality’s electors decrease to under 5,000, it is changed to a village. When the number of electors changes, 
the County Board of Elections is responsible for notifying the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State, upon 
certifying the change in the number of electors, issues a proclamation indicating the change in classification. The 
mayor and municipal legislative body receives copies of the proclamation. Thirty days later the change takes effect.  
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Why Ohio? 
Currently, there are 19,522 municipalities within the U.S. (U.S. Census 2012). To collect 
information on all of the municipalities would be time consuming, tedious, and likely impossible. 
Instead, I opted to focus on municipalities found in the State of Ohio. Using a single state permits 
me to collect information on smaller municipalities as well as larger ones. It is common for 
scholars to focus on larger, more populated municipalities when examining municipal voter 
turnout.35 By limiting my analysis to Ohio, I can, and do, include smaller, less populated 
municipalities. Since municipal elections in Ohio are conducted in odd numbered (non concurrent) 
years, I can isolate the affects in-person early voting has on turnout in municipal elections while 
holding other factors constant (e.g. implementation and administration of early voting, registration 
rules, etc.).  
Additionally, Ohio has distinctive characteristics that are useful for this analysis. Ohio is a 
microcosm of the United States. In 2004, CNN describes this best when they discusses how the 
“Five Ohios-”36 Democratic northeast, conservative and traditional Southwest, the farming belt, 
Appalachia region, and central suburban Ohio- make Ohio a microcosm of the United States.37 
The adoption and implementation of in-person early voting in Ohio provides a unique opportunity 
to study the impact of early voting on turnout in municipal elections. Finally, it is convenient 
because most of the data necessary for this study was available online or obtained by an email 
request. 
Ohio is best thought of as a microcosm of the United States because of its heterogeneity 
and diversity. Geographically, Ohio borders five states: Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Indiana,   
                                                 
35 See Caren (2007), Alfred and Lee (1968), Wood (2002), Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) 
36 The Five Ohios was first discussed in the Plain Dealer, a newspaper in Cleveland, Ohio.  
37 http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/30/quest.ohio/index.html?iref=newssearch 
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Table 4.1 Ohio Municipal Organization Plans 
 Commission Manager Mayor 
Voters Elect Commissioners Councilmen* Mayor and 
Council 
members 
Appointments 
Made By 
Commission Council Mayor 
Appointments Clerk, Treasurer, 
Auditor, 
Solicitor 
(villages only), 
Director of Law 
(cities only) 
Manager, Clerk, 
Treasurer, 
Auditor, 
Solicitor 
(villages only), 
Director of Law 
(cities only) 
Director of 
Public Safety, 
Director of 
Public Service, 
Treasurer, 
Solicitor 
(villages only), 
Director of Law 
(cities only) 
Municipal 
Government 
Supervision 
Commission as a 
whole, or 
departments may 
be assigned to 
individual 
commissioners 
Manager Mayor 
Source: Ohio Revised Code Chapter 705 *Ashtabula the city manager is elected    
 
Michigan, and West Virginia. These neighboring states have a profound influence on Ohio. For 
example, the counties in Ohio that share a border with another state share similar demographic 
composition and political identity as their neighboring state (see Table 1 in Appendix A). This 
makes Ohio relatively unique because the state as a whole is not largely comprised of one political 
identity, industry, or demographic group. Because of this, Ohio is like a small-scale version of 
United States as a whole. Ohio encompasses a similar demographic composition and political 
identity to that of the United States (see Table 2 in Appendix A). 
Within the borders of Ohio, one can find a bit of everything, such as large cities, suburbs, 
and small rural communities, liberal urban centers, and Bible belt communities just to name a few. 
The municipalities in Ohio have institutional variation and political diversity. They range in size, 
demographic composition, and political identity. See Table 4.2 for a description of the 
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municipalities. The municipalities found in Ohio are not fundamentally different than other 
municipalities within the United States. Therefore, the results should be generalizable to other 
municipalities.  
Table 4.2 Summary of Ohio Municipalities 
 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Administrative 
System 
       
Mayor-Council 87.9% 87.9% 87.9% 87.9% 87.9% 87.9% 87.9% 
Council-
Manager 
7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 
        
Electoral 
System 
       
Partisan 
Elections 
1.1% 7.5% 0.6% 5.9% 1.3% 5.1% 0.8% 
Non Partisan 
Elections 
9.8% 46.2% 9.8% 60.9% 11.9% 62.7% 12.8% 
        
Demographics        
Population  8,005 7,991 7,991 7,962 7,998 7,959 7,909 
Percent 
Bachelor 
Degree 
9.77% 10.01% 10.26% 10.51% 10.75% 11.01% 11.29% 
Percent White 94.1% 93.7% 93.4% 93.1% 92.8% 92.5% 92.2% 
Median Income  49,945 54,028 58,111 62,194 66,277 29,531 33,614 
Percent Female 51.7% 51.7% 51.7% 51.8% 51.8% 51.8% 51.8% 
Age 36.9 37.5 38.0 38.5 39.1 39.6 40.1 
Numbers are rounded (N=6,566; n= 938, T=7), where N=n*T  
 
While this study is not a true natural experiment, it has elements of a natural experiment 
that are beneficial to studying in-person early voting and turnout in municipal elections. Ohio 
offers an opportunity to assess a naturally occurring political phenomenon over a substantial time 
period. In 2005, the Ohio General Assembly passed a law offering voters to the opportunity to cast 
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a ballot via in-person early voting.38 In January 2006, the law went into effect. Since 2006, Ohio 
voters have been allowed to cast a ballot 35 days prior to Election Day at their County Board of 
Elections (CBoE).39 The hours for in-person early voting are typically uniform throughout the state 
and are open during the weekends and evenings.40 This means that individuals residing in different 
municipalities in different counties had relatively the same opportunity to utilize early voting. For 
example, voters in Toledo, Ohio (Lucas County) have a similar time period to vote early as voters 
in Columbus, Ohio (Franklin County). Consistency of voting hours across municipalities is 
important as the length of time an individual has to vote influences turnout (Wolfinger, Hughton, 
and Mullin 2005).  
It is convenient to use Ohio municipalities as much of the necessary data needed to 
complete the study was available online. This creates a savings on research costs. Since the 
information I collected was in the public record, most of the agencies’ websites had this 
information available. Any information that wasn’t available online was obtained via an email 
request. Conducting a survey, an alternative to using available data, would be costly especially if 
I sought to have a similar size sample. 
Data Collection and Sources 
Since the United States does not have a centralized database containing information about 
local elections or local governments, I constructed my own data set. The data for this project came 
from a variety of government agencies: the U.S. Census Bureau, Ohio Department of 
Development, the Ohio Secretary of State Office, the Ohio Municipal League, and the Ohio 
                                                 
38 HB 234 was passed in 2005. Ohio law states that a bill will become effective 91 days after being signed. It 
became effective in January 2006. The 2006 elections was the first year of implementation.   
39 In June 2014, this law was altered. It now allows early voting to occur 30 days before Election Day.  
40 The new law, effective in June 2014, reduces the hours voting sites are open. Weekdays, voting sites will be open 
until 5 pm. No voting site can be open on Sundays. And the last two Saturdays of early voting, voting sites can only 
be open until 4 pm.  
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County Board of Elections. Each agency and what information I obtained from them will be 
discussed in more detail below. From these sources, I acquired a variety of information on Ohio 
municipalities. I also collected information on mayoral elections from 2001 to 2013. According to 
Ohio law, voters elect municipal officers, including mayors, in odd numbered years. This provides 
me with seven municipal elections for study - three prior to the implementation of early voting and 
four after it. This time period, discussed in the next section, is an important aspect of this study.   
The information on the municipalities’ population and demographics came from the U.S. 
Census Bureau and the Ohio Department of Development. For the years 2000 and 2010, the U.S. 
Census was used to acquire population and demographic data on the municipalities. The 2000 and 
2010 census were downloaded from the U.S. Census Bureau’s website. The population estimates 
for the years 2001 to 2009 and 2011 to 2013 were obtained from the Ohio Department of 
Development. They publish the U.S. Census Bureau’s population estimates for non-census years 
for municipalities in Ohio. The more recent years were downloaded from the Ohio Department of 
Development website. The other years were obtained via an email request to the agency.  
The Ohio Secretary of State’s office publishes the Ohio Municipal, Township, and School 
Board Roster. This handbook contains information on all the municipalities in the State of Ohio 
and is released every two years. It contains information about their government structure (e.g. 
mayor-council or council-manager), the type of municipality (charter or statutory), and the year of 
incorporation. I also collected similar information from the Ohio Municipal League. Their website 
provides a list of municipalities in Ohio along with their government structure and type of 
municipality. I used these two agencies’ records to check the information for errors.  
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There are 88 County Boards of Elections (CBoE) within the State of Ohio. I visited and/or 
contacted all 88 CBoEs to obtain mayoral election results, precinct lists, and registered voter totals. 
Each of these are discussed in more detail below.  
The CBoE are responsible for maintaining records of municipal elections and registered 
voter files for their respective counties. Many of the CBoEs had mayoral election results available 
on their respective websites. If the data was available online, I downloaded the summary or 
cumulative file to acquire the election results for mayoral races for each year of this study. The 
summary or cumulative file lists each race and the number of votes each candidate received in that 
particular election. I sent an email request to the CBoE asking for the summary or cumulative files 
for the elections not found on their website.  
I use two different documents to obtain the number of registered voters for each 
municipality: the turnout report or the official statements of votes cast. These two documents are 
similar since they both contain information about registered voters and election results. Both 
documents are used to obtain the number of registered voters because the CBoEs do not use the 
same document to report election results. Some of the CBoEs use turnout reports, while others use 
the official statements of votes cast. The turnout report contains a list of each locality, including 
municipalities, within that respective county. For each locality it lists the number of registered 
voters and the overall number of ballots cast in that election. If the turnout reports were 
unavailable, I obtained general election results by precinct, or the official statement of votes cast 
(SOVC) report, from each CBoE. The general election results by precinct, or the SOVC report, 
lists the number of registered voters and election results for precinct in that respective county.  
In addition, the CBoE are responsible for providing precinct maps and lists. Typically, 
precinct maps are used to determine what precincts are assigned to various districts. For example, 
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a precinct map shows which precincts are included in a U.S. House district. However, this was 
unavailable online for municipalities. Since I needed to identify which precincts are assigned to 
each municipality in my study, I contacted the CBoEs and requested this information. The list of 
precinct assignments were used for identifying precincts assigned to a municipality for election 
purposes.  
Of the 88 CBoE, I was able to obtain records from 82 of them. I first went to the CBoEs’ 
websites to obtain election results and the number of registered voters in each municipality. In 
most cases, this data was available online. For example, Lucas County Board of Elections had all 
the necessary records for this study available online. Other CBoEs had some data, but did not have 
all the data necessary for this study. For instance, Ashland County Board of Elections did not have 
the registered voter numbers for the 2003 general election, but had information for all the other 
elections while Wyandot only had information for the 2013 election.  
If these documents were not available online, sent a request to the CBoEs to obtain this 
information. Some CBoEs fulfilled this request quickly. While some of the CBoEs did fulfill my 
requests, some did not. 41 The reasons for not fulfilling my request varied, but included reasons 
such as missing the records, inability to locate the records, not enough people in the department to 
handle the request, and/or they were in the midst of conducting an election. A few CBoEs, like 
Sandusky County Board of Elections, did not have any records available online nor did they 
provide them upon request. From these records, I collected pieces of election information on 789 
of the 938 municipalities. 
                                                 
41 The CBoEs that received an email request either did not respond to it, in which case another request was sent 
again. In the case of Sandusky, I never heard back even after multiple requests were sent. In other cases, the CBoEs 
did not fulfill it because they were administering an election, they did not have the data available in electronic 
format, they no longer had the files, or the files could not be located. In the case of the data not being available in 
electronic format, I requested the files be copied and mailed to me. This was fulfilled in each request.   
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Why Interrupted Time Series? 
I want to determine if in-person early voting increases voter turnout at the municipal level. 
In order to accomplish this, I need a data set that contains information about several municipalities 
collected over a substantial period of time. Since I am interested in the relationship between in-
person early voting and voter turnout, the temporal period needs to include municipal elections 
both before and after the implementation of in-person early voting.  
A credible technique to disentangle the effects of in-person early voting on voter turnout 
is to employ an interrupted time series model. An interrupted time series model allows me to 
examin the impact of a law or public policy.42 The year of implementation serves as an interruption, 
breaking the data into a pre and post implementation groups. By comparing the pre and post 
implementation groups, I can test the statistical significance of a shift in voter turnout that occurs 
after the implementation of the law.43  
There have been many interrupted time series studies done to examine the impact of a law. 
Likely the most famous interrupted time series analysis is that of Campbell and Ross’ (1968) traffic 
study. They sought to determine if the new traffic law for speeding reduced the number of traffic 
deaths. Others have used interrupted time series analysis to examine other policies such as traffic 
laws (Glass 1968; Ross et al 1970), gun control laws (Deutsch and Alt 1977), hotel taxes (Bonham, 
Fugi, Im, and Mak 1992), and anti-drunk driving campaigns (Murry, Stam and Lastovicka 1993).  
In interrupted time series analysis, the impact refers to the shift that occurs after 
implementation. An impact has two characteristics: onset and duration (Mc Dowall, Mc Cleary, 
Meidinger, and Hay 1980). The onset can be gradual or abrupt and the duration can be permanent 
                                                 
42 In particular, I am using a single interrupted time series model. In a single interrupted time series model, 
researchers take repeated observations of the same subjects at regular time intervals for a specified period of time. I 
my case, I have taken repeated observation of municipalities every two years for 14 years.  
43 See Mc Dowall, Mc Cleary, Meidinger and Hay 1980 for a detailed explanation. 
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or temporary (Mc Dowall, Mc Cleary, Meidinger, and Hay 1980). After the implementation of in-
person early voting, did the shift in turnout occur gradually or abruptly? And, was the shift in 
turnout temporary or was it permanent? In this study, I hypothesize that after the implementation 
of in-person early voting, the shift in turnout will be abrupt and permanent.44 A statistically 
significant upwards shift in voter turnout would indicate that the law had a positive impact on voter 
turnout in municipal elections. Conversely, a statistically significant downwards shift in voter 
turnout would indicate that the law had a negative impact on voter turnout in municipal elections.   
Interrupted Time Series Design  
For my study, the implementation of in-person early voting, in 2006, serves as the 
interruption or the treatment to the sample. It divides the sample into a control group (pre) and 
treatment group (post) similar to true experiments. In true experiments, the treatment is 
administered by the experimenter. However, in my study, the treatment is a policy adoption and 
its implementation. Since the treatment is not controlled by the experimenter, it is considered a 
quasi-experiment. In this case, the control group consists of the 2001, 2003 and 2005 elections 
while the treatment group consists of the 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013 elections. Odd numbered 
years were used because municipal elections in Ohio are only held in odd numbered years. Using 
an interrupted time series model, I can determine if the policy (in-person early voting) had an 
impact on voter turnout. If an impact occurs, voter turnout should be different after the treatment 
than before the treatment. The quasi-experimental design is diagramed below. 
                                                𝑂1  𝑂2  𝑂3   𝑋  𝑂4  𝑂5  𝑂6  𝑂7  
                                                 
44 The novelty hypothesis proposed by Gronke and Miller (2007) would suggest an abrupt and temporary shift in 
turnout after the implementation of in-person early voting. This is discussed in more detail when addressing the time 
period of the study.  
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 In general, interrupted time series models have strong internal validity but weak external 
validity. As Campbell and Stanley (1966) and Britt, Kleck, and Bordua (1996) point out, the 
biggest threat to internal validity is history - an alternative explanation or reason for the shift after 
impact. A plausible alternative explanation for higher turnout in my analysis, for example, is that 
turnout increased because of local ballot issues, such as a millage. If there were highly salient 
issues on a municipality’s ballot after the implementation of early voting, but not before the 
implementation of early voting, then this would be an alternative explanation for the increase in 
voter turnout after early voting was implemented. 
 With regards to external validity in an interrupted time series analysis, it is often the case 
that the results cannot be generalized beyond the subjects being studied. This is because the 
subjects being studied usually are not randomly selected. In many cases, subjects are selected after 
the policy intervention occurs (Britt, Kleck and Bordua 1996). Generally, the policy intervention 
is not randomly administered to subjects, but occurs because of a historical or social change (Britt, 
Kleck and Bordua 1996). If randomization were to have occurred, the results can be generalizable 
to a broader population.  
One way to increase external validity and generalize beyond the subjects being studied is 
to conduct similar interrupted time series designs on additional municipalities with in-person early 
voting laws. My study will provide some insight on the impact of in-person early voting on 
municipal elections, however, it remains a single study of in-person early voting and municipal 
elections. As Campbell and Stanley (1966) state, a single study is never enough to be completely 
conclusive (42). Repeating this quasi-experiment on other municipalities and/or localities will help 
establish results that can be generalizable.    
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Panel Data 
Panel data usually has both a temporal and a spatial component. As a result, using linear 
regression with panel data is often problematic since the procedures assumptions are likely 
violated. For example, linear regression assumes that the disturbance terms/errors are spherical45 
(Beck and Katz 1995; Kennedy 1979). Data sets with temporal and spatial components are often 
nonspherical; they contain autocorrelated and heteroskedastic errors (Beck and Katz 1995).46 For 
instance, an OLS regression assumes that the errors are independent of one another. In time series, 
it is assumed that the errors are related to errors at different time points.47 If the data contains 
autocorrelated and heteroskedastic errors, the standard errors of a linear or ordinary least squares 
regression are not guaranteed to be accurate or unbiased (Beck and Katz 1995).  
Linear regression also assumes that the observations of the independent variable can be 
considered fixed in repeated samples (Kennedy 1979). However, in panel data, it is often the case 
that the value of the dependent variable at time t is dependent on a past value of itself (t-1). This 
may be the case with turnout- the dependent variable in my study. For instance, turnout rates in 
the 2003 election could be influenced by turnout rates in the 2001 election. To capture this, the 
lagged value of the dependent variable (turnout) is an independent variable, or regressor ( 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1). 
The result is autoregression, which violates this assumption of linear regression. Time series 
models corrects for autoregression.      
                                                 
45 Disturbances/errors are spherical if they are homoskedastic and are not correlated with one another. 
46 To account for this, it is common to use feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) (see Beck and Katz 1995). For 
instance, Southwell and Burchett (2000) use FGLS to examine VBM elections over time. However, as Beck and 
Katz (1995) point out, using FGLS often leads to inaccurate standard errors and suggest using panel-corrected 
standard errors. Using panel-corrected errors, OLS regressions can be run with time series data. The standard errors 
are accurate even with heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of the errors (see pages 640-41). 
47 This is known as contemporaneously correlated errors. See Cook and Campbell 1979 Chapters 6 for a complete 
discussion or Kennedy 2008.  
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As Beck and Katz (1995) point out, using OLS with time series data leads to “incorrect 
standard errors,” which lead to overconfidence or inadequate confidence in our statistical results 
(636).48  An interrupted time series analysis uses techniques designed to address the assumption 
violations of OLS and permit unbiased errors in a time series, specifically, this is called the 
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model (Cook and Campbell 1979).  
Time Period  
The time period of this study warrants a quick discussion. Specifically, data were collected 
on the 938 municipalities for odd numbered years between 2001 and 2013. The intervention year 
is 2006. This time period provides seven election years for study; three election years before the 
implementation of in-person early voting and four after.  
In Chapter 3, I discuss the early voting novelty effect found by Gronke and Miller. They 
contend that increases in voter turnout after the implementation of early voting are due to novelty 
effects (Gronke and Miller 2007). The literature on early voting studies suggest that three election 
cycles after implementation voter turnout declines because the novelty wears off (Giammo and 
Brox 2010; Gronke and Miller 2007). The time period of this study contains four elections after 
the implementation of early voting, addressing this issue.49 If the novelty effect applies to 
municipal elections, the turnout in the third and fourth elections after implementation (2011 and 
2013 elections respectively) should be lower than turnout in the preceding elections. In other 
words, the result of the impact should be an abrupt and temporary increase in voter turnout. If this 
occurs, it suggests that early voting affects municipal elections in a similar manner as national and 
                                                 
48 Beck and Katz argue that the generalized least squares (GLS) approach with time series data leads to 
overconfidence in the standard errors. Instead, they suggest using a panel-corrected standard errors model.  
49 The last election I include is 2013. Thus, I have every odd numbered year election that has occurred to date in my 
study. 
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state elections. Voters utilize the new laws at first, which leads to an immediate increase in voter 
turnout, but with time, the novelty wears off and voter turnout returns to its previous rate. However, 
if voter turnout does not decline, I can rule out the alternative hypothesis that the increase was due 
to the novelty effect.  
It should be noted that the implementation of in-person early voting in Ohio created a five 
day window for same day registration to occur. From 2006 until 2014, Ohio had a window for 
same day voter registration and in-person early voting.50 As noted in Chapter 3, same day 
registration and in-person early voting are different. Burden et al (2009) suggest that it is important 
to break down type of  early voting (e.g. absentee, in-person early voting, same day registration, 
Election Day registration) when examining the impact on turnout. While it would be valuable to 
study both in-person early voting and same day voter registration as Burden et al (2009) suggest, 
disentangling in-person early voting from same day registration is essentially impossible. The 
available data for elections in Ohio does not differentiate between the two; while many records 
note if a person voted early, they do not denote if they voted and registered during the window of 
same day registration. However, disentangling the two is not necessarily important for this study. 
The research question at hand asks about the overall impact of early voting. Both same day 
registration and in-person early voting are considered to be forms of early voting. Future research 
may want to consider examining each independently as their properties are different. But, for this 
study, I focus on how early voting overall has impacted turnout at the municipal level. 
                                                 
50 In 2014, the Ohio General Assembly passed SB 238. On June 1, 2014 it will become effective. The measure 
shortens the early voting period, effectively eliminating the window for same day voter registration. 
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Modeling the Relationship between Early Voting and Municipal Voter Turnout 
The purpose of this project is to highlight the impact in-person early voting has on voter 
turnout in municipal elections. I assume high voter turnout is desired in elections, particularly local 
elections. I also assume that all elections are not synonymous. For example, state and national 
elections tend to be high stimulus elections while local elections are often low stimulus elections. 
Thus, while scholars have found that in-person early voting has not increased voter turnout in 
national or state elections, I don’t assume the same holds true for local elections. By their nature, 
local elections are different than state or national elections. For instance, in vote by mail elections, 
local/municipal elections have been the greatest beneficiary. Local elections using vote by mail 
systems have seen an increase in voter turnout by as little as 7.6 percent to as high as 26.5 percent 
(Kousser and Mullin 2007; Karp and Banducci 2000). While vote by mail systems and in-person 
early voting are different, as noted in Chapter 3, these findings suggest local democracies may 
benefit the most from early voting laws.  
The research question for this study is as follows: Does in-person early voting increase 
voter turnout in municipal elections? I hypothesize that in-person early voting has a significant 
positive impact on voter turnout in municipal elections. Below is the theoretical model I will be 
testing.  
                                
      →  
 
While a more complex model could be developed, I adopt the principle of parsimony. This 
model captures the theory I propose in the simplest manner. The model is simple and useful. 
Voter Turnout in 
Municipal Elections 
In-Person  
Early Voting 
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According to Feldstein, a useful model is one that is “parsimonious, plausible, and informative” 
(Feldstein quoted in Kennedy 2008, 71). My model has all three of these features.  
However, there are other factors that may lead to increases in voter turnout at the municipal 
level, and these need to be controlled for in order to rule out alternative hypotheses. Previous 
research indicates that the electoral structure (partisan versus nonpartisan), the form of government 
(mayor-council versus council-manager), and the competitiveness of the election influence turnout 
in municipal elections (Caren 2007; Wood 2002; Hajnal & Lewis 2003; Karning and Walters 1983; 
Alford & Lee 1968). In the following section, I discuss how these concepts are measured.  
Measurement of the Variables 
 In order to assess the impact in person early voting has on municipal elections, I examine 
its impact on overall turnout in mayoral elections. Mayoral elections are used because it is the 
highest executive position in municipal government. This section defines the variables, and 
outlines the measures of the variables. I begin with the dependent variable: municipal voter 
turnout. Next, I discuss the independent variable: early voting. Finally, I move to a discussion of 
the control variables. Table 4.3 gives a summary of all the variables, their definitions, and the 
operationalization of them.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this model is municipal voter turnout. It is measured as the 
percent of registered voters casting a ballot in mayoral elections. It is calculated by taking the total 
number of votes cast for all mayoral candidates, and dividing by the number of registered voters 
in the municipality. This is then transformed into a percentage. To calculate the dependent variable, 
I need two pieces of information: 1) the total number of votes cast in each mayoral election and 2) 
the number of registered voters in each municipality in each election year. As previously 
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mentioned, I obtained the mayoral election results for each election year of the study from the 
CBoEs.  
The second part of the dependent variable, the number of registered voters, was much more 
complicated to calculate. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, I used two different documents to 
obtain the number of registered voters for each municipality. The turnout report was easier to use 
since it listed the number of registered voters by locality, including municipality. This number was 
then entered into the data set. The SOVC report was more complicated to use since it listed the 
number of registered voters by precinct instead of municipality. I first had to determine which 
precincts were assigned to each municipality. Using the list of precinct assignments from the 
CBoEs, I could decipher which precincts were assigned to each municipality. The number of 
registered voters for each precinct assigned to a municipality were then added together to obtain 
the overall number of registered voters for each municipality within that county. For example, 
Yellow Springs Village has four precincts. The number of registered voters in each precinct were 
added together to obtain the overall number of registered voters in Yellow Springs Village. 
One concern with using registered voters involves the maintenance of the lists. With the 
passage of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, the maintenance of the registered voter 
file has been standardized. According to the Department of Justice, voters cannot be removed from 
the registered voter file for nonvoting.51 Moreover, maintenance programs must “incorporate 
specific safeguards, e.g., that they be uniform, non-discriminatory, in compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act, and not be undertaken within 90 days of a federal election” (Department of Justice). 
                                                 
51 http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/nvra/activ_nvra.php 
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Table 4.3 Summary of Variable Measures  
Variable Name Variable Description Operationalization 
Voter Turnout Dependent Variable: The 
percent of registered voters 
casting a ballot in mayoral 
elections. 
A percentage value that 
ranges from 0 to 100%. 
Early Voting Independent Variable: Presence 
of in-person early voting in 
election year. 
Takes the value of 1 for 
election years with in-person 
early voting, 0 otherwise. 
Partisan Election Control Variable: Elections 
where the mayoral candidate has 
a political affiliation that 
appears on the ballot. 
Dummy variable: partisan 
elections were coded 1, 0 
otherwise. 
Mayor Administrative 
Structure 
Control Variable: Mayor-
council form of government is 
defined as municipal 
governments where there is a 
mayor but no manager. 
Dummy variable: 
Municipalities with mayor-
council government systems 
were coded 1, 0 otherwise. 
Manager Administrative 
Structure 
Control Variable: Council-
manager forms of government 
are municipal governments 
where there is a manager. 
Dummy variable: 
Municipalities with council-
manager government systems 
were coded 1, 0 otherwise. 
Municipal Size Control Variable: The total 
population of the municipality. 
A numeric value that ranges 
from  27 to 792,499 
Percent White Control Variable: Percent of the 
municipality that has self-
identified as white in the 
Census. 
A percentage value that 
ranges from 0 to 100%. 
Median Income  Control Variable: the median 
value of a municipality’s income 
as reported in the Census. 
A numeric value that ranges 
from 7,427.5 to 326,001.80 
Percent Bachelor Degree Control Variable: Percent of the 
municipality that has self-
identified as having at least 
Bachelor Degree in the Census. 
A percentage value that 
ranges from 0 to 100%. 
Closeness of Mayoral 
Election 
Control Variable: The 
percentage of victory of the 
winning candidate over all other 
candidates. 
A percent value ranging from 
0 to 100%. As the percent 
increases, the closeness of the 
mayoral race increases 
Ballot Measures Control Variable: Elections 
years where a highly salient 
statewide ballot initiative 
appears on the ballot. 
Dummy variable: election 
years with ballot measures 
were coded 1, 0 otherwise. 
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This data set contains only elections held after the National Voter Registration Act was 
implemented in 1995, and therefore it provides uniformity in the data set.  
In addition, the measure chosen for the dependent variable has been used by scholars. For 
example, Hajnal and Lewis (2003) and Caren (2007) both use mayoral elections for their 
dependent variable when studying municipal voter turnout. Both early voting and urban/local 
scholars use registered voters as their denominator (Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Wood 2002; 
Southwell and Burchett 2000; Richardson and Neeley 1996). Thus, this measure has been 
established as having both reliability and validity.  
Independent Variable 
The independent variable is the availability of in-person early voting. Elections prior to 
2006 did not have in-person early voting. These elections were coded 0. Elections after 2006 had 
the option of in-person early voting and were coded 1. This is consistent with the literature on 
quasi-experiments involving interrupted time series (Cook and Campbell 1979, Chapter 6).  
Control Variables 
The control variables for this study include the institutional and local contextual factors 
that previous research has indicated influence voter turnout (see Baybeck 2013; Marschall 2010; 
Kelleher & Lowery 2004; Oliver and Ha 2007) and campaign factors that influence turnout in 
municipal elections (Caren 2007). Each of these factors will be defined and controlled for in this 
study.  
Recall from Chapter 2 that institutional factors include non-concurrent and concurrent 
elections; partisan and nonpartisan elections; and mayor-council and council-manager forms of 
government. Each of these influence voter turnout in municipal elections (Wood 2002; Hajnal & 
Lewis 2003; Karning and Walters 1983; Alford & Lee 1968).  
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The electoral structure of a municipality may influence voter turnout. Therefore, I include 
an electoral structure variable in my study. Partisan elections are elections where the mayoral 
candidate has a political affiliation that appears on the ballot. Nonpartisan elections are elections 
where the mayoral candidate does not have a political affiliation on the ballot. Municipalities that 
held partisan elections were coded 1. Municipalities that conducted nonpartisan elections were 
coded 0.  
Since a municipality’s administrative structure can impact voter turnout, I include an 
administrative structure variable. Mayor-council form of government is defined as municipal 
governments where there is a mayor but no manager; and council-manager forms of government 
are municipal governments where there is a manager. In Ohio, there are four types of government 
systems municipalities can have: mayor-council, council-manager, commission-manager, or 
mayor-council-administrator/manager. The latter two types of government systems are similar to 
adaptive cities. I combine these two types (commission-manager, or mayor-council-
administrator/manager) into one category, adaptive city structure.52 From these three categories, I 
created two dummy variables: one for mayor-council government systems and one for council-
manager government systems. Municipalities with mayor-council government systems, were 
labeled Mayor Administrative Structure, and were coded 1, all others were coded 0. Municipalities 
with council-manager government systems were labeled Manager Administrative Structure and 
coded 1, all others were coded 0.  
The local contextual factors of a municipality include municipality’s size, municipality-
level measures of socioeconomic status (SES), and the racial composition of the municipality. 
Table 4.2 from a previous section in this chapter notes the average composition of an Ohio 
                                                 
52 34 municipalities fell into this combined category of adaptive city structure.  
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municipality. Table 4.4 details the range of the demographic data for each of the variables 
discussed here. Empirical research on a municipality’s size indicates that there is no clear 
consensus on the direction of influence of municipality size on voter turnout (see Kelleher and 
Lowery 2004). Regardless of the direction of influence size has on voter turnout, it is important to 
control for municipal size since it may influence voter turnout. The size of the municipality is 
defined as the total population of the municipality and is a continuous variable.  
In Chapter 2, I discuss Madison and Jefferson’s arguments about government size 
composition as it relates to participation. Madison, admittedly indirectly, advocates for large, 
heterogeneous municipalities while Jefferson supports small, homogeneous municipalities. While 
municipal size is discussed above, here I focus on the demographic composition of the 
municipality. A municipality’s demographic composition is important because it reveals the 
degree of heterogeneity of the municipality. Oliver (1999) suggests heterogeneous cities have 
higher rates of participation because there is more competition for resources (186). The 
heterogeneity of a municipality can be measured by demographic characteristics, such as racial 
composition, education, and income. Alfred and Lee (1968) suggest six different demographic 
characteristics that can be used to measure the heterogeneity of a municipality: ethnicity, religion, 
education, occupation, neighborhood, and race (62). I use U.S. Census data to capture the 
demographic variables that have been shown in the literature to influence municipal turnout: these 
variables are percent white, median income, and median education.  
The U.S. Census data contains a percent white measure for each municipality in 2000 and 
2010. However, I need the percent white for years both in between and after the census years. One 
technique to deal with missing data is to mathematically interpolate data. By doing so, I am 
creating new data points from a set of known data points. Specifically, I am constructing new data 
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points for percent white for the years 2001 to 2009 using the known data points of percent white 
in 2000 and 2010.53 For the years between 2000 and 2010, I obtain estimates on percent white 
from interpolating the variables. I take the difference between percent white in 2010 an percent 
white in 2000 and divide it by 10. For years after 2001 and before 2010, I add this number to the 
previous year. 
For example, Conneaut City, OH in 2000 was 96.3 percent white and in 2010, it was 89.8 
percent white. To find the percent white for 2001 I did the following:  
1) 
89.8−96.3
10
= −.65  
Then added -.65 to the value in 2000 (96.3) 
2) 96.3 + −.65 = 95.65 
The value of percent white for the Conneaut City in 2001 is 95.65 percent. For 2002, I added -.65 
to 95.65. This was done for each year between 2000 and 2010.  
Similarly, data points are missing for percent white for the years of 2011 to 2013. Much 
like interpolating the data for percent white for the years 2001 to 2009, I extrapolate the data for 
percent white for years 2011 to 2013. I use the percent change between 2010 and 2000 and add it 
to the preceding year. By extrapolating the variable, percent white, I assume the municipality is 
continuing to increase or decrease at the same rate as it did between 2000 and 2010. Returning to 
the Conneaut City example, the city decreased in its percent white by -.65 each year. In 2010, the 
percent white for the Conneaut City was 89.8 percent. Thus for 2011, the percent white was 
calculated by adding -.65 to 89.8, which is 89.15 percent. For 2012, the percent white is 89.15 
(2011’s value) plus -.65, which is 88.50 percent. I did this for every year through 2013.  
                                                 
53 The percent white variable is restricted to 100 percent-meaning by interpolating or extrapolating the data, values 
over 100 percent were reduced to an even 100 percent.  
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Table 4.4 Range of Demographics of Ohio Municipalities  
 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Population 29 -710,016 28 -716,825 28 -718,752 28 -736,359 27 - 757,435 36 -780,288 36 - 792,499 
Percent 
Bachelor 
Degree 
0 - 44.84% 0 - 44.92 % 0 - 45 % 0 - 45.08% 0 - 45.73% 0 - 48.27% 0 - 50.81% 
Percent 
White 
7.9 - 99.9% 14.4 - 9.8% 20.9 - 99.8% 27.5 - 99.9% 11.4 - 99.9% 0 - 100% 0 - 100% 
Median 
Income 
20,875 - 214,001 18,875 - 242,001 16875 - 270,001 14,875 - 298,001 12,875 - 26,001 7,428 - 5,575 12,259 - 14,193 
Percent 
Female 
8.4 - 93.1% 18.5 - 87.8% 28.6 - 82.5% 29.4 - 85.7% 23.3 - 94.7% 17.3 - 100% 11.2 -100% 
Median 
Age 
21.8 - 71.7 23.3 - 63.1 22.7 - 54.4 22.1- 54.6 21.5 - 57.1 19.2 - 61.6 15.6 - 66.3 
Numbers are rounded (N=6,566; n= 938, T=7), where N=n*T 
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Previous research has found municipal income to have interesting effects on voter turnout. 
Oliver (1999) examines a community’s economic heterogeneity, finding that homogenous, 
affluent cities have the lowest turnout while heterogeneous middle class cities have the highest 
turnout. I obtain median income of each municipality from the 2000 and 2010 Census. For the 
years between 2000 and 2010, I obtain estimates on median income from interpolating the 
variables just as I did for the percent white variable above. I take the difference between median 
income in 2010 and median income in 2000 and divide it by 10. For years after 2001 and before 
2010, I add this number to the previous year. For the years after 2010, I obtain estimates by 
extrapolating the variables, just as I did for the percent white variable above. By extrapolating the 
variable, median income, I assume the municipality is continuing to increase or decrease at the 
same rate as it did between 2000 and 2010. I use the percent change between 2010 and 2000 and 
add it to the preceding year. To obtain the 2011 median income variable, I take the percent change 
between 2010 and 2000 and add it to 2010 median income variable. For 2012, the percent change 
between 2010 and 2000 is added to the 2011 median income, and so on for each year through 
2013.  
The last demographic variable to capture the heterogeneity of a municipality is education. 
Education is measured as the percent of a municipality’s population over 18 with at least a bachelor 
degree. The U.S. Census provides the percentage of a municipality that has self-reported 
completion of a bachelor degree in 2000 and 2010. I interpolate this variable to obtain values for 
the years 2001 to 2009, just as I did for median income and percent white. To obtain values for 
percent bachelor degree for 2011 to 2013, I extrapolate the variable as I did with median income 
and percent white. Like median income and percent white, by extrapolating the variable, I assume 
percent bachelor degree increases or decreases at the same rate as it did between 2000 and 2010.  
113 
 
 
 
Since campaigns can affect voter turnout, I also control for these dynamics. When elections 
are close, there tends to be higher turnout (Hill and Leighley 1999). To control for this, I use a 
competitiveness variable from the election data collected. The competitiveness of the election is 
determined by taking the absolute value of the percentage of victory of the winning candidate over 
all other candidates. The calculation is as follows:  
(
|𝑊 − 𝑂|
𝑇
) ∗ 100 
Where W is the total number of votes the winning candidate received 
O is the total number of votes all other candidates received, and 
T is the total number of votes cast. 
Using this calculation, the results can range from 0 to 100 percent. As the percentage of 
victory increase, closeness in the election increases. In other words, if the percentage is 100, then 
the mayoral election was very close. If the percentage is 0, then the mayoral race was not close. 
Therefore, if the result is 5 percent, it would indicate that there was only one candidate on the 
ballot or one candidate received all votes cast. Likewise, a result of 99 percent suggests that the 
mayoral race was extremely close.  
 Ballot initiatives have been shown to increase voter turnout in midterm and presidential 
elections (Grummel 2008; Tolbert, Grummel and Smith 2001). There were two election cycles 
where highly salient state ballot initiatives were on the ballot after early voting. Both the 2009 and 
2011 had statewide initiatives that likely contributed to the high turnout for these two election 
cycles. In 2009, there was a casino initiative that would allow for casinos to be built in Ohio. In 
2011, there was a labor initiative that would repeal a measure passed by the state general assembly 
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that would limit collective bargaining for public employees. Since there were highly salient issues 
on the municipal ballot after the implementation of early voting, but not before the implementation 
of early voting, then this could be an alternative explanation for the increase in voter turnout after 
early voting was implemented.54 To control for the statewide ballot issues, I created a ballot 
measure dummy variable. If there was a highly salient ballot measure in that election, it was coded 
1, 0 otherwise. The 2009 and 2011 election years both received 1. The other election years received 
0.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented the hypothesis for this study as well as the theoretical model 
and variable measures. I also described the data set being used in this study. Using the hypothesis 
discussed above, the next chapter examines the relationship between in-person early voting and 
voter turnout in municipal elections. If in-person early voting has a positive influence on voter 
turnout in municipal elections, it may provide a solution to the low voter turnout problem that is 
common in local elections.  
  
                                                 
54 This alternative explanation assumes that ballot initiatives increase turnout in a similar manner as they do in 
midterm and presidential elections.  
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS: 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IN-PERSON EARLY VOTING AND TURNOUT IN 
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
  
In the previous chapter, I discussed the methodology and the application of interrupted time 
series models to assess the impact of in-person early voting on turnout in municipal elections. I 
hypothesized that in-person early voting will have a positive effect on voter turnout in municipal 
elections. In this chapter, I present the results.  
 I perform an interrupted time series model to assess the impact in-person early voting has 
on turnout in municipal elections. The model was sketched out in Chapter 4 and is reprinted below. 
Specifically, I expect in-person early voting to have an abrupt and permanent impact on voter 
turnout in municipal elections. The following section assesses this claim.  
 → 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent, and control variables over all the years 
in this study are presented in Table 5.1.  
Municipal Voter Turnout, Dependent Variable 
The average turnout for municipalities for all time periods, is 35 percent. The 2013 election 
year has the lowest average turnout among the municipalities (28%) while voter turnout in 2011  
  
In-Person  
Early Voting 
  
  
  
Voter Turnout in 
Municipal Elections 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables (N=6,566; n=938, T=7) 
Variable N Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Voter Turnout All 1,911 35.41 14.46 0 80.09 
Voter Turnout 2001 86 36.04 15.65 0 71.19 
Voter Turnout 2003 394 36.12 15.13 0 70.62 
Voter Turnout 2005 84 37.21 12.13 0 65.97 
Voter Turnout 2007 564 31.67 13.63 0 80.09 
Voter Turnout 2009 107 35.36 13.43 0 63.91 
Voter Turnout 2011 573 39.58 14.18 1.34 79.21 
Voter Turnout 2013 103 27.90 11.46 1.02 65.05 
      
Early Voting All 6,566 0.57 0.49 0 1 
Early Voting 2001, 2003, 2005 938 0 0 0 0 
Early Voting 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 938 1 0 1 1 
      
Institutional Structure Variables      
Mayor Administrative Systems All* 6,566 0.88 0.33 0 1 
      
Manger Administrative Systems All* 6,566 0.78 0.27 0 1 
      
Partisan Elections All 6,566 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Partisan Elections 2001 938 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Partisan Elections 2003 938 0.75 0.26 0 1 
Partisan Elections 2005 938 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Partisan Elections 2007 938 0.59 0.24 0 1 
Partisan Elections 2009 938 0.13 0.11 0 1 
Partisan Elections 2011 938 0.51 0.22 0 1 
Partisan Elections 2013 938 0.01 0.09 0 1 
      
Local Context Variables      
Percent Bachelor Degree All 6,552 10.51 8.49 0 50.81 
Percent Bachelor Degree 2001 936 9.77 8.17 0 44.84 
Percent Bachelor Degree 2003 936 10.01 8.15 0 44.92 
Percent Bachelor Degree 2005 936 10.26 8.21 0 45.00 
Percent Bachelor Degree 2007 936 10.51 8.34 0 45.08 
Percent Bachelor Degree 2009 936 10.75 8.54 0 45.73 
Percent Bachelor Degree 2011 936 11.01 8.80 0 48.27 
Percent Bachelor Degree 2013 936 11.29 9.09 0 50.81 
Results are rounded, *These variables are time invariant, so only the overall statistics are presented. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Continued  
Variable N Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Median Income All 6,552 50,528.71 24,785.52 7,427.50 326,001.80 
Median Income 2001 936 49,945.46 19,170.38 20,875.00 214,001.10 
Median Income 2003 936 54,028.26 21,511.21 18,875.00 242,001.30 
Median Income 2005 936 58,111.06 23,894.22 16,875.00 270,001.50 
Median Income 2007 936 62,193.86 26,307.94 14,875.00 298,001.70 
Median Income 2009 936 66,276.67 28,744.65 12,875.00 326,001.80 
Median Income 2011 936 29,531.44 9,270.95 7,427.50 95,575.00 
Median Income 2013 936 33,614.25 10,784.97 12,258.50 114,193.00 
      
Percent White All 6,559 93.26 11.77 0.98 100 
Percent White 2001 937 94.37 10.77 0.98 100 
Percent White 2003 937 94.00 11.03 1.14 100 
Percent White 2005 937 93.63 11.33 1.30 100 
Percent White 2007 937 93.26 11.66 1.46 100 
Percent White 2009 937 92.90 12.04 1.62 100 
Percent White 2011 937 92.52 12.44 1.78 100 
Percent White 2013 937 92.14 12.86 1.94 100 
      
Municipal Population All 6,562 7,982.63 33,931.68 27 782,498.60 
Municipal Population 2001 938 8,005.02 33,988.86 29 710,016.00 
Municipal Population 2003 938 7,991.41 33,925.93 28 716,825.00 
Municipal Population 2005 935 7,991.23 33,750.91 28 718,752.00 
Municipal Population 2007 938 7,962.54 33,815.27 28 736,359.00 
Municipal Population 2009 938 7,998.35 34,404.48 27 757,435.00 
Municipal Population 2011 938 7,958.52 33,7400.03 36 780,288.00 
Municipal Population 2013 937 7,971.35 33,999.75 36 792,498.60 
      
Campaign Variables      
Closeness All 2,219 37.86 40.53 0 100 
Closeness 2001 102 40.23 39.95 0 100 
Closeness 2003 503 42.13 41.61 0 100 
Closeness 2005 98 42.00 40.63 0 100 
Closeness 2007 628 35.32 39.82 0 100 
Closeness 2009 124 40.67 41.48 0 100 
Closeness 2011 648 35.79 39.82 0 100 
Closeness 2013 116 35.95 41.77 0 100 
      
Ballot Measures All 6,566 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Ballot Measures 2001, 2003, 2005, 
2007, 2013 
938 0 0 0 0 
Ballot Measures 2009, 2011 938 1 0 1 1 
Results are rounded, *These variables are time invariant, so only the overall statistics are presented. 
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election has the highest average voter turnout among the municipalities (40%). The large turnout 
in 2011 election is not surprising since there was a highly salient ballot initiative on the ballot.55 
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the variables that includes the between and within 
components specific for panel data. Examining municipal voter turnout, the average voter turnout 
for each municipality varied between zero and 69 percent. The ‘within’ numbers refers to the 
standard deviation around each municipality’s average. This number is added into the overall 
mean. As stated above, the overall mean for municipal voter turnout is 35 percent. Some 
municipalities deviated from their average by 5 percent, or had 30 percent voter turnout.   
Table 5.2 Summary of Variables  
Variable N Mean Std Dev. Min Max T-bar 
Turnout       
Overall 1911 35.41 14.462 0 80.09  
Between 732  12.191 0 69.27  
Within   8.878 5.148 77.49 2.61 
       
Early Voting       
Overall 6566 0.571 0.495 0 1  
Between 938  0 0.571 0.571  
Within   0.495 0 1 7 
       
Institutional Structure Variables       
Mayor Admin Systems       
Overall 6566 0.878 0.327 0 1  
Between 938  0.327 0 1  
Within   0 0.878 0.878 7 
       
Manger Admin Systems 6566 0.078 0.268 0 1  
Overall 938  0.268 0 1  
Between   0 0.078 0.078 7 
Within       
 
 
 
                                                 
55 In 2009, there was a statewide gaming initiative on the ballot. If passed, it would allow for casinos to be built in 
Ohio. Going into the 2011 election, the Ohio General Assembly passed a bill that would limit the collective 
bargaining rights of public employees. Citizens collected enough signatures to place a repeal of the law on the ballot 
(knows as SB5). If passed, the law that limited collective bargaining rights of public employees would be repealed.  
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Table 5.2 Summary of Variables Continued 
Variable N Mean Std Dev. Min Max T-bar 
Partisan Elections       
Overall 6566 0.0317 0.175 0 1  
Between 938  0.102 0 0.857  
Within   0.142 -0.825 0.889 7 
       
Local Context Variables       
Percent Bachelor Degree       
Overall 6552 10.514 8.488 0 50.81  
Between 936  8.328 0 45.08  
Within   1.656 -8.62 29.85 7 
       
Median Income       
Overall 6552 50528.71 24785.52 7427.5 326001.80  
Between 936  19501.62 20589.29 218001.10  
Within   15308.74 -93472.29 158529.40 7 
       
Percent White       
Overall 6559 93.259 11.772 0.98 100  
Between 937  11.663 1.46 100  
Within   1.633 70.879 115.639 7 
       
Population        
Overall 6562 7,982.629 33931.68 27 792498.60  
Between 938  33891.40 32.286 744596.20  
Within   1762.346 -35312.14 55884.97 6.99 
       
Campaign Variables       
Closeness       
Overall 2,219 37.86 40.53 0 100  
Between 780  29.83 0 100  
Within   28.75 -34.07 112.86 2.84 
       
Ballot Measures       
Overall 6,566 0.29 0.45 0 1  
Between 938  0 0.29 0.29  
Within   0.45 0 1 7 
Results are rounded 
 
The large differences between minimum and maximum values of turnout suggest there are 
differences in turnout across municipalities and over time. The minimum values of turnout stay 
roughly the same until 2011 and 2013, then there is a slight increase. The 2007 election, one 
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municipality had 80 percent turnout. A close second, was the 2011 election with at least one 
municipality having 79 percent turnout. The maximum values suggest that some municipalities 
may have substantially higher turnout in mayoral elections than other municipalities. Overall, 
municipal voter turnout in Ohio over the years of this study is normally distributed, as 
demonstrated by Figure 5.1.  
Figure 5.1 Histogram of Municipalities by Voter Turnout
 
Source: Ohio’s County Boards of Elections 
 
Early Voting, Independent Variable 
The mean municipal voter turnout for elections both before and after the implementation 
of early voting provides interesting and useful insight to the influence it has on voter turnout in 
municipal elections. As indicated by Table 5.3, prior to early voting, the mean municipal voter 
turnout for elections was 36 percent. After the implementation of early voting, the mean municipal 
voter turnout for elections was 35 percent. Municipal voter turnout is lower after the 
implementation of early voting by one percent. This suggests that early voting has a negative 
impact on voter turnout in municipal elections, which is contrary to what I hypothesized.  
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 20 40 60 80
Voter Turnout
121 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Voter Turnout Averages Before and After Early Voting 
 N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Before Early Voting 564 36.29 14.79 0 71.19 
After Early Voting 1,347 35.04 14.31 0 80.09 
Results are rounded 
Control Variables 
 The average Ohio municipality has a population of 7,982 and a median income of $50,529. 
The majority of municipalities have highly homogenous populations with regard to race. On 
average, 93 percent of the municipal population was white while 11 percent of the municipal 
population over 18 held at least a bachelor degree.  
The majority of the municipalities have mayor-council systems (approximately 87 
percent). The second largest administrative structure is the council-manager system 
(approximately 8 percent). The remaining 5 percent are the adaptive administrative systems.  On 
average, only three percent of municipalities conducted partisan elections during the years of this 
study. This is not surprising since Ohio law requires municipalities to conduct nonpartisan 
elections.56  
Often there was only one mayoral candidate on the ballot. Over all the seven elections 
included in this study, there were 1,123 mayoral races where a candidate ran unopposed. The 
closeness of mayoral races averaged 38 percent. Since the percentage is relatively low, it means 
that on average the mayoral races were not extremely competitive. In this study, there were 96 
mayoral races where victor won by less than three percent, meaning the mayoral race was 
extremely competitive and the winning candidate won by a slim margin. The large differences 
between minimum and maximum values of competition (0 to 100) suggest that there are large 
differences in competitiveness of mayoral races across municipalities and over time. 
                                                 
56 The exception is a change in the municipal charter. 
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Missing Data 
The overall number of observations in the population is 6,566. 57 However, the number of 
observations include in the sample is 1,806. The difference is due to the inability to collect voter 
turnout data form some CBoEs. In the analysis, the observations without turnout data are dropped. 
This can be problematic if the missing data is not missing at random.  
In this case, the data is not missing at random. There is a systematic bias in the missing 
data. Municipalities with missing turnout data and municipalities without missing turnout data 
were significantly different in population, the percent of municipality’s population that is white, 
and percent of a municipality’s population over 18 with at least a bachelor degree.58 Municipalities 
with missing turnout data are smaller, less educated, and are more white. Less populated, less 
sophisticated, more homogenous areas of Ohio were more difficult to obtain data from. The CBoEs 
in these areas often had less staff, limited resources, lack of electronic files, inability to have files 
on their website, etc. This may be a cause for concern for the generalizability of the results. 
However, this is the first cut at such an analysis. In other words, the data in this study provides a 
starting point to assess the impact of in-person early voting on voter turnout in municipal elections. 
There are methods to for handling missing data, and these will be taken into account in future 
analyses.  
Modeling Strategy   
 I employ a fixed effects regression model. By doing so, I can examine panel data as a before 
and after experiment - where the “before” is the control group and the “after” is the treatment 
group. In the fixed effect model I use, it fixes, or holds constant, the average effects of each 
                                                 
57 N=n*t. Where n=938, t=7, N=(938*7)=6,566 
58 Appendix B contains the T-Test results  
123 
 
 
 
municipality.59 It creates a dummy variable for each municipality, which controls for the average 
differences across municipalities for any observed or unobserved variables, such as political 
culture of a municipality. It assumes that each municipality has its own characteristics that may or 
may not influence the dependent variable, municipal voter turnout. And this influence on the 
dependent variable is fixed across time. By doing this, it absorbs between-group effects and leaves 
within-group effects; therefore, reducing the threat of omitted variable bias.  
 In a panel fixed effect model, it typically drops time-invariant variables because they are 
fixed over both time and observations. In my data this would include two control variables: 
manager and mayor administrative systems. The effects of the dropped variables, such as mayor 
and manager administrative structure, are absorbed into the residuals of the fixed effect model 
thereby controlling for time-invariant differences between municipalities. While these variables 
are not my main variable of interest, they are important as they influence turnout in municipal 
elections. I opt to conduct a fixed effect model by using the xi: reg command in Stata versus the 
xtreg, so I can include these time-invariant variables in my analysis. The xi: reg command in Stata 
is much like the fixed effects panel regression that is done with the xtreg, fe command. The xtreg, 
fe command suppresses the output for the municipal dummies while the xi: reg command reports 
them. The xi: reg command functions much like an OLS regression (reg command) except that it 
includes a dummy variable for each municipality, thereby controlling for differences between 
municipalities and unobserved variables. To simply use an OLS regression, the results would likely 
be biased as there would likely be omitted variables, such as the within municipal effects and/or 
time effects. The xi: reg command can also control for both entity (municipalities) and time 
                                                 
59 Fixed effects models drop cases with only one observation, which is the case with my model as well.  
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(election years) fixed effects. This is an important distinction as I can control for differences not 
only between municipalities but also differences between election years.    
Fixed Effects Model Diagnostics  
Using the fixed effects model, I ran diagnostic tests. First, I test for heteroskedasticity. I 
conduct Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test, which tests for heteroskedasticity in fixed effects 
regression models. The null hypothesis is constant variance (homoscedasticity). Given the test 
results, I reject the null hypothesis; there is heteroskedasticity (χ2=19.96, p=0.000). I correct for 
heteroskedasticity in my fixed effect model. In Stata, this is adding robust to the end of the 
regression command. To check the model for autocorrelation, I conducted a Wooldridge test. The 
null hypothesis is no first order autocorrelation. The results indicate that I fail to reject the null; I 
do not have first order autocorrelation (F=1.266, p=0.2658). The fixed effects models correcting 
for heteroskedasticity results are in Table 5.4 below.  
Results 
The results of the fixed effects regression model are in Table 5.4. First, and of interest to 
this study, the analysis reveals that in-person early voting has a significant negative impact on 
municipal voter turnout. The direction of influence has remained the same in all models and is 
consistent with the correlation matrix.60 In the election years with in-person early voting, municipal 
turnout drops by 4.52 percentage points. While this is not what I hypothesized, the results are 
consistent with the literature on in-person early voting and voter turnout in state and national 
elections (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007). The implications of this finding, as well 
as the other findings, are discussed in the following chapter. 
  
                                                 
60 See Appendix B for bivariate and OLS regressions and correlation matrix.  
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Table 5.4 Results of Fixed Effects Regression Model 
Variable Coefficient  Std Error 
Early Voting -4.52** 0.62 
   
Institutional Structure Variables    
Mayor Admin. Systems 19.15**  2.11 
Manager Admin. Systems -12.55  8.56 
Partisan Elections 0.69 1.05 
   
Local Contextual Variables    
Percent Bachelor  Degree -0.01 0.20 
Median Income -0.00 0.00 
Percent White -0.01 0.12 
Population 0.00 0.00 
   
Campaign Variables   
Closeness 0.17** 0.01 
Ballot Measures 7.83** 0.59 
   
Cons 31.49* 12.30 
Results are rounded  *p<.05  **p<.001, R² = .78, n = 1,806, F=(638,  1167) = 206.63 p=0.000 
 
In Figure 5.2, the average turnout is graphed over time. I anticipated an abrupt permanent 
increase in voter turnout after the implementation of in-person early voting. It is clear from Figure 
5.2, the impact of in-person early voting did not have an abrupt permanent increase in voter 
turnout. Rather it appears to have a gradual permanent decrease in voter turnout. After the 
implementation of early voting, turnout declined dramatically. In 2007, the first year to utilize 
early voting, turnout was 6 percent lower than turnout in 2005. In 2009 and 2011, there is a sudden 
increase in voter turnout. However, this increase is not likely because of early voting alone, but 
due to highly salient ballot measures. In 2009, there was a gaming initiative and in 2011 there was 
a labor initiative on the ballot in Ohio. Both of these measures were highly salient. As Table 5.4 
indicates, early voting has a negative effect on turnout even after controlling for these ballot 
measures. In 2013, there is a steep decline in turnout as well. It is 12 percent lower than turnout in 
the previous municipal election and 9 percent lower than the last election before early voting. 
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                      Source: Ohio County Boards of Elections 
The only institutional structures variable that was significant was mayor administrative 
systems. Mayor administrative systems have a significant positive effect on turnout. Localities 
with mayor administrative systems have an increase in turnout by 19.15 percentage points.  
The campaign variables are both significant and positive. The effect of closeness, or the 
competitiveness of the mayoral race, is small in magnitude. As competition in mayoral races 
increases, municipal voter turnout increases as well. Specifically, the model predicts that a one 
percent increase in competition (increases towards 100%) increases turnout by .17 percentage 
points. This is also consistent with the literature on competitive races and turnout; the more 
competitive the race, the higher the turnout. Interestingly, ballot measures are large in magnitude 
and significant. Highly salient ballot proposals increased turnout by 7.83 percentage points.   
Summary of Findings 
 The purpose of the chapter was to determine if in-person early voting impacted municipal 
voter turnout. Specifically, I hypothesized that in-person early voting would have a significant 
positive impact on municipal voter turnout. However, the fixed effects regression results indicate 
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that in-person early voting has a significant negative relationship on municipal voter turnout. This 
finding is consistent with other scholarship on in-person early voting. Others have found that in-
person early voting has a no significant impact on turnout (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein 
1998; Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Neeley and 
Richardson 2001) or a negative impact on turnout (Gronke Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007).  
Conclusion  
 This project begins to address the question: does in-person early voting impact municipal 
voter turnout? By examining local elections in non concurrent years (odd numbered years), I was 
able to isolate the effects of in-person early voting in local elections. The findings of my analysis 
reveal that in-person early voting has a significant negative impact on municipal voter turnout, 
which did not support my hypothesis. However, the results are consistent with the literature on in-
person early voting in national and state elections. The following chapter summarizes my findings 
and discusses their implications.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: 
DOES EARLY VOTING IMPACT VOTER TURNOUT IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS?  
  
The objective of this research was to examine the effects of in-person early voting on 
turnout in municipal elections. This project contributes to the understanding of election laws and 
local elections. It is different from previous early voting studies because it focused on the 
municipality. By doing so, I could include the features of municipalities that influence voter 
turnout in municipal elections. Previous studies do not include these characteristics. The results 
provide insight on the effect of early voting when focusing exclusively on turnout in municipal 
elections. In this chapter, I summarize the findings from Chapter 5, discuss the implication of my 
findings, and suggest directions for future research.    
Summary of Findings 
 This research project set out to answer a simple question: does early voting impact voter 
turnout in municipal elections? I hypothesized that in-person early voting would have a significant 
positive impact on municipal voter turnout. However, the findings suggest that in-person early 
voting has a significant negative impact on voter turnout in municipal elections.  
My fixed effects model, which includes variables measuring early voting, institutional 
structure, local context, and campaigns, explains 78 percent of the variation in voter turnout in 
municipal elections, F (638, 1167) = 206.63, p<0.0000. Many variables have no statistically 
significant effects, including manager administrative systems, partisan elections, or local context. 
The two campaign variables and mayor administrative systems all have a strong, positive effect 
on municipal turnout: having close mayoral races β= 19.15, p <0.001, having highly salient ballot 
initiatives β = 7.83, p<0.001, and having mayor administrative systems β=0.17, p<0.001. Early 
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voting has a strong negative effect on turnout in municipal elections, β = -4.52, p<0.001. This 
finding is robust. The negative effect is large and could over time substantially decrease turnout in 
local elections.  
Turnout  
Turnout in local elections is abysmal (Sharp 2003; Krebs 2014). This is concerning since 
voter turnout is often used as an indicator for the overall health of a democracy. In Caren’s (2007) 
analysis of turnout in big cities (populations 500,000+), he revealed that turnout in large cities 
could reach lows of five percent and averaged 27 percent. Voter turnout in Ohio municipal 
elections are no different. Ohio municipal elections averaged 35 percent voter turnout, slightly 
higher than what Caren found in the large cities. But, in some elections, municipal voter turnout 
in Ohio reached a low of less than one percent. Three times during the scope of this study a 
municipality has turnout less than one percent. And, six times turnout was zero percent, meaning 
there was a mayoral election held, but there were no candidates on the ballot.61 Turnout such as 
this creates serious concern over the health of local democracies.  
On a more positive side, municipal voter turnout between municipalities ranged from 12 
percent to 69 percent. Occasionally, municipal voter turnout reached a high of 80 percent. There 
were eight mayoral elections where turnout was 70 percent or higher. In each of these eight cases, 
the population of the municipality was less than 7,000. While such high turnout is not the norm, 
per se, for municipal elections, it may be that smaller municipalities, which are often excluded in 
local/urban studies,62 are healthier than the larger municipalities.   
                                                 
61 No candidates filed for the position. 
62 When scholars study local/urban elections, there is a tendency to focus on big cities (See Caren 2007). The 
studies that do include smaller municipalities, like this one, tend to me individual level analysis (see Oliver).  
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Determinants of Turnout 
 I found that mayor administrative systems have significant positive impacts on turnout in 
municipal elections, which is consistent with other studies on municipal structures (Caren 2007; 
Wood 2002). Mayoral elections tend to be much more political and high profile. Mayors also run 
campaigns like higher levels of office. So it is not surprising that turnout is higher.  
Most mayors in Ohio are nonpartisan, yet the local political parties often play a large role 
in disseminating information about their candidate to voters. For instance, the City of Toledo, in 
Lucas County, has a mayor who is nonpartisan according to Ohio law. Yet, the City of Toledo is 
a highly Democratic municipality; it is common for most mayoral candidates to claim affiliation 
with the Democrat Party. As a result, the local Democratic Party will endorse a candidate. By 
doing so, the local Democratic Party will make phone calls, knock on doors, air media ads, etc. to 
help ensure that the endorsed Democrat mayoral candidate is elected mayor over the other 
Democratic candidates. The political situation in the City of Toledo illustrates that while elections 
may be nonpartisan, political parties can still play a large role in motivating individuals to the 
polls. This study did not explicitly examine this phenomena, but it gives support to the findings of 
mayor administrative systems. Mayor administrative systems can have a more exciting election, 
more resources can be spent, and more media attention can be given to them, which only in turn 
helps keep the citizens informed and later mobilizes them to vote.  
These local context variables examine the long lived debate about what features are best 
promote participation in local government. On the one side, it is argued that small, homogenous 
municipalities are best. The other side advocates for large, heterogeneous municipalities. I used 
some of the demographic variables suggested by Alfred and Lee (1968) to measure the 
heterogeneity of a municipality.  
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In my model, I found that none of the local contextual variables had a significant impact 
on municipal voter turnout. In Caren’s (2007) study of the 38 largest cities in the U.S., when he 
included a measure for competitiveness of mayoral races, the local contextual variables statistical 
significance disappeared. This suggests that the campaign variables may be a better indicator of 
local turnout than local contextual variables. That is likely what is happening in my model. If more 
studies on localities, and municipalities in particular, are conducted that include campaign 
variables, it may be that the local context variables are not as explanatory as once believed.  
Few studies on voter turnout have combined measures of campaign contexts, such as 
closeness of races and election laws, together (Tolbert and Franko 2014). Accounting for campaign 
activity in local races is important to fully understand the implications of election laws such as 
early voting. The closeness measure in my study reveals that the more competitive the race 
between mayoral candidates, the higher the turnout. Others have similar findings on the 
relationship between competitiveness and voter turnout (Caren 2007; Hill and Leighley 1999; 
Lublin and Tate 1995). It is important to keep in mind that the campaign measures include both 
closeness of a mayoral race and ballot measures. So to infer that only closeness or competition in 
an election matters is not appropriate. The closeness measure had a positive significant effect on 
turnout, β = 0.17. Ballot measures had a significant positive effect on municipal voter turnout, β = 
7.83. This is not surprising as voter turnout studies have shown ballot initiatives increase voter 
turnout elections (Grummel 2008; Tolbert, Grummel and Smith 2001).  
While I control for mayoral races’ competitiveness, I do not include information on party 
or candidate involvement in the election – primarily because the information at the local level is 
difficult, if not almost impossible, to obtain. Stein, Owens, and Leighley (2003) indicate that in-
person early voting increases turnout when the parties and campaigns incorporate early voting into 
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their campaigns (22). Similarly, Oliver (1996) notes that early voting along with strong 
mobilization efforts increase voter turnout (510). In- person early voting may have a positive 
influence on local elections when there are competitive races coupled with mobilization efforts 
form campaigns and political parties.  
 While my results are not what I hypothesized, it is consistent with other studies on in-
person early voting. Much of the previous work on in-person early voting suggests that it has no 
significant impact on turnout (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein 1998; Stein and Garcia-Monet 
1997; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Neeley and Richardson 2001). One study, 
like mine, found that in-person early voting had a negative impact on turnout (Gronke Galanes-
Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007). These studies taken collectively suggest that in-person early voting 
may not be an effective approach to increase voter turnout, and in some types of elections, it may 
be detrimental to voter turnout.  
Interestingly, the results of my study conflict with prior studies on vote by mail systems 
and turnout in local elections. I can't compare apples to oranges per se, because vote by mail is 
different than in-person early voting. However, the idea that local elections are the biggest 
benefactors of early voting is a shared theme among scholars. The findings from this research 
suggest that 1) the type of election law may matter and 2) how we study local elections is 
paramount.  
Early Voting as a Public Policy  
Recall that proponents of early voting claim that it should increase voter turnout primarily 
because it reduces the costs of voting. However, the empirical expectation, that having early voting 
will yield higher turnout in elections ceteris paribus, has not always been supported by either of 
the two dominate early voting methods (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein and Garcia-Monet 
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1997; Neeley and Richardson 2001; Gronke Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Kousser and 
Mullin 2007). The expectation appears to be vote by mail laws as they have a positive impact on 
turnout in local elections (Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007). In the same way, 
I expected in-person early voting to increase turnout in municipal elections. Clearly this empirical 
expectation was not met in this study.  
The results of this study suggest that if the goal of early voting laws is to increase voter 
turnout, then the type of early voting law matters. In-person early voting studies have found 
consistent results: in-person early voting either has no effect on turnout or a negative impact on it. 
I am reluctant to suggest that in-person early voting is ineffective as more studies on other local 
governments should be done before such statements are made and acted on. However, if future 
studies on in-person early voting continue to reveal negative impacts or no impact, then a 
reevaluation of the law may need to happen.  
This study taken collectively with other in-person early voting studies also suggest there is 
more to elections than simply extending the duration of voting. The study of voter turnout entails 
examining how administrators organize and conduct elections as well as the laws that elected 
officials pass to govern them. Laws like early voting illustrate how fluid Election Day is. If in-
person early voting itself is not increasing voting turnout, and higher voter turnout is a goal, then 
laws that focus solely on the duration of voting period may not be effective. It might be that other 
types of election laws that lessen the costs associated with voting are more effective at increasing 
turnout, such as the place of polling locations (Gimple and Schuknecht 2003), or the types of places 
where individuals can vote, such non-traditional places like grocery stores (Stein and Garcia-
Monet 1997). Or that these laws coupled with in-person early voting that extends the voting period 
could create more opportunities for individuals to cast a ballot and yield higher turnout rates.  
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All in all, it underscores that there is no easy solution to the low voter turnout problem 
found in municipal elections. Finding alternative ways to hold elections or better ways to organize 
them may be fruitful as a policy solution. Continued research on other types of election laws that 
help alleviate the costs of voting in municipal elections may yield more promising results.  
The Study of Local Elections 
This study illustrates that how we study local elections is essential. While vote by mail 
studies have found a positive impact on voter turnout in local elections, localities were not the 
focus of the study. They were merely one of many variables included in the analysis. This begs 
the question: would similar results be found if localities were the unit of analysis in a vote by mail 
study? While the answer to this is outside the scope of this project, it highlights my point. To only 
include local elections as merely a variable ignores the importance and uniqueness of local 
governments and their elections. Localities are plentiful and diverse; this diversity helps scholars 
understand which contexts influence turnout in local elections. Incorporating these contextual 
aspects of municipalities in a study emphasizes the value of localities as a unit of analysis. This 
research takes into account the institutional and local contexts of municipalities as well as the 
dynamics of mayoral campaigns to determine the impact of in-person early voting on turnout in 
municipal elections. In doing so, it gives scholars, administrators, and the like, a better 
understanding of the impacts in-person early voting has on all levels of government.  
What Does It Mean for Local Elections? 
The ‘low voter turnout problem’ has plagued American elections for decades and is most 
apparent at the local level. The consistent low voter turnout in municipal elections has substantial 
consequences as voting confers not only legitimacy to the governing body, but also influences who 
is elected and the overall direction of public policies.  
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Since early voting is a statewide policy, governmental subunits, or local governments, must 
comply with it. The policy itself tends to be controversial, with many states seeking to reduce the 
number of days ballots can be cast (e.g. Ohio and Florida). While no direct connection can be made 
to indicate any political reasoning for changes in early voting laws, elections are nonetheless about 
winning and losing. The rules that govern the election, therefore, are often used for political gain.63 
Altering the laws that govern elections has consequences. For this reason, this study is essential to 
understand the effect early voting has on voter turnout in municipal elections.  
As the results from this study indicate, in-person early voting has a negative impact on 
municipal voter turnout. While on its face, in-person early voting appears as a viable solution to 
the low voter turnout problem, this may not be the case. If the goal of early voting is to increase 
voter turnout, then the findings from this study, and others, on in-person early voting are troubling. 
It is especially concerning for local elections in particular since they already have such low voter 
turnout. It may be that in-person early voting is not an effective way to increase voter turnout or 
alleviate the low voter turnout problem that plagues American elections. However, it would be 
unwise to jump to such broad conclusions without conducting more studies on in-person early 
voting. For instance, does in-person early voting have a similar effect on turnout in school board 
elections? County Board elections? Township elections? Or even state legislative elections? It is 
evident that more research should to be done. This study offers a glimpse into the effect of in-
person early voting in local elections.  
                                                 
63 Gerrymandering and malapportionment are examples of using the election laws to gain a political advantage. 
While gerrymandering is unconstitutional, it still occurs. In Texas, the 2003 Congressional redistricting was 
challenged since it added 5 Republican seats and allegedly diluted the minority vote.  
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Future Research  
While this study does not yield positive results for in-person early voting as a means to 
increase voter turnout in municipal elections, it does provide a glance into the impact early voting 
has on municipal elections. Future research should continue to examine the impact of in-person 
early voting, and other methods of early voting, on other local elections and in other contexts. 
What this study does reveal is that how we study local elections is important. Local elections 
should be the focus of these future studies, not merely a variable or measure in larger analyses on 
turnout. By doing so, scholars, administrators, and the like will gain a better understanding of the 
effects of early voting at all levels of government.  
 As previous research has illustrated, the institutional reforms put in place from the 
Progressive Era have reduced voter turnout in municipal elections (Caren 2007; Wood 2002). It 
would be interesting, and beneficial, to see if the impact of these reforms are mitigated by early 
voting. I included variables to capture these reform measures in this study, however, to examine if 
early voting offsets, per se, the impact of the reform measures was outside the scope of this study. 
A future analysis like this would be valuable. If early voting lessens the effect of these reform 
measures, it might be a solution for municipalities that are less political and more administrative 
in nature.  
 Early voting extends the duration of the voting period. By doing so, the nature of political 
campaigns would change to include the longer voting period. For instance, Get Out The Vote 
(GOTV) programs would be extended since Election Day can last for 35 days (e.g. Ohio’s early 
voting period). The natural deduction from this would entail changes in campaign strategy, 
campaign spending, media campaigns, etc. for any candidate, including local mayoral candidates 
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and/or council candidates. These areas of local elections are already understudied (Krebs 2014). 
However, it would be interesting to explore how early voting alters local campaigns.  
 The title of this dissertation asks if early voting impacts local elections. The answer to this, 
at least at the municipal level, is yes, but not positively. If democracy rests on the consent of the 
governed, and this consent is given by casting a ballot, then this study paints a devastating picture 
for local democracies in states with in-person early voting. Yet, this is one study on a particular 
type of locality. I hope future research continues to investigate the effects of early voting laws so 
that scholars, administrators, elected officials, and the like gain a better understanding of them and 
their impacts on voter turnout in all types of elections.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table 1: Demographics of Ohio and the United States 
 % 
Bachelor 
Degree 
% 
White 
% 
Black 
Median 
Income 
2000 
Presidential 
Vote 
2004 
Presidential 
Vote 
2008 
Presidential 
Vote 
2012 
Presidential 
Vote 
Ohio 24.1% 83.6% 12.4% $47,358 Republican Republican Democrat Democrat 
United 
States 
27.9% 78.1% 13.1% $51,914 Republican Republican Democrat Democrat 
* Data taken from 2010 U.S. Census, FEC Election Results, and Secretary of State Offices 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Demographics of Ohio Counties and Neighboring States 
Data taken from 2010 U.S. Census, FEC Election Results, and Secretary of State Offices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 % 
Bachelor 
Degree 
% 
White 
% 
Black 
Median 
Income 
2000 
Presidential 
Vote 
2004 
Presidential 
Vote 
2008 
Presidential 
Vote 
2012 
Presidential 
Vote 
Lucas County, OH 
Michigan  
23% 
25% 
76% 
80.2% 
19.4% 
14.3% 
$42,072 
$48,432 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Hamilton County, OH 
Kentucky 
32.5% 
20.3% 
69.7% 
88.9% 
25.8% 
8% 
$48,234 
$41,576 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Democrat 
Republican 
 
Republican 
Washington County, OH 
West Virginia  
16% 
17.3% 
96.5% 
94.1% 
1.2% 
3.5% 
$41,654 
$30,380 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
 
Republican 
Mahoning County, OH 
Pennsylvania 
20.4% 
26.4% 
81.1% 
83.8% 
16.1% 
11.3% 
$40,123 
$50,398 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
 
Democrat 
Butler County, OH 
Indiana  
25.9% 
22.4% 
87.5% 
86.8% 
7.7% 
9.4% 
$54,788 
$47,697 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Democrat 
 
Republican 
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APPENDIX B 
Missing Data T-Tests 
T-Test Results, Municipal Population for Missing Turnout and Non-Missing Turnout Groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 4,651 7388.86 441.35 30099.49    
Non-Missing 1,911 9427.75 955.97 41790    
     6,560 -2.21 0.027 
Results are rounded, Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test Results, Percent Bachelor Degree for Missing Turnout and Non-Missing Turnout Groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 4,644 10.14 0.12 8.40    
Non-Missing 1,908 11.42 0.20 8.62    
     6,550 -5.54 0.000 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test Results, Percent White for Missing Turnout and Non-Missing Turnout Groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 4,648 93.61 0.17 11.26    
Non-Missing 1,911 92.39 0.30 12.90    
     6,557 3.82 0.000 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test Results, Median Income for Missing Turnout and Non-Missing Turnout Groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std Deviation DF t p 
Missing 4,641 50,747.22 356.80 23,307.14    
Non-Missing 1,911 49,998.05 592.69 25,909.45    
     6,550 1.11 0.266 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Population in 2001 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 8690.899 1384.427 16899.09    
Non-Missing 789 7875.494 1293.418 36330.99    
     936 0.2684 0.7884 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
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T-Test on Population in 2003 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 8694.121 1371.722 16744    
Non-Missing 789 7858.703 1291.404   36274.42    
     936 0.2755 0.7830   
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Population in 2005 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 8707.852 1355.722 16548.7    
Non-Missing 786 7855.379 1287.833 36105.29    
     933 0.2825 0.7776 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Population in 2007 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 8862.993 1345.612 16425.29    
Non-Missing 789 7792.497 1287.964 36177.81    
     936 0.3542 0.7232 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Population in 2009 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 8910.067 1342.802 16390.99    
Non-Missing 789 7826.171 1311.37 36835.27    
     936 0.3525 0.7245 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Population in 2011 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 8923.537 1297.231 15834.72    
Non-Missing 789 7776.284 1286.737 36143.34    
     936 0.3805 0.7037 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
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T-Test on Population in 2013 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 8912.096 1293.706 15791.7    
Non-Missing 788 7793.467 1298.058 36438.24    
     935 
 
0.3681 0.7129 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2001 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 10.47608 .7966591 9.691776    
Non-Missing 788 9.633997 .279879 7.856578    
     934 1.1501 0.2504 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2003 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 10.69446 .7913029 9.626615    
Non-Missing 788 9.885749 .2793946 7.84298    
     934 1.1077 0.2683 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2005 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 10.91284 .7905718 9.617721    
Non-Missing 788 10.1375 .2818727 7.912543    
     934 1.0549 0.2918 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2007 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 11.13122 .7944786 9.66525    
Non-Missing 788 10.38925 .2872366 8.063115    
     934 0.9936 0.3207 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
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T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2009 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 11.34959 .8029557 9.768378    
Non-Missing 788 10.641 .2953291 8.290284    
     934 0.9262 0.3546   
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2011 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 11.58736 .8139223 9.901792    
Non-Missing 788 10.90202 .3055038 8.575901    
     934 0.8695 0.3848   
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2013 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 11.84453    .8267871   10.0583    
Non-Missing 788 11.18152   .3170369 8.89965    
     934 0.8140 0.4159 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Median Income in 2001 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 51480.72 1735.655   21115.15    
Non-Missing 788 49657.11 669.1249 18783.23    
     934 1.0619 0.2886 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Median Income in 2003 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 55793.31 1925.744 23427.69    
Non-Missing 788 53696.75 752.776 21131.43    
     934 1.0880 0.2769 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
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T-Test on Median Income in 2005 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 60105.9 2119.338 25782.86    
Non-Missing 788 57736.4   837.907 23521.17    
     934 1.1071 0.2686 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Median Income in 2007 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 64418.48 2315.557 28169.97    
Non-Missing 788 61776.04    924.109   25940.98    
     934 1.1213 0.2624   
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Median Income in 2009 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 68731.07    2513.788 30581.55    
Non-Missing 788 65815.69 1011.108 28383.16    
     934 1.1323 0.2578 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Median Income in 2011 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 29917.78   916.0748 11144.53    
Non-Missing 788 29458.88 316.3918 8881.541    
     934 0.5523 0.5809 
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
 
T-Test on Median Income in 2013 for Missing and Non-Missing groups 
Group N Mean Std Error Std 
Deviation 
DF t p 
Missing 149 34230.37 1048.634 12757.18    
Non-Missing 788 33498.53 369.7065 10378.16    
     934 0.7573 0.4491   
Equal variances assumed p>0.05 
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Results of Bivariate Regression  
Variable Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
P Value 
Early Voting -1.249 0.725 0.085 
Cons 36.289** 0.609 0.000 
Results are rounded n=1,905   *p<.05  **p<.001   R²=0.0016 
 
 
Results of OLS Multivariate Regression  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error P Value 
Early Voting -4.24 0.68 0.000 
    
Institutional Variables     
Mayor Admin. Systems 4.44 1.41 0.002 
Manager Admin. Systems -0.28 1.92 0.885 
Partisan Elections -0.03 0.91 0.970 
    
Local Contextual Variables     
Percent Bachelor  Degree 0.35 0.04 0.000 
Median Income -0.00 0.00 0.433 
Percent White 0.11 0.02 0.000 
Population -0.00 6.69e-06 0.000 
    
Campaign Variables    
Closeness 0.18 0.01 0.000 
Ballot Measures 7.50 0.74 0.000 
    
Cons 11.40 2.46 0.000 
Results are rounded n=1,806   *p<.05  **p<.001   R²=0.3566 
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ABSTRACT 
 
ELECTION REFORM: DOES EARLY VOTING IMPACT TURNOUT IN MUNICIPAL 
ELECTIONS? 
by 
GAYLE ALBERDA 
August 2014 
Advisor: Dr. Brady Baybeck 
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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
Turnout in the United States is low, especially in municipal elections. Early voting laws, 
which have been adopted by over half of the states within the United States, offer voters a chance 
to cast a ballot over a longer period of time thereby lowering the cost of voting. Early voting 
includes no excuse absentee voting, in person early voting, and/or vote by mail elections. Many of 
the previous studies on early voting have focused on national or statewide elections. What has 
been largely understudied is the impact of early voting laws on voter turnout in municipal elections, 
where voter turnout is the lowest. Previous early voting studies that have included municipal 
elections in their analysis have examined vote by mail laws or only examined in person early 
voting only in the year it was implemented leaving unanswered questions on the impact of in 
person early voting laws on voter turnout in municipal elections over time. Additionally, many of 
the studies on early voting and voter turnout in municipal elections have not included the 
institutional and local contextual factors of municipalities; important features when studying 
municipal elections as previous research indicates that these contextual factors impact voter 
turnout. In contrast to previous studies, this project seeks to determine how early voting laws, in 
particular in person early voting, influence political participation in municipal elections when 
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accounting for the institutional and local contexts of municipalities. Using data collected from 938 
cities in Ohio, I conduct an interrupted time series analysis to examine the impact of early voting 
laws on voter turnout in municipal elections. I find that in-person early voting has a significant 
negative effect on voter turnout in municipal elections. This finding is consistent with other studies 
that have found in-person early voting laws have not increased voter turnout in national or 
statewide elections. This suggests that early voting laws alone may not be an adequate solution to 
the low voter turnout problem found in municipal elections.  
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